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ABSTRACT 




The dissertation develops and tests a new theory to explain intergroup cooperation and outgroup 
discrimination. The theoretical part specifies under what conditions ethnic differences undermine 
public goods provision and exacerbate ethnic discrimination. It posits that people cooperate more 
with and discriminate less against the groups expected to reciprocate cooperative behavior. 
Conditional cooperators rationally update their group stereotypes based on their experience with 
the groups’ individual members. This change in turn reduces prejudice and discrimination. I 
tested observable implications of the model on a representative sample of more than 400 slum-
dwellers in Mumbai. The field research in India combined laboratory experiments, an original 
survey, and interviews. Once I manipulated expectations of reciprocity, ethnically heterogeneous 
groups produced as much public goods as the homogeneous ones. The experimental treatment 
also radically increased trust and reduced ethnic discrimination of the generally mistrusted 
Muslim minority. The survey analysis compared the real-life effect of reciprocity with prominent 
alternative explanations from the literature. Compared to other factors, positive reciprocity 
provides a powerful explanation of why people choose to discriminate against some, but not 
other ethnic groups. The cross-national chapter of the dissertation extends the analysis beyond 
India. Using surveys from 87 countries, it shows that generalized trust moderates the negative 
effect of ethnic diversity on people’s willingness to contribute to public goods. 
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 On the night of January 8, 1993, a Hindu family of six was sleeping in a simple 
room at Radhabai Chawl, in a Muslim slum in northern Bombay. In the middle of night, 
someone blocked their door and threw a petrol bomb in through the window. The whole 
family perished in the blazing fire that would soon spread out and turn the cosmopolitan 
metropolis into an inferno. One of the victims was a handicapped teenage girl. Stirred by 
an unfounded rumor that the handicapped Hindu girl was gang-raped by the same 
Muslim men who later set her and her parents on fire, a Hindu mob assembled and started 
to massacre Muslims across the city. A New York-based writer Suketu Mehta interviewed 
some of the rioters for his Pulitzer finalist book Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found. 
This is how Sunil, a Hindu rioter, remembers one of their gruesome murders (Mehta 
2004, 39): 
“We met a pavwallah on the highway, on a bicycle. I knew him; he used to sell me 
bread every day. I set him on fire. We poured petrol on him and set him on fire. 
All I thought was, This is a Muslim. He was shaking. He was crying, 'I have 
children, I have children!' I said , 'When your Muslims were killing the Radhabai 
Chawl people, did you think of your children?'” 
 Sunil's story of killing an acquaintance because of a collective identity seems to 
support the standard view of ethnic conflict as a principally inescapable phenomenon. 
Especially in the 1990s, this belief justified passivity of politicians in dealing with ethnic 
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conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. For example, former President 
Bill Clinton said about the crisis in the Balkans: “It’s tragic, it’s terrible, but their 
enmities go back five hundred years, some would say almost a thousand years.” 
However, despite making headlines by its extreme violence, ethnic conflict is in fact quite 
rare. One noteworthy analysis of ethnic violence in Africa concluded that only one for 
every two thousand pairs of ethnic groups with a potential of being in conflict actually 
fights (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Even when a conflict occurs, not everyone participates in 
it. While Sunil was setting a Muslim bread seller ablaze, other Hindus protected their 
Muslim friends and neighbors, very often at the risk of their own lives. An important 
question is also why the conflict opposed Marathi-speaking Hindus and Muslims, and not 
for example Hindus vs. Zaroastrian Parsis, or Marathi-speakers vs. Gujarati-speakers, or 
any other pair of ethnic groups inhabiting this populous city. 
 Some of the leading theories in social sciences overpredict conflict between 
groups and often underestimate the possibility of cooperation between strangers. 
Evolutionary biologists have originally have gone so far as to predict pro-social behavior 
only among blood relatives. According to the popular gene-centric approach, an 
individual engages in an altruistic behavior only if it ultimately helps other individuals 
with the same genes to procreate (Dawkins 1976). As the founding father of population 
genetics, J. B. S. Haldane, once famously said: “I will jump into the river to save two 
brothers or eight cousins” (Nowak and Sigmund 2007, 7). This intuition was later 
formalized in Hamilton's rule: Cooperation is favored by natural selection if the 
coefficient of genetic relatedness is higher than the cost/benefit ratio of the altruistic act 
(Hamilton 1996). 
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 Social psychologists acknowledge that solidarity is not necessarily limited by 
kinship. Instead, favoritism can be extended to culturally defined, yet still bounded units. 
Social identity theory (Turner 1975; Tajfel and Turner 1986) predicts that an individual 
should favor her fellow ingroup members over outgroup members even if groups have 
been created in an arbitrary way – for example by flipping a coin. Positive evaluation of 
the ingroup raises the member’s self-esteem and in turn maintains her identification with 
the group. Ingroup favoritism can manifest itself in the form of behavior (discrimination), 
attitudes (prejudice), or pure cognition (stereotype). More often than not, strong group 
attachment leads to political intolerance (Gibson and Gouws 2000), such as support for 
anti-immigration policies (Sniderman et al. 2004). According to this view, ethnic conflict 
naturally arises from incessant intergroup comparison and groups’ concern with their 
position relative to other groups rather than with absolute well-being (Horowitz 1985). 
 Social identity theory shares its belief in universal ingroup favoritism with 
primordialism – a historically influential but nowadays almost abandoned theory of 
ethnic politics. Primordialism claims that ethnic affinity is deeply rooted in history 
(Smith 1987) and essentially unchangeable by rational calculus or social interactions 
(Geertz 1973). Nations, such as Croats and Serbs, are consequently locked in a perennial 
conflict fueled by ancient hatred (Kaplan 1993). However, a more careful reading of 
history reveals that supposedly ancient hatreds and even national identities themselves 
are much more recent and fluid (Eller and Coughlan 1993; Fearon and Laitin 2000). 
Furthermore, primordialism can hardly explain considerable variation of intergroup 
conflict in time and space. The same groups sometimes fight each other in some places, 
while living peacefully in others. To use a classic example from the political science 
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literature, the very same tribes of Chewas and Tumbukas are political allies in Zambia 
and opponents in the neighboring Malawi (Posner 2004). Patterns of intergroup conflict 
and cooperation often vary even within the same polity. The bloody ethnic riots in 1992-
93 swept through the slums of the Indian city of Surat, while sparing Surat's old town 
(Varshney 2002). 
 Whereas social identity theory traces intergroup conflict to social categorization 
itself, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif et al. 1961) adds another condition: presence 
of a limited resource. According to realistic group conflict theory, hostility between 
groups arises when they compete for scarce resources and their interests are 
incompatible. The famous Robbers Cave Experiment, described in Sherif et al. (1961), 
demonstrated how vicious competition between two groups of 11 year-old boys desiring a 
summer camp trophy can become. In the realm of politics, conflicts usually occur over 
the scarce resources of patronage (Posner 2005) or high social status (Petersen 2002). In 
Posner’s account, ethno-political cleavages arise between groups large enough to form a 
minimum wining coalition capable of seizing scarce resources of patronage and political 
power in a country. Instead of political conflict being fueled by salient ethnic identities, 
electoral rules and other institutions determine which ethnic groups are big enough to 
become salient social categories. Petersen describes patterns of ethnic violence in western 
Ukraine during World War II. After this previously Polish territory was occupied by the 
Soviets in 1939, the low-status Ukrainian population gave way to their resentment of the 
former Polish elite and attacked Polish landowners and military colonists. Ethnic violence 
is portrayed here as emerging when a sudden change in power makes a previously 
underprivileged group believe that they can subordinate a high-status group. In addition 
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to power and status, hostility to minorities is sometimes driven also by economic 
concerns of the dominant group (Quillian 1995; Sniderman et al. 2004). 
 This dissertation proposes a new explanation of ethnic conflict and cooperation. It 
posits that people cooperate more with and, consequently, discriminate less against the 
groups expected to reciprocate cooperative behavior. Conditional cooperators rationally 
update their group stereotypes after experiencing reciprocity in interactions with the 
groups’ individual members. This change in turn reduces prejudice and discrimination. 
Chapter 1 outlines the new theory and derives its observable implications. Chapter 2 
describes the environment of Indian slums, in which the theory was tested 
experimentally. Chapter 3 focuses on the experiments themselves. Increasing 
expectations of cooperative behavior in a laboratory increased trust and reduced ethnic 
discrimination of a generally mistrusted ethnic minority.  
Chapters 4 and 5 then use the theory to explain two important puzzles from the 
literature on ethnicity. Chapter 4 addresses the puzzling observation that the same person 
discriminates against some but not all outgroups. For example, Black Africans' ethnic 
group identification in South Africa is associated with negative attitudes towards 
Afrikaans Whites, but not towards English Whites (Duckitt and Mphuthing 1998). Much 
of the current research in social psychology analyzes individual attributes, such as self-
esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1986), authoritarian personality (Adorno 1950), or social 
dominance orientation (Sidanius 1993), in search for a universal explanation of 
intergroup conflict. However, these explanations are generally not consistent with the fact 
that people distinguish between different outgroups. Although an authoritarian 
personality may explain why someone has a higher propensity for discrimination in 
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general, it can tell us little about why the same person would discriminate against 
Afrikaans Whites but not against English Whites. 
 Several scholars have used group attributes instead to explain why only few 
groups compete against each other. According to Blalock (1967), the group’s size is what 
matters. A greater relative size of the minority group to the dominant group would 
threaten the latter because of increased competition for scarce resources and the 
minority’s higher potential for political mobilization. In his book on electoral politics in 
Zambia, Posner (2005) argued that ethno-political cleavages appear between groups, 
whose size allows them to be part of a minimum winning coalition. Quillian (1995) found 
a positive association between the proportion of immigrants and strength of racial 
prejudices in Western Europe. However, a cross-country study of intrastate conflict by 
Ellingsen (2000) did not find a statistically significant effect of a large minority. 
Moreover, the relative group size argument cannot explain why discrimination often 
targets small or disenfranchised minorities. For example, Haitians represent only three 
percent of the population of the Dominican Republic, Whites less than one percent of the 
population of Zimbabwe, and Bahá’ís less than 0.5 percent of the population of Iran. 
Comparably, governments in Indian states tend to protect the Muslim minority against 
ethnic riots if it is large enough to give them votes (Wilkinson 2004). Reciprocity helps 
explain this puzzle in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 applies the theory on the field of economic development. The “natural” 
preference for one’s group presumed by the literature has substantial implications for 
economic development of multiethnic countries. Much empirical research indicates that 
ethnic diversity leads to suboptimal public goods provision and hinders development. 
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Several reasons have been proposed. Divergent policy preferences of racial groups living 
in the same country can lead to a disagreement about which public goods should be 
provided (Alesina et al. 1999; Kinder and Winter 2001). Alternatively, production of 
public goods in homogenous societies can be facilitated by more effective social 
sanctioning – an advantage that ethnically heterogeneous countries lack. As Habyarimana 
et al. (2009, 104) concluded in their experimental study, “ethnically homogeneous 
communities may have an advantage in providing public goods because those individuals 
least likely to contribute are also particularly sensitive to threats of retaliation should it be 
known that they have failed to contribute to collective endeavors.” One possible 
mechanism behind this effect is the simple observation that it is easier to find and punish 
someone who exploited one's trust if the person belongs to one's own group 
(Habyarimana et al. 2007, 2009). Bad reputation of an untrustworthy person can also 
spread through social networks. Since social networks are usually denser within than 
across ethnic groups, it should be easier to obtain information about the past of a coethnic 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996). 
In the 1990s, development economists did indeed pinpoint ethnic fragmentation as 
a cause of low schooling and inadequate infrastructure in Africa, the most 
underdeveloped region of the world (Easterly and Levine 1997). For example, Miguel 
and Gugerty (2005) found that Kenyan communities with an average ethnic diversity 
generated 20 percent less contributions for their schools than ethnically homogenous 
communities. Five thousand miles away, households in mixed communities in Indonesia 
are less likely to contribute money and labor to local health centers, rice cooperatives, 
neighborhood irrigation associations, and other voluntary organizations (Okten and Osili 
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2004). Investment in public goods, from education to roads to trash pickup, is inversely 
related to racial diversity also in U. S. cities (Alesina et al. 1999). In addition to 
insufficient public goods provision, ethnically diverse communities in the United States 
are generally characterized by lower levels of cooperation, altruism, and trust (Putnam 
2007). For a larger sample of countries, Alesina et al. (2001) found a negative correlation 
between ethnic fractionalization and the government’s social spending. Due to all the 
empirical evidence, “the notion that social divisions undermine economic progress” has 
become “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy” (Banerjee et al. 
2005, 639). 
However, the effect of ethnic diversity is not uniformly malign. Miguel (2004) 
compared two nearby and similar districts, separated only by the Kenyan-Tanzanian 
border. Kenyan communities at an average level of ethnic diversity raised 25 percent less 
funding for their schools than homogenous communities. Across the border, in Tanzania, 
heterogeneous communities were equally successful as their homogenous counterparts. In 
the United States, racial fractionalization is associated with poor public policies, while 
other measures of cultural diversity seem to rather correlate with higher productivity 
(Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). When we look at developed countries with a high number 
of immigrants, such as Canada or New Zealand, they are actually doing quite well 
compared to the rest of the world. If there is any general conclusion, it is that “similar 
levels of ethnic diversity are associated with very different degrees of conflict and 
interethnic cooperation” (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, 794). Understanding the specific 
conditions under which ethnic diversity decreases cooperation and public goods provision 
is not only an interesting theoretical question, but also an urgent political issue because of 
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the growing numbers of immigrants in most societies (Putnam 2007). Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation offers an explanation of why ethnic diversity reduces people’s willingness to 






 The idea that reciprocity sustains cooperation is not new. As early as 1906, social 
scientists hailed reciprocity as “the vital principle of the society” (Hobhouse 1906, 12). 
Almost a century of research later, a Science article reiterated this view: “Reciprocation is 
the basis of human cooperation” (Nowak and Sigmund 2000, 819). Gouldner (1960) 
suggested that the moral norm of reciprocity is one of the universal social norms, present 
in most if not all moral codes. Early research on the iterated prisoner's dilemma game 
showed that the most successful strategies are those of conditional cooperators. The 
particularly successful “tit for tat” strategy consists of always cooperating in the first 
round and then reciprocating what the other player did on the previous move (Axelrod 
1984). As conditional cooperators reinforce each other, this strategy can be viable even if 
everyone else in the population defects (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Evolutionary 
models show that a population of indiscriminate altruists will be quickly invaded by free 
riders (Bowles and Gintis 2004). Only if a sufficient number of conditional cooperators 
refuse to cooperate with free riders can cooperation be sustained (Nowak and Sigmund 
2005). Such discrimination between likely cooperators and defectors is regarded as the 
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society’s “immune response” against free-riding (Nowak and Sigmund 2000, 819). 
 Trivers (1971) concluded that animals have evolved to respond in kind to the 
actions of others. Therefore, he put what he called “human reciprocal altruism” into the 
same category as alliances among baboons and warning calls in birds. On the other hand, 
Hill et al. (2011) argued that extensive cooperation between genetically unrelated 
individuals differentiates humans from other animals. Whatever the truth is, experimental 
data from around the world support the view that humans evolved to be conditional 
cooperators; they typically reward cooperation and punish defection (Ostrom 2000; 
Fischbacher et al. 2001; Chaudhuri 2011). 
 It is easy to punish defection in repeated face-to-face interactions with the same 
partner. However, much of the modern world relies on anonymous transactions with 
people we do not know: customers buy goods from complete strangers at eBay (Resnick 
et al. 2000), political parties buy votes despite their essential inability to monitor the 
secret ballot (Brusco et al. 2004), and even personal security can be threatened by people 
we have never met. Something as routine as paying taxes is akin to cooperation with a 
very large number of anonymous strangers. Moreover, many transactions are not 
instantaneous, but rather involve delayed payment. For example, online shopping 
customers pay with expectation that the website's owner will deliver the goods, banks 
lend money with expectation that the loan will be repaid, and voters hope that their 
elected representative will keep at least some of her promises. 
To make the society’s immune response against free riders work outside the scope 
of repeated face-to-face interaction, conditional cooperators have to rely on their potential 
partner’s reputation (Nowak and Sigmund 2007). But if the reputation of another person 
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is not readily available, what information can we use to identify likely cooperators and 
free riders? I argue that humans use group membership as an information shortcut. If 
group membership is the only information available, the individual i estimates whether 
the individual j will cooperate or defect by looking at the record (real or imagined) of 
cooperation and defection of other members of j’s group. This logic should be even more 
important if we are interested rather in an aggregate of individuals (e.g. large groups 
contributing to a public good). I define the expectations of cooperative behavior as the 
probability perceived by the individual i that the individual j will cooperate with i. While 
i can estimate j’s general propensity to cooperate from i’s stereotypical belief’s about j’s 
group, the expectation of interest also depends on i’s attributes. For example, a neo-Nazi i 
may not expect any help from a Jewish person j despite her strong belief that j would go 
to great pains to support other Jews. 
 
1.2.2 Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination 
 
It is a normal cognitive function to classify people into social categories based on 
visible characteristics, such as race or gender, and to view thusly formed groups as 
homogenous in terms of personality traits (Fiske 2000; Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010). For 
example, Blacks in the American society are often seen as “lazy” and “criminal” (Devine 
and Elliot 1995). Although objectionable on moral grounds, stereotyping itself is a banal 
cognitive strategy that the human mind uses to reduce the complexity of the social world 
by transforming innumerable fuzzy differences between individuals into few clear 
dichotomies. As many other behavioral characteristics have become subject to group 
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stereotypes, there is no reason to believe that general expectations of cooperative 
behavior are immune to this natural tendency. 
Following Weber and Crocker (1983, 961), I define stereotypes as beliefs about 
the characteristics of a specific group. I further define group as any social category in 
which an individual may be a member. This definition is very similar to Kanchan 
Chandra's definition of “identity” (Chandra 2006). Social categories are sets of people 
given a common label and distinguished by (1) rules of membership that decide who is 
and is not a member of the category, and (2) sets of characteristics (such as beliefs, 
physical attributes, or behavior) thought to be typical of members of the category.1 Men, 
the youth, and university students are all examples of groups. Each membership in a 
group is represented in the member's mind as a social identity. 
Group is a much broader category than social group, whose definition typically 
also includes common goals and interaction between members. Accordingly, my 
definitions of ingroup and outgroup are also broader than their usual definitions in 
sociology and social psychology. In this dissertation, ingroup is a group, in which an 
individual is eligible to be a member, and outgroup is a group, in which an individual is 
not eligible to be a member. This means that although a social category of “white people” 
may be too large and distant to be a true social group (and therefore an ingroup) in the 
eyes of most social psychologists, this dissertation would consider it a meaningful 
ingroup. Another conceptual difference is the distinction between ingroups and 
outgroups. Followers of social identity theory define ingroup by the individual's feeling 
of loyalty or belonging. They define outgroup by contempt or antagonism. Since my 
1 This definition closely follows Fearon and Laitin (2000). 
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dissertation studies ingroup bias as a dependent variable, this definition would be circular 
and I opted for a more neutral definition by membership eligibility instead. 
Although the proposed model is general enough to be applicable to any groups, 
the rest of the dissertation focuses on ethnic groups because they are most relevant for 
political scientists and policy makers. Following Chandra (2006), I define ethnic group as 
a group, in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, 
or believed to be associated with, descent. Examples of descent-based attributes include 
skin color, language, last name, and ancestral religion. 
Many different triggers can activate stereotypes about groups and lead 
consequently to prejudice (Devine 1989; Wheeler and Petty 2001). Similarly to Allport 
(1954), I define prejudice as antipathy (1) based on group-level generalization and (2) 
directed either toward a group as a whole or toward an individual because of her group 
membership. There is empirical evidence that beliefs about cooperative behavior translate 
into sympathy and antipathy. Successful social exchange with another person increases 
liking of that person and produces positive feelings of gratitude and pleasure (Lawler 
2001). Free-riding, on the other hand, causes strong emotions of anger and sadness (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000; Lawler 2001). The more the free-riders deviate from the group's 
expectations, the stronger these emotions are (Fehr and Gächter 2000). 
If one’s group supports or fails to police discriminatory behavior, prejudices may 
manifest themselves in the form of discrimination, ranging from selective hiring to hate 
crimes (Yzerbyt and Demoulin 2010). If I believe that all immigrants are crooks, I will be 
less likely to offer an immigrant a job, lend her money, or enter into any transactions 
based on trust with her. As discrimination prevents a person from obtaining resources by 
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cooperation, competition between groups becomes paramount. Although prejudices do 
not always lead to overt discrimination, empirically, there is a positive correlation 
between the two (Schütz and Six 1996), as well as between stereotypes and 
discrimination (Cuddy et al. 2007). Discrimination in this work is understood broadly as 
differential treatment of individuals based on their group membership, such as ethnic 
affiliation (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001). 
Stereotypes and prejudices may be based on real information (e.g., the group’s 
social norms) or their basis can be entirely faulty. According to theory of symbolic 
politics, people develop a limited set of highly stable symbolic predispositions, including 
partisanship, ideology, and ethnic prejudices, early in their lives (Sears and Funk 1999). 
Since so much socialization occurs in families, stereotypes can be easily inherited from 
previous generations. Some psychologists see prejudice as a manifestation of deep-rooted 
personality traits. For example, Adorno (1950) used his interviews with former Nazis to 
argue that people with an authoritarian personality suppress the groups over which they 
have authority. Sidanius (1993) asserted that prejudice correlates with an individual's 
acceptance of social hierarchies, captured by the social dominance orientation scale. 
According to another longstanding argument, stereotypes are formed by mass 
media, though empirical evidence is mixed (Green and Seher 2003). In a now-classic 
study, Wade (1987) highlighted a nefarious impact of the 1915 epic film Birth of a 
Nation, which glorified the then waning Ku Klux Klan and depicted African American 
men essentially as sexually aggressive brutes. More recent behavioral studies have 
demonstrated that political propaganda can make certain prejudices more or less salient. 
For instance, Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) found that the local television's stereotypical 
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portrayal of crime perpetrators as non-white males heightened whites' negative attitudes 
against blacks. Although prejudices are sometimes evoked during electoral campaigns, 
politicians in the United States are no longer able to play race card too overtly 
(Mendelberg 2001). Moreover, there is little evidence for a more far-reaching idea that 
narratives in mass media can create new attitudes (Green and Seher 2003). Even the 
effect on salience is not guaranteed. Hovland et al. (1949) demonstrated that the U.S. 
Army's series of propaganda films entitled Why We Fight did in fact little to increase 
soldiers' patriotic attitudes. Although this dissertation does not study where prior beliefs 
about cooperation come from, it is likely that they are formed just like other stereotypes 
by a combined effect of family, schooling, media, and personal experience. 
 
1.2.3 Intergroup Contact 
 
Whatever their origins are, prejudices sometimes change in a dramatic way. For 
example, Schuman et al. (1985) described how the American public opinion moved away 
from the belief that whites should have a priority over blacks in the public life between 
the 1940s and 1970s. One particularly influential explanation of why prejudices change is 
the contact hypothesis. More than a half-century ago, Gordon Allport proposed that under 
specific conditions, intergroup contact reduces prejudice. Since then, the contact 
hypothesis has influenced generations of scientists and policy-makers. Racial integration 
in the U.S. Army during World War II provides an illuminating example of benefits 
derived from intergroup contact. According to Putnam (2007), 62 percent of white 
soldiers with no contact with black troops opposed mixing black and white platoons in 
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their company. In the regiments with some black platoons, this number dropped to 20 
percent. Among white soldiers, whose companies have already been mixed, only 7 
percent opposed the policy. As Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 751) unequivocally concluded 
in their widely cited survey of contact-hypothesis studies, “with 713 independent samples 
from 515 studies, the meta-analysis finds that intergroup contact typically reduces 
intergroup prejudice.” In fact, 94% of the samples included in their meta-analysis 
exhibited an inverse relationship between contact and prejudice. 
That said, not all contact between groups is supposed to be beneficial. Pettigrew 
(1971, 275) summarized the optimal conditions of a positive contact as such: “Prejudice 
is lessened when the two groups (1) possess equal status, (2) seek common goals, (3) are 
cooperatively dependent upon each other, and (4) interact with the positive support of 
authorities, laws, or customs.” 
As a set of restrictive conditions like this is rarely achievable in practice, few 
researchers have managed to replicate the optimal conditions and measure their effect. An 
example of a successful test of the contact hypothesis under the most favorable 
conditions is a field experiment by Green and Wong (2009). 54 white teenagers 
participated in wilderness courses. They were randomly assigned to either an all-white or 
a racially mixed group. All members had an equal status, shared the same goal (survival 
in wilderness), cooperatively depended on each other, and their interaction was supported 
by a qualified group leader. One month after completing the course, members of racially 
heterogeneous groups reported higher levels of tolerance. 
It is unclear whether the optimal conditions of positive contact are jointly or 
independently sufficient. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 751) argued that they “are best 
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conceptualized as an interrelated bundle rather than as independent factors.” 
Unfortunately, bundling four very different conditions together in empirical studies 
makes it difficult to discern their individual effects. In their meta-analysis, Pettigrew and 
Tropp (2006) found evidence suggesting that the optimal conditions were not necessary, 
but the positive support of authorities did significantly increase effectiveness of contact. 
Allport (1954, 268) merely hinted at the possible causal mechanism behind his 
theory: “Contacts that bring knowledge and acquaintance are likely to engender sounder 
beliefs concerning minority groups, and for this reason contribute to the reduction of 
prejudice.” This dissertation argues that it is not simply any information updating that 
matters. What matters is specifically increasing expectations of cooperative behavior. In 
line with the logic of reciprocity, experiencing cooperative behavior during intergroup 
contact can change the stereotypical beliefs – and by extension also prejudices – about 
the outgroup. 
I hypothesize that observing individual behavior can change stereotypes at the 
group level. This proposition is not without an empirical basis. According to an 
experimental study by Weber and Crocker (1983), people respond to information that 
deviates from their stereotypes by updating beliefs. Every new piece of evidence causes a 
minor change in the stereotype. Updated beliefs also affect attitudes and behavior. Peffley 
et al. (1997) found that information contradicting pre-existing racial stereotypes changed 
discriminatory political attitudes even among people with a strong racial bias. What kind 
of evidence do we need to change stereotypes about propensity to cooperate? 
Affect theory of social exchange predicates that a person-to-group tie is more 
salient in indirect exchange and positive emotions created by a successful exchange are 
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attributed to the group as a whole (Lawler 2001).2 This contrasts with direct exchange, 
where a person-to-person tie is more salient (Lawler 2001). Molm et al. (2003) found that 
indirect exchange increases perceptions of fairness. On the other hand, negotiated 
exchange actually makes competition more salient and triggers unfavorable perceptions 
of the other side as unfair (Molm et al. 2003). Molm’s finding may help explain why 
intergroup contact in work situations usually does not lower prejudice (Amir 1969). 
Drawing on this line of research in psychology, I focus on indirect positive reciprocity, 
which can be defined in the words of Nowak and Sigmund (2005, 1291) as “I help you 




Table 1: Predicted Group Bias Depending on Expected Cooperative Behavior 
  Outgroup 
  Cooperates Defects 
Ingroup 
Cooperates No bias Ingroup bias 
Defects Outgroup bias No bias 
 
 Table 1 summarizes testable implications for discrimination depending on the 
cooperative behavior from expected from ingroup and outgroup members. The first cell 
of the table corresponds to the case of generalized reciprocity. People expect others to 
2 Indirect exchange arises when a third party uninvolved in the initial interaction returns the favor sometime 
in the future (Befu 1977). Negotiated exchange “incorporates collective decision-making, advance 
knowledge of terms, mutual assent, and binding agreements” – think of trade and employment (Molm et al. 
2003, 128). 
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cooperate regardless of group membership. There should be no discrimination between 
the two groups. 
The model predicts ingroup bias only in one special case – if ingroup members 
are expected to cooperate, while outgroup members are not (second cell). This 
implication significantly departs from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986; 
Turner 1975), according to which a person should always favor her fellow ingroup 
members over outgroup members. 
The third cell of Table 1 predicts outgroup bias, with a rational individual 
preferring the cooperative outgroup over the untrustworthy ingroup. Although counter-
intuitive, outgroup bias can be sometimes observed empirically. For example, a 
Eurobarometer survey in 1996 asked citizens of 15 member states of the EU whether they 
trusted people from various European and non-European countries. Surprisingly, Italians 
trusted the Swiss, Swedes, and Americans more than their own countrymen. Swedish 
respondents had more trust in Norwegians than in other Swedes. Similarly, Chinese 
participants in an economic experiment described by Buchan et al. (2006) found outgroup 
members more trustworthy than ingroup members during an investment game. 
The fourth cell describes a situation of general mistrust and is thus the polar 
opposite of generalized reciprocity. Whereas the default strategy in the first cell was to 
cooperate with everyone, here it is rational to defect with everyone. Of course, 
cooperation is possible even in the fourth case if there is an alternative way to assure 
reciprocity. For example, a more credible threat of punishment of cheaters if they belong 
to the same community as the victim may transform the fourth cell to the second cell. 
These four equilibria are stabilized by an inherent reinforcement mechanism. 
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Cooperation reduces discrimination, which creates even more opportunities to cooperate 
with the same group, while preexisting mistrust prevents future cooperation that could 
otherwise help overcome it. The causal mechanism described in this dissertation may 
create virtuous cycles of cooperation or vicious cycles of conflict. A slightly higher 
cooperation rate in a well-bounded group for example due to more effective enforcement 
increases expectations of future cooperation, which convinces more members to 
cooperate, which leads to more positive reciprocity… Similarly, a member of a 
stigmatized group may want to cooperate, but ultimately defects because she does not 
believe that a high-status person would trust her enough to reciprocate cooperation. Of 
course, such preemptive defection will only reinforce the high-status group’s stereotypes, 
creating a negative feedback loop of mistrust and deteriorating intergroup relations. 
If preferences regarding cooperation with specific groups are common knowledge, 
the four strategies will become focal points used by both groups to coordinate their 
behavior. In this way, patterns of discrimination can be rectified for a long time, until an 
exogenous shock breaks the vicious cycle of mistrust. Varshney (2002) provided an 
example of virtuous and vicious cycles predicted by this study in his book on ethnic riots 
in India: 90 percent of Hindu and Muslim families in the peaceful city of Calicut, but 
only 42 percent in conflict-prone Aligarh, reported that their children played together. 
Aligarhs of our world may never improve without introducing more opportunities for 
interethnic cooperation. On the other hand, once reciprocal cooperation becomes 
institutionalized, it can protect the community from ethnic violence for centuries – as Jha 
(2008) demonstrated in the case of Hindu-Muslim relations in former medieval trading 
ports in India. Chapter 6 will discuss ways, in which we can increase expectations of 
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reciprocity in multiethnic societies. 
For cases with a prior ingroup bias, the causal argument of the paper implies that 
an exogenous increase in an outgroup’s indirect positive reciprocity should reduce 
discrimination against the said outgroup (first column of the Table 1). This is exactly 
what a public goods experiment described in Chapter 3 achieves by manipulating 
cooperative behavior across treatment groups. The process can be envisaged as Bayesian 
updating of expectations of cooperative behavior. A person has some priors based on 
groups stereotypes that she holds. As I explained above, negative stereotypes may lead to 
prejudice and discrimination. When this person encounters a member of the outgroup and 
the contact results in a cooperative interaction, stereotypes get updated. More positive 
posterior beliefs reduce the level of prejudice and discrimination. 
The simplified dyadic image sketched out in the previous section can be extended 
easily to situations with many different outgroups. When faced with various groups, a 
person should favor those whom she trusts to reciprocate cooperative behavior. 
Consequently, discrimination should negatively correlate with the expectations of 
cooperative behavior. Chapter 4 observes this hypothesized effect of reciprocity in survey 
data. It also compares the effect of reciprocity to the most prominent alternative 
explanations of discrimination in the literature on ethnic politics. 
In addition to explaining selective discrimination, the model has an important 
implication for economic development at the societal level. In the societies ruled by the 
social norm of generalized reciprocity (first cell of Table 1), ethnic identity should not be 
an obstacle to cooperation. If the lack of interethnic cooperation hinders economic 
development – as is assumed by much of the literature in the field of development 
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economics – ethnic diversity of the country should correlate negatively with economic 
growth and public goods provision only in the countries without the generalized 
expectations of reciprocity. Ethnic diversity should not affect people’s willingness to 
contribute to public goods in the societies characterized by generalized reciprocity. 
Chapter 5 tests this hypothesis using cross-national survey data. 
 
1.4 Structure, Agency, and Social Construction of Identities 
 
 This essentially rational model specifies structural conditions of discrimination. It 
does not compete with – it complements – agency theories explaining when 
discrimination escalates into open ethnic conflict. For example, Gagnon (1995) and Des 
Forges (1999) highlighted the role of elite manipulation in instigating the Yugoslav wars 
and the genocide in Rwanda respectively. Whereas my argument may help elucidate why 
Slobodan Milošević chose to demonize Kosovar Albanians and not Vojvodina 
Hungarians, it does not cleanse him from the guilt of mobilizing masses of his supporters 
by ethnic hatred. As is often the case in politics, structure and agency interact. Prior 
beliefs constrain political elites in their hostility against a cooperative outgroup; 
preexisting mistrust paints a bull’s eye for an ambitious ethnic entrepreneur to aim her 
rhetoric. Negative stereotypes may also help us understand better instances of ethnic 
massacres without leadership, such as those discussed in Petersen (2002). Conversely, 
encouraging positive reciprocity in post-conflict societies may reduce prejudice and 
distrust between groups, whose identities have been previously constructed as 
antagonistic by political elites. Despite having important implications for the study of 
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ethnic conflict, this dissertation focuses only on one causal mechanism in a long causal 
chain leading to ethnic violence. 
 The proposed causal mechanism interacts with other structural conditions, such as 
market integration. Although the relationship between stereotypes and discriminatory 
behavior is mediated by emotions (Cuddy et al. 2007), the direct link between the two is 
probably of a more rational nature. When Cicero proclaimed “there is no duty more 
indispensable than that of returning a kindness,” he quickly added an instrumental reason: 
“all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit” (Gouldner 1960, 161). People do not care 
very much about others’ propensity to cooperate if they have nothing to gain from 
cooperation or if it is easier to obtain resources by coercion (Gouldner 1960). For 
example, Hutus and Tutsis at the time of the genocide in Rwanda were not in 
complementary roles: “Tutsis raise cattle primarily for their own use, while Hutus raise 
crops primarily for their own consumption, and both Rwanda and Burundi are organized 
primarily in agricultural subsistence units that spread over the land” (Hardin 1995, 170). 
Contrast Rwanda with the Indian city of Lucknow, in which economic interdependence 
between Hindu traders and Sunni Muslim workers arguably prevented serious ethnic 
rioting that have plagued other Indian cities in the 1990s (Varshney 2002). Death or flight 
of skilled workers during the riots would cause a collapse of the local economy and was 
thus against the interest of Hindu leaders regardless of what they thought about the Hindu 
nationalist cause. As a large cross-cultural study of small-scale societies all around the 
globe concluded more generally, “the higher the degree of market integration and the 
higher the payoffs to cooperation, the greater the level of cooperation in experimental 
games” (Henrich et al. 2001, 74). It is very likely that a sufficient level of market 
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integration is necessary for a beneficial effect of positive reciprocity to take place. 
 Finally, the theory is about relations between groups that already exist as salient 
social categories. Different theories explain how groups with distinct social identities 
emerge at the first place. For example, Weber (1976) described how compulsory 
education and conscription contributed to nation-building in France, Anderson (1991) 
attributed the birth of modern European nations to “print-capitalism”, and Marx (1998) 
studied the black identity as a function of exclusionary policies instituted by the majority. 
Acknowledging contributions of this strand of literature, the dissertation focuses on social 
identities that have already become salient. 
 Two prominent schools in social psychology, identity theory and social identity 
theory, concur that an individual holds multiple identities at the same time (Hogg et al. 
1995). Famous experiments by Henri Tajfel showed that new collective identities can be 
created literally in minutes, and based on trivial characteristics, such as preference for 
Kandinsky or Klee (Tajfel et al. 1971). The dominant constructivist paradigm in the field 
of ethnic politics also adopted a view of social identities as multiple and malleable. Eric 
Hobsbawm once summarized this notion in a cogent example: “Whether a Mr. Patel in 
London will think of himself primarily as an Indian, a British citizen, a Hindu, a Gujarati-
speaker, an ex-colonist from Kenya, a member of a specific caste or kin-group, or in 
some other capacity depends on whether he faces an immigration officer, a Pakistani, a 
Sikh or Moslem, a Bengali-speaker, and so on” (Hobsbawm 1996, 1067). Theories other 
than mine explain Mr. Patel’s choice of a particular identity from his identity repertoire. 
People may identify with a high-status group (Laitin 1998) or a group strong enough to 
win elections (Posner 2005), for instance. On other occasions, individuals are not free to 
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choose their social identity. Jews during the Holocaust and Tutsis during the Genocide in 
Rwanda died with an identity ascribed to them by their murderers. This dissertation does 
not explain individual identity choice, but attitudes towards other groups once the 
ingroup identity is fixed in the short term. Expanding on Hobsbawm's example, my 
model does not explain why Mr. Patel would emphasize his Gujarati identity over his 
British identity, but it may explain why he, as a Gujarati, would do business with a Parsi 




Chapter 2. Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation in Slums 
 
Following Harry Eckstein’s case-selection criteria, I chose the least-likely crucial 
case to test the proposed argument (Eckstein 1975) in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 5 then 
extends the analysis to the global level. A least-likely case is one that “on all dimensions 
except the dimension of theoretical interest, is predicted not to achieve a certain outcome, 
and yet does so” (Gerring 2007, 115). As I explain below, I found such a tough test in the 
slums of Mumbai, India. 
 
2.1 History of the Hindu-Muslim Conflict in Mumbai 
 
Communal violence between Hindus and Muslims has been a major issue in 
Indian politics for a long time. But even in the Indian context, Mumbai gained notoriety 
as the country’s historically most riot-prone city, with 1,137 recorded deaths in 1950-95 
(Varshney 2002). History of ethnic violence in Mumbai – previously known as Bombay – 
goes back for at least more than a century. After some small-scale clashes in the second 
half of the 19th century, the first serious ethnic riot in Bombay took place in 1893, killing 
80 people and wounding 530 (Kidambi 2007). Anticipating similar spells of violence in 
the 20th century, a local newspaper described “the destruction of temples and mosques, 
and the looting of shops, to the accompaniment of fierce faction fights in the streets, 
varied with senseless assaults on the police and the military” (Kidambi 2007, 118). In 
1929, low-level violence between Muslim Pathans, infamous as often unscrupulous 
money lenders, and Hindu textile mill workers escalated into another large-scale Hindu-
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Muslim riot (Hansen 2001). An anti-British naval strike spilled into Hindu-Muslim 
violence resulting in 250 deaths in 1946 (Hansen 2001). The deadly riot in 1984, which 
claimed 278 lives, was so shocking that it is sometimes seen as the final blow to the 
perception of Bombay as a cosmopolitan city (Punwani 2005). The latest recorded riot 
between Muslims and the mostly Hindu police occurred on August 11, 2012 (52 
casualties). 
The single worst episode of the perennial ethnic conflict in Mumbai followed the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by a mob of Hindu extremists in December 
1992. Hindu nationalist parties targeted the dilapidated 16th-century mosque because it 
was allegedly built on a site, where god Ram, the hero of the national epic Ramayana, 
was born. The demolition sparked an increasingly violent series of Muslim protests that 
escalated into full-blown street fighting between Muslim and Hindu mobs. The police 
intervened, killing disproportionately more Muslims than Hindus (Srikrishna 1998). The 
second, more serious round of rioting began in January 1993 in a response to the 
slaughter of a Hindu family at Radhabai Chawl, described at the beginning of the 
dissertation. Despite much spontaneous violence, the riot was to a great degree 
orchestrated by the local fascist party Shiv Sena and occurred with complicity of the 
police (Engineer 1993; Srikrishna 1998; Hansen 2001). According to an extensive official 
report on the riots, “the attacks on Muslims by the Shiv Sainiks were mounted with 
military precision, with list of establishments and voter’s lists in hand” (Srikrishna 
1998).3 In one conversation taped off the police frequency during the riots, the control 
center not only refused to prevent arson, but also encouraged the officers on the ground to 
3 Shiv Sainiks are members of the paramilitary wing of the Shiv Sena party. 
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participate in it. In this incident, a police officer referred to the Muslim owner of the 
burnt property as to a “circumcised prick” (Mehta 2004, 50). 
Two months of rioting left 900 dead, among whom 575 were identified as 
Muslims and 275 as Hindus (Srikrishna 1998). Many victims were burnt alive and bodies 
of others were routinely mutilated (Engineer 1993). Rioters razed or burnt down nearly 
10,000 houses and an estimated 200,000 people fled the city (Engineer 1993) in a frantic 
exodus immortalized by the Oscar-winning movie Slumdog Millionaire. The riots of 
January 1993 alone cost the city an estimated $3.6 billion in property losses, lost 
production, sales, and taxes (Wilkinson 2004). 
The riots also changed the ethnic composition of this once cosmopolitan city. 
Large numbers of Muslims previously living among the Hindu majority left their 
scattered enclaves and moved to few overcrowded, but more defensible ghettos (Hansen 
2001; Shaban 2010). As an unintended consequence, the local gangs supposedly 
protecting these Muslim communities from an eventual future riot contribute to the 
negative stereotyping of Muslims as criminals in the peacetime (Shaban 2010). To the 
constant ire of Muslims, organizers of the riots, most notably Shiv Sena's former leader 
Bal Thackeray, have never faced justice. My own field work in Mumbai in 2011 showed 
that the riots of 1993 are still the single most important item in the city’s collective 
memory. Every conversation about ethnic relations in Mumbai inevitably drifted to the 
topic of riots. 
Although ethnic riots have become more of a terrifying memory than a serious 
threat, frequent terrorist attacks attributed to Indian Muslim terrorist organizations with 
ties to Pakistan regularly rekindle the simmering conflict between Hindus and Muslims 
29 
living in Mumbai. The first large-scale terrorist attack came as a response of the Muslim 
criminal underworld to the 1993 riots. On March 12, 1993, ten powerful bombs exploded 
at Mumbai's landmarks, including Bombay Stock Exchange. This unprecedented attack 
killed 251 people and injured 713. Many victims of the riots welcomed the blasts as a 
justified retaliation. 
On December 6, 2002, right on the 10th anniversary of the destruction of the Babri 
Mosque, a bomb exploded inside a public bus. It killed two people and injured 28. On 
January 23, 2003, another bomb killed one and injured 28 near the Vile Parle railway 
station, which, coincidentally, I was using every day during my field work in Mumbai. 
On March 13, 2003, a bomb in a ladies' compartment of a commuter train killed 10 and 
injured 70. On July 28, 2003, another blast in a public bus killed four and injured 32. On 
August 25, 2003, two car bombs went off, killing 54 and injuring 244 people. One of the 
bombs was detonated at the most popular tourist attraction, the Gateway of India. On July 
11, 2006, seven bombs exploded in overcrowded suburban trains over a period of just 11 
minutes. The blasts scheduled for a rush hour killed 209 commuters and injured more 
than 700... 
A terrorist attack that mesmerized media worldwide occurred on November 26, 
2008. A small band of Pakistani terrorists landed with assistance of an unknown number 
of locals and attacked multiple locations, including Mumbai’s main train station, the 
famous Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, and a center run by an international Jewish movement. 
The 60-hour drama, full of indiscriminate shooting, explosions, and hostage murdering, 
was followed by millions of TV viewers. The final body count reached 172. 
The most recent terrorist attack in Mumbai incidentally happened just after I 
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finished my field research there. In the evening of July 13, 2011, bombs exploded at 
several crowded locations across the city. They killed 26 and injured 141 people. 
I expect that salience of the ethnic violence between Hindus and Muslims will 
make Mumbaikars less likely to care about reciprocal cooperation.4 The dissertation also 
helps increase the miniscule number of experimental prejudice-reduction studies among 
antagonistic groups (Paluck and Green 2009). At the same time, ethnic polarization in the 
slums creates a baseline quite different from that in more peaceful societies. Rational 
updating of stereotypes may have arguably a weaker marginal effect, for example, in 
Manhattan than in Mumbai because stereotypes themselves may be weaker. Only 
replication studies in a less biased society can address this issue. 
 
2.2 Population of Interest 
 
India’s biggest city would be an interesting case even without an ongoing ethnic 
conflict. RAND Corporation aptly called Mumbai “India’s Wall Street, its Hollywood, its 
Milan” (Rabasa et al. 2009, 1). The biggest city in India, it is poised to become the 
world's third biggest urban agglomeration after Tokyo and Mexico City (MCGM 2010). 
The metropolis has an ethnically very diverse population, with 44 percent being 
immigrants from other parts of India (MCGM 2010). Among the immigrants, most 
people came from the rest of the state of Maharashtra (37%), Uttar Pradesh (24%), and 
4 At the time of my field research, antagonism between Hindus and Muslims was also heightened by, of all 
things, cricket. Not only is cricket the Indian national sport, but the ICC World Cup was played on the 
Indian soil, with the final in Mumbai occurring shortly before the experiment. Especially a closely followed 
semifinal between India and its regional Muslim rival Pakistan exacerbated the communal tensions between 
Hindus and Muslims living in Mumbai. Many Hindus accused Muslims of cheering for Pakistan, which 
supposedly signaled their lack of loyalty to India. 
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Gujarat (10%) (MCGM 2010). Whereas Gujaratis (along with a small Parsi minority) are 
considered to be part of the city's traditional commercial bourgeoisie (Hansen 2001), 
more recent immigrants from North India are often frowned upon because of their high 
number (24% of all immigrants come from Uttar Pradesh) or their dramatically 
increasing immigration rate (especially those coming from Bihar). According to the 
census data, 19% of Mumbaikars are Muslims, though the number of Muslims living 
illegally in slums may be underreported. 
Before describing the population of interest, let us briefly stop to explain the 
Indian caste system. In each linguistic region of India, there are up to 200 different castes 
called jatis (Ghurye 1969). Traditionally, castes were endogamous communities 
characterized by a hereditary occupation (e.g. washing clothes for Dhobis), ritualized 
behavior (e.g. lacto vegetarianism of Deshastha Brahmins), and cultural self-policing 
through a panchayat (caste council). Castes differed in social status and formed local 
hierarchies that converged during the colonial period into the religiously inspired varna 
system, with a social status scale running down from upper-caste Brahmins to the 
untouchables (Sheth 1999). Independence of India brought the formal end of this social 
stratification. At the same time, the caste system became politicized, as the new state 
gave special entitlements to the traditionally backward castes, clustered under the labels 
of Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), and Other Backward Castes (OBC). 
Indian political parties also promoted a system of patronage based on caste membership 
and ethnic voting (Chandra 2004). In this way, the Indian caste shares political salience 
with the Western concepts of class and ethnic group. 
During the field research in the slums of Mumbai, I focused on the population of 
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mostly Hindu Marathi-speakers originally from Maharashtra. In accordance with the 
interchangeable use of these two terms in the environment, in which I conducted 
research, I refer to the population of interest as Marathi people or Maharashtrians. The 
Marathi community became the politically dominant group in the city after the creation 
of the separate Marathi-speaking state of Maharashtra with Bombay as its capital in the 
1960s (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2006). As I explain in the paragraphs below, Marathi-
speakers have a particularly salient social identity, defined in opposition to other ethnic 
groups and especially to Muslims. They are also the only ethnic group in Mumbai 
insisting on outsiders to use its language instead of the usual Bambaiya Hindi pidgin of 
Hindi, English, and Marathi that Salman Rushdie described skillfully as “Bombay’s 
garbage argot… in which a sentence could begin in one language, swoop through a 
second and even a third and swing back round to the first” (Rushdie 1999). Clear ethnic 
boundaries made it easy to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members during 
the experiments (Chapter 3) and survey (Chapter 4). 
In Mumbai, the terms “Marathas”, “Marathi people”, and “Maharashtrians” are 
usually used interchangeably. It is not always clear whether they refer to the Marathi 
language group or the specific Maratha jati, descending from Marathi-speaking warriors 
and land-owning peasants of the Deccan Plateau. The ancient society of the Deccan 
Plateau was organized around clans that shared the same Marathi linguistic identity and a 
relatively homogenous culture (Hansen 2001). The broad linguistic identity was later 
stabilized “by references to savarna jati, the caste communities of pure blood, or the 
hindu samaj, the larger Hindu community as opposed to Muslims” (Hansen 2001, 24). 
The term “Maratha” originally denoted all Marathi-speakers and was only later defined 
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somewhat more narrowly in opposition to Brahmins (O'Hanlon 2002). The boundaries of 
the Maratha identity were traditionally more fluid than boundaries of more conventional 
castes. Historically, there has been a great deal of social mobility between the castes of 
Marathas, Kunbis, and Kolis, for instance. It was possible to become a Kunbi just by 
taking up an occupation in agriculture and, conversely, wealthy Kunbis could easily 
become Marathas (O'Hanlon 2002). Even now, many Kunbis and Agris have the same 
last names as and can pass for Marathas. 
Residents of Mumbai often regard the Marathi category as encompassing other 
castes. When explicitly asked about their jati, some participants in my research declared 
themselves to be “Marathi (Koli)”, though Kolis are technically a separate jati, or even 
“Marathi (SC)”, though Marathas are a middle caste, while SCs are members of lower 
castes. Adding to confusion, one person from the Bhandari caste identified himself as a 
“Marathi (Bhandari)”, while another as just a “Bhandari”. Some members of the Maratha 
caste used a name of one of the 96 historical Maratha clans (e.g., Thakur) or a regional 
sub-group (e.g., Ghati) as their supposed jati. Among the Hindus who were sampled for 
this research and reported their caste, 65 percent identified themselves in one way or 
another as members of the Maratha caste. 
Marathas are the largest supporter of both the mainstream Indian National 
Congress party and the nationalist political parties Shiv Sena and Maharashtra 
Navnirman Sena (Palshikar and Deshpande 1999; Palshikar 2004; Shaban 2010). The 
Shiv Sena movement was founded in Bombay in 1966 as a vehicle for the interests of the 
Marathi-speaking middle class against skilled South Indians (Hansen 2001; Palshikar 
2004). Just like fascist parties in the interwar Europe, this anti-establishment social 
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movement employed marginalized young men from lower classes to terrorize its 
opponents. Over the years, Shiv Sena’s targets changed from South Indians to 
Communists to the city elite to Indian Muslims (Hansen 2001). 
 Apart from the Maratha caste, Shiv Sena also finds a lot of support among Kunbis 
(Palshikar and Deshpande 1999) and OBCs (Palshikar 2004). Unlike elsewhere in India, 
OBCs in Maharashtra do not have any united identity. During the riots of 1987, Bombay's 
OBCs were part of Shiv Sena's rioters against low-caste Dalits (Hansen 2001). The 
fisherman caste of Kolis, the original inhabitants of what is now Mumbai, are also 
frequent members of Shiv Sena (Weinstein 2009). The Dalit vote is divided between 
different parties. Although they tend not to support Shiv Sena (Palshikar 2004; Vora and 
Palshikar 2005), Dalits sided with other Hindu rioters during the bloody ethnic riots in 
the 1990s (Vora and Palshikar 2005). All these castes share the same Marathi language, 
the same origin in Maharashtra, and, apart from an exception explained below, the same 
Hindu religion. Among the research participants who voted in the last Lok Sabha 
election, 40 percent chose Shiv Sena or its breakaway party Maharashtra Navnirman 
Sena (MNS). 
In a vain attempt to escape the rigid caste system, a section of the low-caste Dalits 
(formerly known as untouchables) converted from Hinduism to Buddhism along with 
their leader B. R. Ambedkar in the mid-20th century. However, the religious boundaries 
between Hinduism and Buddhism in Mumbai are somewhat blurry and Buddhists are 
usually considered part of a larger Dalit community. Among the sampled slum-dwellers, 
most self-reported Buddhists identified themselves also as members of the Scheduled 
Castes. Some other respondents chose Hinduism as their religion, but then wrote 
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“Buddhist” when the questionnaire asked about their jati. During the bloody riots in the 
1990s, Dalits sided with other Hindu rioters, though they normally do not vote for Shiv 
Sena (Vora and Palshikar 2005) and they still tend to support Ambedkar's party RPI 
(Shaban 2010). 86 percent of the participants in the research were Hindus, while the rest 
were mostly Buddhists. I kept Buddhists in the sample because, as Chapter 3 shows in 
more detail, they did not react to the experimental intervention differently from Hindus. 
Mumbai's population density is the highest among all cities on Earth. There are 
only 21 square meters per person in the city of Mumbai – and this number includes not 
only apartments, but also all the roads, parks, office buildings, factories, and landfills. In 
comparison, New Yorkers enjoy 94 square meters per person despite living in a much 
more vertical city. Although the estimated six to seven million slum-dwellers compose 
more than half of the population of Mumbai, they are sardined into overcrowded areas 
that cover no more than 6-10 percent of the city's total land (Weinstein and Ren 2009). 
According to realistic group conflict theory, hostility between groups arises when 
they compete for scarce resources and their interests are incompatible (Sherif et al. 1961). 
In Mumbai, the scarce resources of housing and employment have become a frequent 
point of contention between ethnically based political parties and patronage networks. 
Quillian (1995) argued that prejudice is driven by the dominant group’s perception that 
the subordinate outgroup is threatening its economic conditions. Mumbai’s dominant 
ethnic group indeed counters the perceived economic threat by a wide range of 
discriminatory activities, from political pressure to assassinations. Two nationalist 
political parties in Mumbai, Shiv Sena and MNS, have marketed themselves from the 
beginning as defenders of the “indigenous” Marathi-speaking people against South 
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Indians (Shiv Sena) and North Indians (MNS) in competition for jobs. Shiv Sena created 
an affiliated organization Sthaniya Lokadhikar Samiti (SLAS) to ensure that 80% of the 
most lucrative jobs are reserved to Maharashtrians. One of the managers complained 
about its influence (Noronha 2005, 122): “You cannot disallow the SLAS from recruiting 
their ‘own’ labour. They can go to the extent of killing you.” In accordance with the 
decision to choose the least-likely case, an experimental intervention in a laboratory may 
not be able to bridge the deeply entrenched ethnic cleavages based on conflicting material 
interests. 
At the same time, the inevitable spatial proximity of different groups creates a 
quirky mix of competition and cooperation that we can find especially in slums, in which 
lower-caste Hindus from the Scheduled Castes mostly live next to and around Muslim 
ghettos (Shaban 2010). Equally discriminated against by upper-caste Hindus, both groups 
have developed many ties despite their fundamental religious difference. Katherine Boo 
illustrates an uneasy character of the Hindu-Muslim cooperation in Mumbai slums in her 
nonfiction book Behind the Beautiful Forevers. Asha, a Hindu woman and a local Shiv 
Sena operative, was trying to help her Muslim neighbors avoid jail. At the same time, she 
charged an exorbitant fee for her “brokerage” between a poor Muslim family and the 
predominantly Hindu police (Boo 2012). 
I sampled only Marathi-speaking men. In Mumbai – and arguably also in general 
– men are more violent than women. It is no coincidence that the core electoral base of 
the nationalistic alliance of BJP and Shiv Sena in Maharashtra came from the urban male 
youth (Palshikar and Deshpande 1999). If we can reduce discrimination among men, the 
same effect will be even more plausible among women. The theoretical argument itself 
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does not make different predictions for men and women. And if the predicted effect is a 
causal mechanism underlying the contact hypothesis, gender differences are unlikely 
because men and women displayed the same positive effect of intergroup contact on 




There are approximately 2,000 slums in Mumbai (MCGM 2010). They vary 
greatly in size and have fuzzy borders. Although there are no reliable demographic data 
collected at the level of neighborhoods, local experts helped me identify three 
predominantly Marathi-speaking Hindu slums: Bhoiwada, Magathane, and Shivaji Nagar. 
The three slums I chose are not only located in three different parts of the city (see 
Map 1), but their different levels of development encompass the whole spectrum of poor 
residential areas in Mumbai. Bhoiwada is the most “affluent” among the three 
neighborhoods. It is a typical example of an old industrial chawl. Chawls are single-room 
tenements, built in 1920-1950s by factories to house their workers. Most of them have 
two floors with shared toilets on each floor. Each small tenement now houses a whole 
(and often extended) family. Since rents were frozen by the Rent Control Act during 
World War II and never unfrozen again, landlords virtually abandoned any effort to 
maintain the buildings, creating slum-like living conditions (MCGM 2010). In 
comparison to Bhoiwada, Magathane and Shivaji Nagar are closer to the iconic image of 
an Indian slum, with independently built small huts. Many residents there rely on shared 
water sources and distant public toilets installed by local NGOs. 
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Map 1: Research Sites in Mumbai 
 
 
As is often the case in Mumbai – and in other ethnically heterogeneous parts of 
the world –more or less homogenous buildings or streets lay in close proximity to zones 
inhabited by other ethnic groups. Shivaji Nagar with its alternation of exclusively 
“Hindu” and “Muslim” streets greatly illustrates this pattern. Although all the buildings in 
Shivaji Nagar are the same corrugated iron huts, the ubiquitous saffron or green flags 
easily point a lost visitor to the right ethnic bastion. The much smaller Magathane slum 
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borders a large slum inhabited by various ethnic groups from North and South India. 
Only Bhoiwada is ethnically homogenous, surrounded by other Maharashtrian areas. But 
even here, residents come from different castes, with a large number of SCs living 
together with Marathas. 
As an official report concluded, “slums have a tendency of magnifying small 
issues and minor irritants into full–blown communal riots” (Srikrishna 1998). It is no 
coincidence that the very first serious ethnic riot in Bombay (in 1893) originated in a 
slum (Hansen 2001). Bhoiwada was one of the loci of serious rioting, stabbings, and 
attacks against madrassas in 1992-3 (Srikrishna 1998). In Shivaji Nagar, a rampaging 
mob killed constables “with choppers and swords,” and burnt down several temples 
during the riots (Srikrishna 1998). Local violent nonstate actors, whether it be gangs in 
Muslim slums or extremist political parties in Hindu slums, enjoy impunity in their 
respective areas (Shaban 2010). 
At the same time, common civic institutions are securing communal peace in and 
between these neighborhoods. After the deadly riots in 1993, each police station has set 
up a mohalla committee consisting of local community leaders, who diffuse intergroup 
tensions at the time of crisis. Thakkar (2004) credited mohalla committees with 
prevention of ethnic riots in the wake of terrorist attacks in New York (9/11) and New 
Delhi, as well as after other incidents. During the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2003 and 
2006, 26 members of a mohalla committee in the neighborhood of Nagpada reportedly 
spread out to calm members of their respective ethnic communities, put up soothing 
messages at street corners, and fought rumors that might have otherwise triggered a riot 
(Fernandes 2009). Although some mohalla committees have since then become mere 
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tools in the hands of the police or ambitious politicians, many other still serve their 
primary purpose of building bridges between rival ethnic communities (Thakkar 2004). 
Security is not the only public good requiring bottom-up contributions channeled 
through the civil society. The main vehicle for public goods provision in the slums of 
Mumbai is community-based organizations (CBO). For example, slums located on 
hillsides get their water not directly from the authorities, but through their own 
cooperative societies that maintain pumps, collect money from members, and pay bills to 
the municipal corporation (MCGM 2010). Any break-up of cooperation results in a 
significantly lower quality of life for everyone: according to Gadpale (2011), women 
living in Mumbai's slums spend on average three hours every day walking to fetch 
drinking water and 69 percent of children skip school classes for the same purpose. 
However, in order to succeed, CBOs have to coordinate hundreds of residents 
living in the same, ethnically mixed neighborhood. For example, an average citizen group 
involved in waste management covers almost 600 residents (Rathi 2006). The CBO has 
not only to collect garbage from households, but also to persuade households to separate 
“dry” and “wet” waste. Predictably, non-participation of residents is the biggest problem 
that CBOs face (Rathi 2006). To illustrate graveness of this issue with numbers, Bhide 
(2011) reported that only 3,000 out of 5,000 households in the neighborhood of 
Ketkipada paid their dues for garbage disposal, even though financial contributions were 
very modest (Rs. 10-20 per month per household, which is approximately 19-38 U.S. 
Cents). Public goods provision in Mumbai’s slums depends to a great degree on the local 
communities’ ability to cooperate. However, mistrust of other ethnic groups can easily 




Public goods experiments are usually run in university laboratories, with subjects 
drawn from Ivy League undergraduate students taking courses in psychology or 
economics. According to Druckman et al. (2006), 64% of the laboratory experiments that 
have appeared in the American Political Science Review used student convenience 
samples. In Political Behavior and Political Psychology, this number raises to 70% (Kam 
et al. 2007), a figure similar to top-tier social psychology journals (Sears 1986; Sherman 
et al. 1999). If we consider only experimental studies of prejudice, one of the topics that I 
am focusing on in this study, 92% of the research articles published in top-tier social 
psychology journals used students as subjects (Henry 2008). Similarly, among 60 papers 
published in the major experimental economics journals in 2001-2002, only four did not 
use student samples (Danielson and Holm 2007). 
Some of the leading experimentalists are wary of student convenience samples. In 
the words of Henrich (2001, 414): 
“There’s three billion potential adult subjects out there who have never 
participated in any experiments, and are a lot more representative of humanity 
then the privileged inhabitants of elite universities. Researchers do not need to go 
to the Amazon, Papua New Guinea, the Ituri Forest, or Kalimentan—try the bus 
station, the beaches, the market, the used furniture auction, the bowling alley, the 
'projects', or the county fair.” 
Because of systematic differences between American college students and the rest 
of the world, it is usually problematic to generalize results to any meaningful population. 
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As David Sears observed in his influential critique of student samples, “compared with 
older adults, college students are likely to have less-crystallized attitudes, less-formulated 
senses of self, stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to comply with authority, and 
more unstable peer group relationships” (Sears 1986, 515). As a result, experimental 
studies using exclusively students may put too much emphasis on cognitive processes and 
too little on personality dispositions, material self-interest, emotionally based 
irrationalities, group norms, and stage-specific phenomena (Sears 1986). While 
comparing how students and nonstudents living in Oxford played typical experimental 
games, Belot et al. (2010) found that students followed more closely predictions of game 
theory, while nonstudents were more motivated by other-regarding preferences, such as 
altruism or trust. Henry (2008) found that students are less conservative, more egalitarian, 
and significantly friendlier to outgroups than the average member of the population. 
Contact with outgroup members also seems to reduce prejudice more easily among 
college students than among adults (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). At the same time, Paluck 
and Green (2009) identified a dearth of prejudice-reduction studies among people who 
actually hold prejudiced beliefs. 
In order to increase external validity of my findings, I chose a less common 
approach – random sampling of subjects representative of a politically relevant 
population of slum-dwellers, many of them voters of extreme nationalist parties infamous 
for organizing ethnic riots.5 The experiments were conducted in rented Internet cafes 
5 Another advantage is that, unlike people sampled from usual subject pools (such as at universities or over 
the Internet), slum-dwellers had no prior experience with behavioral experiments. As there was only one 
experimental manipulation involved, the design eliminated “cross-effects” occurring “when subjects’ 
choices in an experiment are influenced by the manipulations they have received in previous experiments” 
(Morton and Williams 2010, 315). 
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close to the three slums. Combining advantages of field experiments (a representative 
sample) and lab experiments (full control over the environment), this approach is called a 
“lab in the field” experiment (Morton and Williams 2010). Hopefully, my experimental 
study of real people living in violence-prone slums of Mumbai will help remedy the 
current state of our field, in which “there is little sustained experimental evaluation of 
conflict negotiation and reduction for the many millions of ordinary citizens living in 
conflict or postconflict settings” (Paluck and Green 2009, 359). 
Inferences from a random sample can be generalizable to the population as a 
whole. Ideally, a random sample would be drawn from a list of all eligible individuals 
living in the area. Unfortunately, no such list exists in this case. Due to the questionable 
legality of residence in slums, not even voting registers are very reliable. Furthermore, 
slums themselves resemble an ever-shifting maze of unnamed streets and alleys that 
would make finding each of hundreds of registered voters sampled from a voting register 
an insurmountable logistical challenge. 
Instead, the research team used a “random route” technique to sample households 
in regular intervals while walking in a randomly selected direction in the sampled area. 
Once a household has been selected, a full list of all eligible individuals (adult Marathi-
speaking males) was written down and one of them randomly chosen. If the chosen 
individual refused to participate or was not present in the household, one more attempt to 
reach him was made in a prearranged time. In case the second attempt failed, substitution 
by another eligible individual from the same household was permitted. 
40 percent of the initially sampled individuals in the slums of Shivaji Nagar and 
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Magathane, and 20 percent in Bhoiwada refused to participate in the research.6 As 
random assignment to treatment groups happened only after subjects agreed to 
participate, refusals should not bias the experimental results reported in Chapter 3. 
However, refusals may limit external validity of the study. Although no systematic survey 
of the refusals could be made, the socioeconomic conditions of those who did and those 
who did not participate seemed to be virtually the same to the interviewers. The only 
reason consistently mentioned by those who refused to participate was lack of time. 
Although randomization of treatment assignment prevents bias in the reported 
experiments, potential bias could be introduced to the observational part of the research 
(Chapter 4) if one of the key variables was also a reason why some people refused to 
participate (Groves 2009). For example, a sensitive question about discrimination could 
motivate people with discriminatory attitudes not to participate at all. Since all the key 
questions in the survey elicited a response rate close to 100%, it is unlikely that the 
refusals were motivated by fear of answering sensitive questions. In fact, slum-dwellers 
seemed to be happy to share their opinions – even those usually considered extreme 
outside India – with a white researcher. 
The resulting sample includes 402 adult male Marathi-speaking slum-dwellers – 
134 in each neighborhood.7 The average age is 31 years. 86 percent of the sample are 
Hindus, while 13 percent are self-reported Buddhists. 98 percent speak Marathi at home 
and only two subjects were not born in Maharashtra. With the participants having 
6 For comparison, the no-show rate in experiments run by economists at Western universities is around 30% 
(Friedman et al. 2004). 
7 The number of subjects was predetermined by power analysis and available resources. Cornfield (1966) 
warns against ad hoc stopping rules that can be used essentially to halt data collection as soon as 
statistically significant results are obtained. In order to avoid this temptation, I did not conduct any analysis 
until all the data were collected. 
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completed almost 11 years of school on average, the literacy rate in the sample reached 
96%. The average household income varies a lot across neighborhoods, from Rs. 34,000 
(about $640) a month in Bhoiwada to Rs. 16,000 ($300) in Magathane to Rs. 13,400 
($250) in Shivaji Nagar. In accordance with the logic of the least-likely crucial case, 
journalists and party operatives with whom I talked identified all three neighborhoods as 
traditional regional bastions of the extremist parties Shiv Sena and MNS. However, a 
survey administered for this study offers a more refined picture: among those, who voted 
in the last Lok Sabha elections (2009), 40 percent chose Shiv Sena or MNS, while the rest 




Chapter 3. An Experiment of Hindu-Muslims Cooperation in Slums 
 
The main goal of the experiments described in this chapter is to find out whether 
indirect reciprocity has an effect on trust and discrimination. Although the tradition of 
experiments in political science goes back to the 1920s, experimental methods have come 
to prominence only recently. The total of experimental publications in the American 
Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of 
Politics in the first five years of the 21st century equals the number of experimental 
articles published in the whole 1990s and is twice as high as the number of articles in the 
1980s (Morton and Williams 2010). Political scientists use experiments more and more 
often as the field is slowly moving from studying correlations to the deeper and more 
interesting questions of causal inference. An experimenter can control confounding 
factors that are normally impossible or at least very difficult to disentangle from the 
explanation of interest in other research designs. 
 Another advantage of the experimental research design is that it is less prone to 
the endogeneity problem. Most if not all relevant explanatory variables in political 
science are arguably endogenous to the outcome that they seek to explain. Institutions 
surely do influence behavior, but were they not built by actions of the same actors at the 
first place? An experimenter can exogenously determine institutions and randomly assign 
subjects to the groups with different institutional settings. 
Despite all these advantages, most studies of prejudice, discrimination, and related 
topics still heavily rely on non-experimental methods or have questionable internal 
validity. Out of 985 studies on how to reduce prejudice collected by Paluck and Green 
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(2009), 60% are non-experimental. As Paluck and Green (2009, 345) concluded, “fewer 
than twelve [out of 985 studies] can be considered strongly suggestive of causal impact 
(or lack thereof).” Focusing heavily on unbiased causal inference and using qualitative 
evidence to assess internal validity, this dissertation seeks to solve some of the biggest 






The research team sampled randomly 402 adult male Marathi-speaking slum-
dwellers – 134 in each neighborhood. Among them, 210 randomly selected individuals 
were interviewed, but they did not receive any experimental treatment. Following the 
usual practice in the field, I refer to them as to the “control group” because their attitudes 
reflect the baseline values in the population. At the same time, the control group is not a 
true placebo group as in medical research because it is different from the treatment 
groups in several regards simultaneously.8 Therefore, the quantitative analysis presented 
in this chapter focuses mostly on comparisons across four treatment groups, while the 
next chapter looks at the respondents assigned to the control group. 
Subjects in each area were first randomly assigned to either the control group (and 
were interviewed) or to receive the treatment (and arranged an appointment for an 
8 In contrast to the treatment groups, subjects in this group did not play behavioral games. They knew that 
they would not receive any monetary reward for their participation in the survey. They were interviewed by 
an interviewer instead of filling a questionnaire in on a computer. Interviewers were other Hindu Marathi 
males in order to reduce social desirability bias. 
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experimental session, usually on the same or next day). At the beginning of each 
experimental session, a random number generator assigned subject to one of the four 
treatment groups. As I describe in more detail later in this chapter, four treatment groups 
correspond to the four cells of Table 1. The experiment used block – not cluster – 
randomization, with treatment assignment randomized within each neighborhood. Within 
neighborhoods, I used the simple randomization. As a result, each individual had the 
same probability of receiving one of the treatments. Table 2 demonstrates that treatment 
assignment did not correlate with location and the treatment groups were well balanced. 
 
Table 2: Sampled Individuals by Treatment Group and Neighborhood 
Treatment Group Bhoiwada Magathane Shivaji N. Total 
“Generalized Reciprocity” Group  14  17  17  48 
“Cooperative Hindus” Group  15  16  16  47 
“Cooperative Muslims” Group  16  17  16  49 
“No Reciprocity” Group  19  14  15  48 
Control Group  70  70  70 210 
Total 134 134 134 402 
 
Despite some observable differences between treatment groups (see Table 3), 
imbalances in demographic characteristics were not statistically significant at the usual 
.05 level except for age, with subjects in the control group on average slightly older than 
subjects assigned to three out of four treatment groups. However, even in this case, 
treatment assignment explains less than 3 percent of variation in age. 
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Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
3.1.2 Laboratory Experiments 
 
During the experiment, each subject assigned to one of four treatment groups was 
seated in front of a computer. He learned that he would play simple computer games over 
the Internet with various people in two other areas of Mumbai: Bhendi Bazar (a typical 
Muslim enclave) and Dadar (a well-known Hindu Marathi neighborhood). Although 
ethnic affiliation was never explicitly mentioned during the experiment, the computer 
screen showed a photograph, the first name, and the neighborhood of the other player – 
three unobtrusive cues of the partner’s membership in the Hindu ingroup or the Muslim 
outgroup. The research team explained to subjects that their partners could see the name 
of the subject’s neighborhood (a cue for ethnicity), but not his face or name. Therefore, 
the partner supposedly knew that the subject was a Hindu, but, at the same time, there 
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was no fear of retaliation against the subject as an individual person. 
 
3.1.2.1 First Dictator Game 
 
 Cooperation, including joint provision of public goods, cannot be explained by 
material benefits and costs alone. In addition to cost-benefit considerations, it is 
motivated by other-regarding preferences, such as reciprocity and altruism (Meier 2006). 
Much empirical research shows that true altruism, distinguishable from material benefits 
and social pressure, exists and is part of the human nature (Dovidio 1984; Piliavin and 
Charng 1990).9 
This additional intrinsic psychological motivation consists of two different 
elements: General altruism is independent from the recipient’s identity, while the element 
that I call ethnocentric altruism gives more value to cooperation with ingroup members 
than with outgroup members. Evolutionary biologists believe that ethnocentric altruism 
has a biological basis and that generosity reflects kinship ties between the donor and the 
recipient (Hamilton 1996). It is a well-observed fact that even non-biologists are more 
willing to help their kinsmen rather than strangers (Cialdini et al. 1997). However, the 
term ethnocentric altruism is a bit misleading because we tend to help not only people 
who are genetically related to us, but also those who are similar to us in other regards 
(Dovidio 1984), or whom we like for whatever reason (Mallozzi et al. 1990).10 In order to 
9 Of course, altruism can be egoistically motivated (Meier 2006), for example by social approval (Deutsch 
and Lamberti 1986), or – as trivial as it sounds – enhanced mood (Gueguen and Gail 2003). 
10 For example, an amusing experiment reported in Mallozzi et al. (1990) demonstrated that a well-dressed 
woman elicited more helping behavior from drivers passing around than male confederates. 
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identify the causal effect of reciprocity, the research design differentiates between 
reciprocity, general altruism, and ethnocentric altruism. For this purpose, it uses the 
dictator game. 
After receiving the instructions and a brief tutorial about computer use, subjects 
played one round of a dictator game. The dictator game is a one-stage game in which a 
subject decides how to allocate a sum of money between herself and other players (hence 
the “dictator” name). A purely self-interested person should keep all the money. However, 
empirical research found that people usually transfer considerable amounts of money to 
other players (Camerer 2003). Participants in my study played a version in which the 
allocator is anonymous to other players, but, at the same time, the allocator knows the 
receivers’ identities. Manipulating the information available to the allocator, we can not 
only measure the allocator's baseline altruism (Camerer 2003), but also altruism towards 
different groups (Bohnet and Frey 1999; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Habyarimana et al. 
2009), which is the goal of this part of the research. 
During the dictator game, each subject was given 10 Rupees and told that he 
could divide them between himself and two partners in any way he wished. The two 
partners were represented on the computer screen by a photograph, first name, and 
neighborhood. Using these clues, one partner appeared to be a Marathi Hindu (an ingroup 
member) and the other a Muslim (an outgroup member). The amounts of money allocated 
by the player to each of them create direct behavioral measures of the subject’s baseline 
altruism in relation to ingroup and outgroup members. The money retained by the subject 
is an inverse measure of general altruism. 
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3.1.2.2 Public Goods Game 
 
I employed the public goods game to manipulate expectations of cooperative 
behavior during the experiment. This behavioral game is used frequently by economists – 
see Camerer (2003) for a review – and increasingly also by political scientists to 
investigate under what conditions people cooperate. In the public goods game, two or 
more subjects secretly and simultaneously choose how many tokens to contribute to a 
common pot. The experimenter multiplies the pot and distributes the resulting amount 
equally among all the subjects regardless of their contributions. This procedure gave the 
public goods game its name. Subjects also retain privately all the tokens they did not 
contribute. Unlike other experiments that use the public goods game merely to measure 
the cooperation rate between subjects, I used the game as a randomized treatment 
inducing group-specific expectations of cooperative behavior. 
 
3.1.2.2.1 Logic of the Payoff Structure 
 
The payoff structure of the game played by the participants (Table 4) corresponds 
to the stag hunt game that got its name from a famous story in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men. The story, never actually 
spelled out by its author, can be envisaged as follows: Two or more hunters are hunting a 
stag. While they are waiting for the beast to appear, one of the hunters sees a hare passing 
by. The hunter faces a dilemma: If he shoots the hare, he will get its meat for himself. 
Unfortunately, the shot will also scare the stag off. The stag could provide him and his 
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companions with much more meat than a single hare. However, if the hunter decides to 
wait for the stag, he risks that someone else will see the hare and fire at it. In its general 
form, the stag hunt game can be described by the following ordering of outcomes: 
CC > DC ≥ DD > CD. 
 
Table 4: Payoff Structure of the Stag Hunt Game 
  Player 2 
  Cooperate Defect 
Player 1 
Cooperate 
 20  10 
20  0  
Defect 
 0  10 
10  10  
 
The game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: Either both players cooperate or 
they both defect. How the game will end depends on the level of trust in the group. A 
rational player will hunt the stag if she expects the other player to do the same; but she 
will go for the hare if she does not trust her companion. Both players are better off if they 
hunt the stag (CC); this is the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. But to hunt the hare (DD) is a 
risk-dominant strategy. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium depending on the exact 
payoff matrix. In the game used in India, the mixed equilibrium was to cooperate with the 
probability of 0.5. 
No player can provide the public good alone. This feature corresponds to the 
sociological definition of social exchange, whose purpose is “to generate benefit for each 
individual by exchanging behaviors or goods that actors cannot achieve alone” (Lawler 
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2001, 322). Situations, in which no cooperation is actually needed because one of the 
players can produce the public good alone are outside the scope of my work. 
Most laboratory public goods games to this day have used the prisoner’s dilemma 
payoff matrix. The key difference is that gains from mutual cooperation (CC) are higher 
than gains from exploitation (DC) in the stag hunt, while the opposite is true for the 
prisoner's dilemma (Jervis 1978). Although a rational egoist should always defect in a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, real people tend to cooperate if they believe that 
others are likely to cooperate (Ostrom 2000). For example, even in a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma game, 40% of subjects actually preferred (CC) to (DC) and 27% were 
indifferent between these two alternatives (Ahn et al. 2001). Even if material payoffs are 
structured like the prisoner’s dilemma, other factors, such as other-regarding preferences, 
are likely to transform the game into a stag hunt. 
The stag hunt game was hailed as the “prototype of the social contract” (Skyrms 
2004, 1). As early as in the 18th century, David Hume used the stag hunt game to model 
public goods provision. In his example, two neighbors wish to drain a meadow that they 
own in common. If they both work hard, they will succeed. But if either fails in his part, 
the meadow will not be drained (Hume 1739 [2003]). 
In his example of two neighbors draining a common meadow, Hume (1739 
[2003]) recognized that achieving cooperation is more difficult in many-person stag hunt 
games than in a two-person game: 
“Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; 
because it is easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive, 
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the 
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whole project. But it is very difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand 
persons should agree in any such action; it being difficult for them to concert so 
complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each 
seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expence, and would lay the 
whole burden on others.” 
Hume’s intuition was formalized in the 20th century. According to Oye (1985), 
cooperation decreases as the number of players increases due to higher transaction and 
information costs, and the difficulty of anticipating other players' future behavior. As 
players are less likely to achieve the potential gains from cooperation (CC), a stag hunt 
game can turn into a less beneficial prisoner's dilemma (Jervis 1978). Mutual defection is 
the unique stochastically stable equilibrium in the stag hunt game (Skyrms 2004) – a 
result reminiscent of the prisoner's dilemma. 
Mumbaikars play n-person stag hunt games every day. For example, if local 
residents want to have garbage removed from their streets, they have to put together a 
modest fee. If fundraising succeeds, everyone is better off. However, this simple act of 
cooperation requires monetary contributions from hundreds of households living in the 
same, often ethnically heterogeneous neighborhood. If residents do not trust their 
neighbors because of caste or religious differences, and consequently expect fundraising 
to fail, they have little incentive to contribute. The neighborhood descends to a state of 
disorder, in which local women spend their days trying to move garbage from near their 
houses to the vicinity of their neighbors’ houses – or deterring such attempts by their 
neighbors. 
Hume (1739 [2003]) argued that an obvious solution to the tragedy of commons 
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in n-person stag hunt games is creation of the state or other political institutions able to 
coordinate cooperation between selfish and distrustful individuals: 
“Political society easily remedies both these inconveniences. Magistrates find an 
immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects. They 
need consult no body but themselves to form any scheme for the promoting of 
that interest. And as the failure of any one piece in the execution is connected, 
though not immediately, with the failure of the whole, they prevent that failure, 
because they find no interest in it, either immediate or remote. Thus bridges are 
built; harbours opened; ramparts raised; canals formed; fleets equiped; and armies 
disciplined every where, by the care of government, which, though composed of 
men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most 
subtle inventions imaginable, a composition, which is, in some measure, 
exempted from all these infirmities.” 
From the evolutionary perspective, cooperation in the n-person stag hunt game 
can be self-sustained in the long run if the initial proportion of cooperators is high enough 
(Skyrms 2004). If a sufficient number of people hunt a stag from the very beginning, they 
will eventually take over the whole population, as the less efficient hare hunters will die 
of. More complicated setups may lead to cooperative evolutionary stable equilibria if 
cooperators interact more frequently with each other (for example within a social 
network), if they are allowed to send credible signals about their type, or if they can learn 
from the past through positive reinforcement (Skyrms 2004). As members of the person’s 
group can learn about her past more easily than outsiders (Fearon and Laitin 1996; 
Habyarimana et al. 2009), cooperative solutions to the n-person stag hunt game are 
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probably more likely to emerge in bounded groups. My theory suggests that intergroup 
contact can enable coordination between cooperators across ethnic boundaries as well. 
Another way to induce more cooperation is to play an iterated version of the 
game. When people face situations analogical to the stag hunt or prisoner's dilemma 
games repeatedly and value future gains, the “shadow of the future” leads to more 
cooperation (Axelrod 1984; Oye 1985). In fact, even the prisoner's dilemma can become 
much more similar to the stag hunt as the shadow of the future reduces the relative payoff 
of exploitation (Jervis 1978). Since this mechanism is different from the one tested in the 
dissertation, participants in the Mumbai experiment knew that they would face each 
partner only once. Unlike in Axelrod’s tit-for-tat strategy, reciprocity was indirect, not 
direct. 
The experiment models simple dyadic interactions in order to establish a clear 
causal relationship between reciprocity and discrimination. This study will hopefully 
become a stepping stone for subsequent research that will explore updating of stereotypes 
in larger groups. Previous studies of n-person stag hunt games suggest that success of 
real-world interventions based on the proposed theory will probably depend on the social 
and political context. On the one hand, it may be harder to encourage cooperation among 
a large number of people than it is among two subjects inside a lab. On the other hand, 
pre-existing institutions, prior intergroup contact, and mutual interdependence in the real 
world may facilitate intergroup cooperation. 
Interactions between players and their partners in the experimental public goods 
game were anonymous. This feature makes the research design more appropriate if one 
seeks to understand intergroup relations in an urban setting, such as slums (Habyarimana 
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et al. 2009). On the other hand, processes in small-scale rural communities based on 
repeated face-to-face interactions may work differently. The dissertation’s inferences are 
also relevant to intergroup relations at the national or regional level, where sheer size of 
communities precludes repeated face-to-face interactions with most members. Given the 
fact that people in most modern societies identify themselves with and classify others into 
large cultural categories, the “imagined communities” of nations (Gellner 1983; Anderson 
1991), the model may help understand many macroscopic phenomena in the realm of 
politics. In the end, examples of people cooperating with strangers encompass a large 
range of behaviors from paying taxes to voting to fighting wars. 
 
3.1.2.2.2 Procedure of the Public Goods Game 
 
Players participated in ten rounds of a public goods game, first with five distinct 
ingroup members, and then with five distinct outgroup members. Since players knew they 
would face the same partner only once, any reciprocity would be indirect, not direct. The 
setup follows the typical procedures in experimental economics according to which 
subjects perform the same task repeatedly, each time with fresh endowments, until 
learning makes their behavior converge at an equilibrium (Camerer et al. 2004).11 
Participants were promised financial rewards contingent on their performance in 
the experimental games. Salient monetary rewards are a standard practice in economic 
11 Although more repetitions may produce more pronounced results, ten rounds generally seem to be 
sufficient to identify patterns in behavioral games. In their experiments, Fehr and Gächter (2000) used 
twenty rounds of the public goods game, while Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) fifteen. Andreoni (1995), 
Brandts and Schram (2001), Houser and Kurzban (2002), Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) used all ten 
periods. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) used only eight and Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) only six rounds. 
Ostrom (2000, 139) concluded that behavior in public goods games “closely approximates the predicted 
equilibrium by the end of the first five rounds.” 
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experiments at least since Smith (1962) and experimental economists prefer them over 
survey questions that do not entail any cost for the respondent. In the words of a popular 
experimental economics textbook, “what people say they would do in hypothetical 
situations does not necessarily correspond to what they actually do” and, therefore, “an 
experimentalist who uses unmotivated subjects can anticipate that many economists will 
challenge the results” (Friedman and Shyam 1994, 15). A half of the experimental studies 
published in the American Political Science Review also used financial rewards 
(Druckman et al. 2006). The average compensation for a half an hour-long experiment in 
the slums represented approximately 20% of the average daily household income. 
In each round, the player received 10 Rupees and could decide whether to keep 
them or to “invest them in a common project” with the partner on the screen. The partner 
made the same decision simultaneously, without any communication with the player. The 
payoff structure corresponded to the stag hunt game (Table 4): If both the player and his 
partner invested in the common project, each of them received 20 Rupees (CC). If the 
player invested, but the partner kept his money, the project failed and the player lost his 
money (CD). Alternatively, the player could simply keep the 10 Rupees. If he did so and 
the partner kept his money too, each got the payoff of 10 Rupees (DD). If the partner 
invested, but the player kept his money, the player’s payoff was still 10 Rupees, while the 
partner’s payoff was 0 (DC). The best strategy clearly depended on whether the player 
expected his partner to cooperate or not. 
Subjects played each round with a different partner and did not know the partner’s 
previous record of cooperation. After each round, a screen showed the results of the 
round: how much the player invested, how much the partner invested, whether the 
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common project succeeded, the amount of money kept, and the amount of money gained 
from the investment. As none of the subjects have ever seen a behavioral game before, 
the research team explained the payoff structure carefully before commencing the 
experiment. We went through a number of examples on a blackboard and answered all 
the questions until we were certain that everyone in the room understood the game. 
Four treatment groups correspond to the cells of Table 1. Subjects in the 
Generalized Reciprocity group always faced cooperators: first five Hindus, then five 
Muslims. Subjects in the Cooperative Hindus group played five rounds with cooperating 
Hindus and then five rounds with defecting Muslims. The Cooperative Muslims group 
was paired with uncooperative Hindus and cooperative Muslims. In the No Reciprocity 
group, all ten partners defected. The manipulated frequency of defection in the game 
created low or high expectations of cooperative behavior from Hindus and Muslims. 
These four ideal types cover the whole spectrum of possible intergroup interactions. 
One can imagine similar experiments, in which ingroup and outgroup partners 
would appear in a random sequence and their probability of cooperation would be 
different from 0 or 100%. Although such a design would be more believable to seasoned 
subjects in Western laboratories, it would also effectively multiply the number of 
treatment groups. Strictly speaking, a subject facing four Muslim cooperators and one 
Muslim defector does not receive the same treatment as a subject facing five Muslim 
cooperators. A more realistic randomization would decrease statistical power because we 
would have to compare many more groups with fewer subjects in each. 
31 percent of laboratory experiments in the American Political Science Review 
involved deception (Druckman et al. 2006). More than a half of published studies in the 
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field of social psychology also used deception (Druckman et al. 2006) and this tool is 
especially prevalent among studies of prejudice (McDermott 2002). My experimental 
design is no exception. The element of deception consisted in the participants believing 
that they were playing games with real people, while their partners were in fact generated 
by a computer program.12 Unfortunately, we would not necessarily be able to observe 
people’s behavior across all four experimental conditions without deception. The research 
aims to measure the causal effect of the treatment variable, not just to measure its 
preexisting levels and the resulting equilibrium behavior in the sample. Furthermore, as 
experiencing cooperation is the central explanatory variable here, I needed to randomize 
it across subjects to be able to draw unbiased causal inference. If I merely observed 
evolving unrestricted behavior among real pairs of people, I might have not been able to 
identify the average treatment effect (ATE) at all. Green and Tusicisny (2012) discuss 
limits of causal inference for an identical example: 
“Even a basic experimental design with only one partner, two possible outcomes 
(cooperate, defect), and 10 rounds of a public goods game creates 210 possible 
trajectories. For any given subject, the true counterfactual would be a subject 
facing precisely the same sequence of ten partners’ behaviors and differing only in 
treatment assignment. With 210 theoretical possibilities and N typically in dozens 
or hundreds, it would be virtually impossible to find a meaningful pair of subjects 
to compare.” 
Although it sounds paradoxical, another reason for deception was ethical. After 
12 First names were coded independently by two local people as exclusively Hindu, exclusively Muslim, or 
other. Only the names consistently recognized as either Hindu or Muslim were used for the computer-
generated “partners.” Faces on the photographs belonged to either Marathi-speaking Hindus or Muslims 
living in a different town near Mumbai. 
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the debriefing, subjects knew that non-cooperative behavior was generated by a computer 
and was not a real attribute of the Muslim minority. Had they encountered real 
uncooperative Muslims during the experiment, the research itself could contribute to 
negative stereotyping of this group. I decided not to take this risk due to its potential 
ethical repercussions in a violent city like Mumbai. 
Deception was explained to subjects during debriefing. Although subjects seemed 
to be genuinely surprised by this information, none of them reacted in a negative way. 
Fun and novelty greatly outweighed potential discomfort associated with deception. 
Since it would be unfair to pay a lower amount of money to those who had faced 
defectors, all subjects were given the maximum earning instead. 
Among 192 participants who interacted with the computer, none expressed 
disbelief or doubts about existence of other players during the experiment or when asked 
about it during the debriefing. This is otherwise a frequent problem among “professional 
subjects” in developed countries (Morton and Williams 2010), who might have fund the 
homogenous behavior of their partners (all members of the same group either cooperating 
or defecting) more suspicious. Replication of this experiment in a seasoned subject pool 
will probably require a greater variation in the behavior, to which subjects are exposed. 
There is no empirical evidence that experiments using deception are more harmful 
to the subjects than other experiments (McDermott 2002). However, economists are often 
concerned that participants in the experiments that involve deception will not trust other 
experimenters in the future (Morton and Williams 2010). As the likelihood that any of the 
sampled slum-dwellers will ever participate in a behavioral experiment again is 
microscopic, the sampling strategy prevents this so-called “pollution” of the sample pool 
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by deception (Henrich 2001). 
 The research design holds the potentially confounding effect of social sanctioning 
constant at zero. Subjects interacted only through computers. Their partners could not see 
their names or faces. Therefore, players had no reason to fear retaliation after the 
experiment ended. Privacy screens around computers assured anonymity inside the lab. 
In addition, subjects were not allowed to talk to each other or to look at each other’s 
screen. As they could not copy someone else’s strategy, the research design also 
minimized possible spillover effects that could otherwise lead to biased estimates of the 
ATE by violating the non-interference assumption, better known under the acronym 
SUTVA (Rubin 1990). 
Both non-compliance and attrition rates were equal to zero. Subjects were 
motivated by nontrivial financial compensation and perhaps even more by an interesting 
and novel activity. During the debriefing, many participants expressed their gratitude not 
as much for the earned money, as for the first opportunity to use a personal computer in 
their lives. That is why they took the experiment seriously and complied with the 
instructions. 
 
3.1.2.3 Second Dictator Game 
 
 In order to see whether the treatment changed other-regarding preferences, I 
repeated one round of the dictator game after the end of the public goods game. Subjects 
were asked again to divide 10 Rupees between themselves, an anonymous Hindu, and an 
anonymous Muslim. 
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3.1.3 Post-Treatment Survey 
 
The subject’s contributions to the common project serve as behavioral measures 
of cooperation. Most public goods game experiments stop here and content themselves 
with measuring the treatment effect on cooperation in an artificial laboratory setting. 
However, I also asked subjects about their real-life attitudes and behavioral intentions in 
a survey administered several minutes after the experiment. 
 In accordance to the usual practice in experimental economics (Berg et al. 1995; 
Cox 2004), I used trust as a proxy for stereotypical beliefs about cooperative behavior. 
Trust is also a major component of social capital (Putnam et al. 1993), defined as 
“institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate co-operative 
overtures” (Boix and Posner 1998, 686). According to Putnam et al. (1993) and others, 
interpersonal trust facilitates collective action, which is essential for public goods 
provision. In the words of Cox (2004, 263): 
“[Trust] is inherently a matter of the beliefs that one agent has about the behavior 
of another. An action that is trusting of another is one that creates the possibility 
of mutual benefit, if the other person is cooperative, and the risk of loss to oneself 
if the other person defects.” 
Cooperation in the public goods game indicates how much subjects trusted their 
individual Maharashtrian and Muslim partners to cooperate. The survey took one step 
further and asked about trust in Maharashtrians and Muslims in general. The survey 
measure of trust was a slightly modified Eurobarometer question: “I would like to ask 
you a question about how much trust you have in people from various groups. For each, 
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please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust 
at all?” The subjects interviewed during the pretest understood the question unanimously 
as asking whether they would found a business partnership with or lend money to a 
Muslim. 
Allport (1954) suggested that there are five ways how prejudice can be expressed 
in behavior: by antilocution (talking in terms of prejudice or making jokes), avoidance 
(avoiding contact with members of an outgroup), discrimination (actively doing 
something to deny members of an outgroup something they desire), physical attack 
(beatings, lynchings, etc.), and extermination (an attempt to eliminate an entire group). 
Allport (1954) also argued that softer forms set the stage for more serious expressions of 
prejudice. Discriminatory behavior often escalates, like in Nazi Germany, from avoidance 
to discrimination to physical attacks to extermination. As I could not observe the harshest 
forms of discriminatory behavior among the research participants, the survey asked about 
a softer form: avoidance. Tendencies to avoid contact with a member of a particular 
group are analytically interchangeable with social distance (Oskamp 2004). Accordingly, 
I used two questions from Bogardus’ social distance scale (Bogardus 1925) as proxies for 
discriminatory attitudes. The first question asks: “If it was up to you, would you accept a 
Muslim as a neighbor?” The second question asks: “If it was up to you, would you accept 
a Muslim to close kinship by marriage?” The second question represents the extreme pole 
of Bogardus' scale because even the most tolerant respondents in liberal democracies 
often discriminate against outgroups as long as family matters are concerned. Bogardus’ 
social distance scale is used often by psychologists. In the field of political science, 
Sniderman et al. (2004) measured social distance by asking how attractive an outgroup 
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member would be as a neighbor or as a life partner. A similar question about acceptance 
of neighbors is also part of the World Values Survey. 
All the indicators of hostile behavioral intentions are explicit (i.e. self-reported in 
a questionnaire) and not implicit. An example of an implicit measure would be the 
popular implicit association test (IAT), described in Greenwald et al. (1998). I decided to 
use an explicit measure because it predicts discrimination in social life better than 
implicit measures of prejudices do (Maass et al. 2000). Implicit measures do not affect 
judgmental tasks requiring some cognitive effort and they predict primarily non-verbal 
behavior (Dovidio et al. 1997). In a large number of studies, implicit measures were at 
best a weak or noisy predictor of discriminatory behavior (Blanton and Jaccard 2008). 
Although explicit measures of racism do not always produce sufficient variation in North 
America and Europe, as we will see in the section discussing the experimental results, 
Hindu slum-dwellers were more than willing to admit their bias against Muslims. 
Since Muslim players were allegedly from Bhendi Bazar, a control variable called 
“Bhendi Bazar” measured whether the subject had acquaintances in that neighborhood. I 
controlled for covariates, which appeared to be slightly imbalanced across treatment 
groups (see Table 3) in order to eliminate the observed differences between the groups: 
religious affiliation, age, number of years of schooling, household income, and voting for 
Shiv Sena or MNS in the last Lok Sabha elections.13 I also added fixed effects for the 
neighborhoods. These control variables were measured by the post-treatment survey. 
Post-treatment measurement of covariates should be generally avoided because the 
variables may be endogenous to the experimental intervention itself (Robins and 
13 To facilitate interpretation of the regression coefficients, age, income, and the number of years of 
schooling are centered at their mean values. Income is measured in thousands of Rupees. 
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Greenland 1992). Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine how the treatment could change 
subjects’ fixed attributes in this study. 
There is a disagreement in the literature about the virtue of control variables in 
randomized experiments. Maxwell and Delaney (2004) argued that inclusion of control 
variables will reduce bias if randomization is not perfect and increase precision even in a 
perfectly randomized study. But they also suggested that we should include only 
covariates balanced across treatment groups and covariates highly correlated with the 
dependent variable. Freedman (2008) cautioned that a multivariate regression may return 
biased estimates in small samples. So far, the last word in this debate is Green and 
Aronow (2011), who show that this bias diminishes quickly with the sample size and 
usually should not be a problem for samples over 20 subjects. Because of a relatively 
high N in this study, I decided to estimate the treatment effect using a multivariate 
regression with control variables. Covariates in regression models have an advantage that 
they lead to more precise estimates of the ATE. At the same time, the article also reports 
the regression coefficients without a covariate adjustment, as well as difference-in-means 
estimates of the ATE, in order to show that covariates do not substantively change the 
results (Gerber and Green 2012). Of course, other, unobserved confounding factors may 
also affect discrimination. Randomization ensures that they are orthogonal to the 
treatment and therefore do not bias the results. Design-based standard errors take into 
account randomization of treatment within three blocks (neighborhoods) and are robust to 
heteroscedasticity (Lumley 2010). 
Earlier laboratory experiments have showed that mere presence of an 
experimenter is a cue that the individual should choose a behavioral strategy that is 
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socially acceptable (Yamagishi and Suzuki 2010). Unfortunately, it was impossible to 
conduct the experiment in total anonymity because participants without prior experience 
with computers often asked for assistance. Although social desirability bias introduced by 
presence of the experimenter cannot be fully ruled out, the “desired” answers were not 
obvious because the questionnaire asked the same questions about five different ethnic 
groups, not just Maharashtrians and Muslims. As can be seen from the questionnaire in 
Appendix B, the two key questions about discrimination against Muslims appeared 
among a number of similar questions about other ethnic groups in the middle of a 
questionnaire containing 84 survey questions. Moreover, self-administered surveys, such 
as through a computer interface, are characterized by a smaller social desirability bias 
than face-to-face interviews (Groves 2004). What is important, any bias would affect all 






Figure 1 shows that subjects understood the logic of the public goods game and 
updated their expectations of cooperation based on experience in previous rounds. In the 
first round, about 77% of participants invested real money in a common project with a 
stranger on a computer screen. In comparison, the average contribution in the first round 
in Western laboratories is typically between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment (Ostrom 
2000). That said, most public goods games in Western laboratories follow the prisoner’s 
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dilemma payoff structure, where the best strategy is to defect 100% of time. The game 
used in the slums had a mixed strategy equilibrium of cooperating in 50% rounds and 
defecting in 50% rounds. 
 
Figure 1: Cooperation Rate in the Public Goods Game 
 
 
In just five rounds, trajectories of the four treatment groups quickly diverged. By 
the fifth round, the cooperation rate in the two groups that encountered Hindu defectors 
(Cooperative Muslims and No Reciprocity) dropped by half, in a 0.95 movement in 
standard deviation of the initial cooperation rate. On the other hand, the two groups that 
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faced cooperative players (Generalized Reciprocity and Cooperative Hindus) retained the 
initial high level of cooperation. In fact, the proportion of cooperators increased from 
75% to 82% (or 0.17 movement in standard deviation of the initial cooperation rate). The 
difference of 40 percentage points between the groups with cooperative and 
uncooperative partners was highly significant, with all p-values lower than 0.001.14 
 In this anonymous setting, natural – as opposed to induced by social sanctioning – 
preference for one’s own ethnic group would have manifested itself by a drop in 
cooperation, when ethnicity of the partner changed suddenly in the middle of the 
experiment from the last Hindu partner in the fifth round to the first Muslim partner in the 
sixth round. In reality, the drop in the cooperation rate was rather small: 6 percentage 
point in the Generalized Reciprocity group, 9 percentage points in the Cooperative 
Hindus group, and 10 percentage points in the Cooperative Muslims group. In the No 
Reciprocity treatment group, the cooperation rate in fact increased by 4 percentage 
points. None of these differences was statistically significant. Clearly, cooperation across 
ethnic lines in the slums of Mumbai is possible. 
Willingness to invest money in a transaction with a Muslim during a laboratory 
game reflects the level of market integration in Mumbai. Autorickshaws, the ubiquitous 
three-wheelers of South Asian roads, offer a cogent illustration of the existing Hindu-
Muslim economic ties. Autorickshaws in Mumbai are almost exclusively owned by 
Marathas. However, Marathi owners rent them out for exorbitant amounts of money to 
14 P-values in all comparisons of means across treatment groups in this study were obtained using 
randomization inference under the sharp null hypothesis of no difference between the two groups. Unlike a 
t-test or other parametric tests, randomization inference does not assume normality and independence. The 
only assumption is that assignment of treatment is random – which it is. Fisher (1935) developed 
randomization inference as the ideal nonparametric test for experimental data. An important advantage is 
that randomization inference will work with any sample size and any scale of the outcome variable (Gerber 
and Green 2012). As the theoretical argument predicts the direction of the effects, p-values are one-tailed. 
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Muslims and immigrants from North India, who actually drive the vehicles. As 
paradoxical as it sounds, the same Marathi owners typically support the political parties 
promoting hatred of Muslims (Shiv Sena) and of North Indian immigrants (MNS). 
Although a principally exploitative relationship between owners and drivers does not 
necessarily improve intergroup relations, familiarity with intergroup economic ties may 
explain the lack of ethnic bias in the public goods game. This example is in line with a 
string of earlier observations that, unlike indirect exchange between groups, intergroup 
contact in work situations does not lower prejudice (Amir 1969; Molm et al. 2003). 
The cooperation rate in the Generalized Reciprocity group rose ultimately to 88 
percent (0.29 movement in standard deviation of the initial cooperation rate in the sixth 
round). On the other hand, the proportion of cooperators in the Cooperative Hindus group 
dropped from 75 to 36 percent after the players realized that their Muslim partners did 
not reciprocate cooperation. This drop corresponds to a 0.87 movement of standard 
deviation. 
Interestingly, the equilibrium cooperation rate in both groups that encountered 
Muslim defectors (Cooperative Hindus, and No Reciprocity) was the same despite a 
different history of the first five rounds. One third of the sample kept contributing despite 
their partners’ defections and regardless of the defectors’ social identity. Unlike 
conditional cooperators in the rest of the sample, they were probably motivated by 
altruism (Ledyard 1995), confusion (Andreoni 1995), or ambiguity aversion (Di Mauro 
and Castro 2011) instead of reciprocity. The number of altruistic and confused players in 
Indian slums is no different from that among students in developed countries. In Western 
laboratories, almost 30% of subjects contribute in the announced last round of a finitely 
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repeated prisoner’s dilemma game (Ostrom 2000). In addition, approximately one tenth 
of the Mumbai sample defected in the last period of the game despite facing nine 
cooperators in previous rounds. That leaves the number of conditional cooperators in the 
slums just slightly higher than 50 percent. A seminal laboratory study among Swiss 
students by Fischbacher et al. (2001) also classified 50% subjects as conditional 
cooperators (and 30% as free riders).  
The cooperation rate in the Cooperative Muslims group eventually doubled by the 
tenth round (from 33 to 69 percent). This increase by 47 percentage points corresponds to 
a 0.78 move in standard deviation of the cooperation rate in the sixth round. However, the 
Cooperative Muslims group never converged at the same high level of cooperation as the 
Generalized Reciprocity group (88%, difference with a p-value of 0.02). A pairwise 
comparison of means shows that the average final contributions in the Generalized 
Reciprocity and Cooperative Muslims groups are significantly different from those in the 
Cooperative Hindus and the No Reciprocity groups (all p-values<0.001). There is no 
statistically significant difference between the average final contributions in the 
Cooperative Hindus and No Reciprocity groups. 
Qualitative data gathered during interviews after the experiment suggest that 
players were not as risk averse as I expected. This is how one member of the ill-fated No 
Reciprocity group explained his strategy: “I went on with the investment of ten Rupees 
every time in order to get the maximum profit. My partners didn’t invest more than zero 
Rupees and I ultimately ended in gaining no profit at all.” What is intriguing, some 
subjects kept investing despite no contributions from their partners. As one of them said: 
“My partner didn’t invest but I didn’t feel anything for that. Still I went on investing the 
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amount.” These dispassionate responses suggest that my study may have a problem with 
the house money effect. Building on prospect theory, Thaler and Johnson (1990, 657) 
argued that experiments with financial incentives often suffer from the same problem: 
“After a gain, subsequent losses that are smaller than the original gain' can be integrated 
with the prior gain, mitigating the influence of loss aversion and facilitating risk-
seeking.” As the subjects in the slums were playing with the money given to them by the 
experimenter, they were more willing to take risks than if they had to earn the same 
amount of money by working. Risk-seekers probably cooperate more even if they should 
not (i.e., when they expect the other player to defect). As a result, the difference between 
people with high and low expectations of cooperation may be even bigger than it appears. 
 Conditioned by past behavior, ethnically heterogeneous pairs produced as much 
public goods as ethnically homogenous pairs in the public goods game. Regardless of 
ethnicity, participants cooperated with those whom they trusted to reciprocate 
cooperation. But did a positive interaction with Muslims change attitudes towards 




 This dissertation advances an argument that experiencing indirect reciprocity in 
interactions with individual Muslims should change stereotypical beliefs about 
cooperative behavior of Muslims as a group. If this is true, we should observe increased 
generalized trust of Muslims in the treatment groups that interacted with cooperative 
Muslim players. In order to identify the average treatment effect, this and the subsequent 
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section compare only the treatment groups that shared the same history of play with 
ingroup members and differed in nothing but cooperativeness of outgroup members: 
Generalized Reciprocity vs. Cooperative Hindus, and Cooperative Muslims vs. No 
Reciprocity. Comparing all four groups together would not allow to disentangle the 
treatment effect of the rounds played with Muslims from the effect of the rounds played 
with Hindus. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of subjects who reported in the post-treatment 
survey that they had “no trust at all” or “not very much trust” in Muslims. Interaction 
with cooperative outgroup members reduced distrust of the outgroup as a whole by 23 
and 15 percentage points, with p-values of 0.02 and 0.08 respectively, in comparison to 
the corresponding treatment groups that faced noncooperative Muslims. Table A.2 in the 
Appendix shows that these results were practically unchanged by covariate adjustment. 
 




Although the experiment was ostensibly about “cooperation between people from 
different neighborhoods” and never mentioned “Muslims” as a group at all, subjects 
generalized their experience with individual seemingly Muslim partners on the computer 
screen to the Muslims as a social category and updated their stereotypes. 
When asked later to explain why they trusted Muslims, five subjects mentioned 
positive reciprocity. In the words of one of them: “I trust the Muslim people because we 
have Muslims as our neighbors. They help us in all situations and they also mix with us. 
They do not try to hurt us.” Three subjects justified their mistrust of Muslims by negative 
reciprocity, believing that Muslims do try to hurt members of other groups and keep 
social distance by not inviting Hindus to their houses. Three subjects perceived Muslims 
as a heterogeneous mix of “good and bad people,” while two subjects talked about the 
shared history and identity. 
 
3.2.3 Social Distance 
 
 The post-treatment survey shows that interaction with Muslims during the 
experiment changed discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims as a group. Let us look 
first at the survey question whether the respondent would accept a Muslim as a neighbor 
(top two graphs in Figure 3). The proportion of people who would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor dropped from 54% in the No Reciprocity condition to 41% in the Cooperative 
Muslims group. Although in the predicted direction, the treatment effect was not 
statistically significant in this case (p-value=0.09). On the other hand, the difference of 24 
percentage points between the Generalized Reciprocity and Cooperative Hindus groups 
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was significant (p-value=0.01, 0.5 standard deviation movement). As these two groups 
differed only in whether their Muslim partners cooperated with them, the large effect can 
be attributed to the treatment and not to pre-existing differences between the two groups. 
 





The effect of reciprocity remains strong even after controlling for covariates 
(Table 5). As covariate adjustment allows to estimate the treatment effect more precisely, 
both coefficients are now statistically significant. 
 
Table 5: Logistic Regression Predicting Social Distance (Neighbors) 
 Generalized Reciprocity and 
Cooperative Hindus groups 
Cooperative Muslims and 
No Reciprocity groups 














Magathane   0.435 
(0.663) 
  1.346. 
(0.743) 
Shivaji Nagar   0.719 
(0.740) 
  1.037 
(0.899) 








Age   0.006 
(0.034) 
  0.040 
(0.031) 
Education   0.011 
(0.052) 
  0.171. 
(0.094) 
Income  -0.002 
(0.007) 
  0.008 
(0.007) 




Intercept  0.214  0.247  0.167  0.360 
N  95  88  97  89 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The post-riots Mumbai is an ethnically segregated society. 149 out of 210 
respondents (71%) in the control group said they would not accept a Muslim neighbor, 
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while only 3 out of 210 respondents would not accept a Marathi. Although experimenters 
rarely ask subjects about their inner motivations, I was interested in understanding why 
subjects answered this question as they did. The qualitative data support the story that 
arose from the quantitative analysis. Only one of eight interviewed respondents did not 
mind Muslims living in his neighborhood. His explanation nicely illustrates the causal 
argument advanced by this study: “We allow the Muslim people to be our neighbors 
because they are very honest and help us all the time in all the situations” (italics added 
by author for emphasis). In other words, the subject was motivated by positive reciprocity. 
Seven respondents offered a variety of explanations of why they did not desire Muslims 
in their neighborhood. According to one respondent, Muslims “are not good people,” 
“cannot behave nicely,” and “always quarrel with their neighbors.” Another said that 
Muslims “are not good people by nature” and “cannot behave in good manner.” Another 
respondent even called Muslims “goons by nature.” These responses reveal negative 
reciprocity driven by adverse stereotypes of Muslims. Two interviewed participants were 
afraid of a perceived threat. Among them, the most appalling, but also somewhat 
understandable answer in the context of the violent ethnic conflict in Mumbai, was: “I do 
not accept the Muslim people as my neighbors because it is very difficult to survive 
beside them in the time of riots.” Finally, two answers highlighted cultural differences 
between ingroup and outgroup. According to these two respondents, “[Muslims’] living 
standard is not well according to our culture” and “they give too much importance to 
their religion.” The interviews show clearly that participants had their real living 
conditions in slums – and not some hypothetical counterfactual of a more peaceful 
society – in mind while answering the survey question on social distance. Therefore, the 
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qualitative evidence increases confidence in internal validity of the experimental results. 
Surprisingly, the change in prejudice could be discerned easily even from the 
answers to Bogardus' harshest indicator of social distance, that is the question whether 
the participants would “accept a Muslim to close kinship by marriage.” In India, marriage 
is one of the most revered institutions. According to a survey from 2005, 95% of Indian 
marriages are arranged by parents with little to no say of the actual bride (Desai and 
Andrist 2010). Predictably, a vast majority of marriages occur not only within the same 
religion, but also within the same caste (jati). The control group displayed a strong 
preference for ethnic endogamy: 170 out of 210 respondents (81%) said that they would 
not accept a Muslim marrying into their family, while 209 out of 210 respondents would 
accept a Maharashtrian. 
Given the importance of ethnicity in the selection of a marriage partner, I did not 
expect any effect of the experimental treatment on attitudes concerning intermarriage. 
Nevertheless, as the bottom portion of Figure 3 shows, the experimental treatments 
decreased the number of people who would not accept a Muslim to marry into their 
family by 27 (from Cooperative Hindus to Generalized Reciprocity) and 17 (from No 
Reciprocity to Cooperative Muslims) percentage points. The difference-in-means 
estimator of the ATE is fairly large – a 0.4 to 0.6 movement in standard deviation – and 
statistically significant (with a p-value of less than 0.01 for the first comparison and less 
than 0.05 for the second one). After including all the control variables in the regression, 
the treatment effect of Generalized Reciprocity retains its statistical significance (p-value 
< 0.001), but the effect of Cooperative Muslims is significant only at the 0.1 level (see 
Table 6). 
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Table 6: Logistic Regression Predicting Social Distance (Intermarriage) 
 Generalized Reciprocity and 
Cooperative Hindus groups 
Cooperative Muslims and 
No Reciprocity groups 














Magathane  -0.928 
(0.877) 
  1.272* 
(0.628) 
Shivaji Nagar  -1.850. 
(0.944) 
  1.732. 
(0.887) 




Hindu   1.049 
(0.841) 
  0.609 
(0.627) 




Education  -0.117. 
(0.060) 
  0.009 
(0.065) 
Income   0.006 
(0.007) 
  0.007 
(0.006) 




Intercept  1.186***  2.533**  0.990** -0.160 
N  95  88  97  89 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
I suspect that the treatment effect appears to be so strong because it was measured 
immediately after the experiment. I could not observe how quickly the effect of 
reciprocity decays in time. This is a general weakness of all laboratory, lab-in-the-field, 
and survey experiments. One can imagine a follow-up study, in which measurement of 
hostile behavioral intentions – or of behavior itself – occurs in various randomized 
intervals ranging from hours to months after the experiment. Since such a modified 
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research design would make a debriefing more difficult, it would prevent the use of 
deception. It would also raise ethical concerns about artificially induced negative 
stereotypes influencing subjects outside the laboratory. 
By necessity, the treatment groups used for pairwise comparisons differed not 
only in whether Muslim partners cooperated, but also in the overall payout gained during 
the experiment. For example, as subjects in the Generalized Reciprocity group never 
faced defectors, they earned more money on average than subjects in the Cooperative 
Hindus group. Higher earnings may have led to less discrimination simply due to 
improved mood or some other reason. Unfortunately, as payout and treatment assignment 
are by necessity highly correlated (with r equal to 0.80 for the Generalized Reciprocity 
and Cooperative Hindus groups), multicollinearity prevents inclusion of the payout in the 
same regression as the treatment. 
What I could do instead was to compare two treatment groups with the same 
number of cooperative partners (Cooperative Hindus vs. Cooperative Muslims). Despite 
similar earnings (Rs. 130 in the Cooperative Hindus group and Rs. 115 in the 
Cooperative Muslims group), discrimination in the Cooperative Muslims group was 
lower by 19 percentage points (p-value=0.03) using the question about intermarriage and 
by 15 percentage points for the question about a Muslim neighbor (p-value=0.11). 
The questionnaire asked the same questions about four different outgroups: 
Muslims, Gujaratis, Biharis, and Parsis. If discrimination against Muslims is lowered by 
higher earnings and not group-specific reciprocity, we should observe the same effect on 
discriminatory attitudes towards other outgroups as well. Figure A.1 in the Appendix 
plots average discriminatory attitudes in four treatment groups. Whereas patterns of 
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discrimination against Muslims are in the predicted direction (thick lines, with lower 
discrimination in the Generalized Reciprocity and Cooperative Muslims groups), 
discrimination of other outgroups (thin lines) does not follow any discernible pattern, 
except for perhaps slightly higher discrimination in the No Reciprocity group. If driven 
by earnings, all lines, whether thick or thin, should correlate with the average payout – 
represented by the number of Rupees just above the x-axis. 
The treatment in the public goods experiment had a negative effect on 
discrimination, as predicted by the theory, across a variety of specifications (comparisons 
of means, regressions, two different measures of social distance). Subjects generalized 
their positive experience with Muslim cooperators to the ethnic group as a whole. At the 
same time, negative experience with Muslims during the experiment did not increase 
discrimination because avoidance of Muslims in the Cooperative Hindus and No 
Reciprocity groups was not significantly higher than in the control group (see Table A.3 




The findings would be less relevant if I found out that, for example, political 
extremists were immune to the treatment. Therefore, I replicated the regression analysis, 
but this time including interactions between treatments and two covariates of interest: 
religious affiliation and past voting for extremist parties. As Table A.4 in the Appendix 
shows, interaction terms were statistically insignificant. Moreover, when I replicated all 
the regressions using a sub-sample restricted to Hindus, it did not change any of the 
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substantive findings – only made some of the treatment coefficients appear slightly more 
or less significant than before. In other words, Hindus responded to increased 
expectations of cooperative behavior in the same way as Buddhists did and voters of 
extreme nationalist parties (Shiv Sena and MNS) in the same way as moderates. A 
homogenous effect across different subgroups gives more confidence in the external 
validity of the results.15 The fact that supporters of extremist political parties responded 





 The experimental intervention reduced the pre-existing ethnic bias substantially, 
but it did not erase it completely. Although acceptance of Muslims as potential neighbors 
was higher in the Generalized Reciprocity (69%) and Cooperative Muslims (59%) groups 
than in the control group (29%), it was much lower than acceptance of fellow 
Maharashtrians (92-99%, depending on the treatment group). Similarly, the Generalized 
Reciprocity group trusted Muslims (77%) more than the control group did (59%), but 
ingroup members still enjoyed more trust across all treatment conditions (83-96%). 
Curiously, Hindu subjects in the slums of Mumbai displayed little ethnic 
favoritism in laboratory games. I already discussed likely reasons for why the 
cooperation rate in the public goods game did not change much as ethnicity of partners 
15 The treatment effect may still be heterogeneous across some unobserved subgroups. However, this 
heterogeneity does not necessarily undermine external validity of the findings. According to Monte Carlo 
simulations run by Druckman and Kam (2011), the estimate of the treatment effect will be biased only if 
the unobserved variable that is moderating it does not vary virtually at all in the sample. 
                                                 
84 
suddenly changed between the fifth and sixth round. Similarly, Figure 4 demonstrates that 
the anonymous dictator game did not reveal any natural ingroup bias in how subjects 
distributed money between themselves, a Hindu, and a Muslim. The difference between 
the amount of money allocated on average to an ingroup member (Rs. 1.79) and to an 
outgroup member (Rs. 1.86) was insignificant both substantively and statistically (p-
value=0.457). In fact, the modal strategy was to give each of the two other players one 
Rupee and pocket the rest. When not observed by anyone, 52% of participants rewarded 
themselves with 8 out of 10 Rupees that they could distribute. Ethnocentrism was not a 
strong factor in people’s decisions during the experiment – especially while compared to 
the strong causal effect of reciprocity. 
 
Figure 4: Average Contributions in the First Dictator Game 
 
This result contradicts the usual understanding of social identity theory and some 
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earlier observations. For example, Democrats and Republicans in the United States gave 
more to the recipient from their own party than from the other party while playing the 
dictator game (Fowler and Kam 2006). On the other hand, Yamagishi and Mifune (2008) 
reported that ingroup favoritism in the dictator game disappeared in an anonymous 
setting, when recipients did not know the identity of the dictator. Similarly, Habyarimana 
et al. (2009) found that subjects in Uganda did not favor their coethnics, when they were 
free to express their true preferences in an anonymous setting. The dictator game in India 
confirms these earlier findings from Japan and Uganda. After anonymity disentangled 
altruism from the effect of social sanctioning, we observe no ethnocentric altruism and, in 
effect, not much general altruism either. 
Qualitative evidence from a small number of interviews conducted after the 
experiment confirms a limited role of ethnocentrism. None of the eleven subjects asked to 
explain their motivation in the first dictator game mentioned ethnicity. In fact, they were 
mostly talking about themselves. A typical answer was “I kept the money with me 
because I wanted more money.” Several interviews suggested that altruism in the slums 
of Mumbai does not extend beyond one’s immediate social network and therefore may 
not be generalized to the imagined communities of big ethnic groups. As one subject put 
it: “I gave one Rupee to each of them because I didn't know them at all.” 
Although the experiment did not manipulate altruism, observational data collected 
during the experiment provide more evidence for insignificance of this variable. Table 
A.5 in the Appendix shows that baseline altruism towards Muslims, as revealed by the 
dictator game played before the experimental manipulation, did not correlate with 
discriminatory attitudes expressed in the post-treatment survey. Reciprocity and altruism 
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are two very different aspects of other-regarding preferences (Meier 2006). In Indian 
slums, it seems, there is not much altruism at the first place and the existing altruism does 
not predict discrimination very well. Reciprocity, on the other hand, has a strong causal 
effect on discriminatory attitudes. 
The effect of reciprocity is direct and independent from altruism. Comparing the 
results of the dictator games played before and after the treatment shows that a positive 
experience with Muslims reduced discriminatory intentions without changing the 
baseline altruism. Table A.6 in the Appendix regresses the difference between the amount 
given to a Muslim in the second dictator game and the amount given to a Muslims in the 
first dictator game on treatment. The treatment effect is indistinguishable from zero and 
strategies used in the two dictator games did not differ much (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Average Contributions in the Second Dictator Game 
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 Social identity theory and its extensions in political science predict that people 
with a salient collective identity should favor coethnics more and they should 
discriminate more strongly against the outgroup (Brown 2000). As Brewer (1999) 
discusses at length, these two predictions are often conflated in the literature, though 
negative attitudes towards outgroups are not necessarily related to ingroup bias. There is 
little evidence for either claim in the observational data gathered during the Mumbai 
experiment. To find out more about the statistical association between identity salience, 
ingroup bias, and outgroup discrimination, the questionnaire included two covariates that 
serve as proxies for ingroup identity salience: attachment to Maharashtra (and thus to the 
Marathi identity) and frequency of praying (indicating the person’s attachment to the 
Hindu religion). “Attachment” to one’s identity is considered to be the best measure of 
identity salience (Sinnott 2006) and the wording of my question is used on a regular basis 
by Eurobarometer. For the model with the frequency of prayer, I included only the Hindu 
subjects. 
Table A.7 in the Appendix summarizes the results for discriminatory attitudes. 
Religious Hindus are no more or less likely to tolerate Muslims, though the question 
about accepting a Muslim neighbor may indicate slightly stronger discriminatory 
intentions among more religious people (p-value=0.06). A Salient Marathi identity turned 
out to be a poor predictor of acceptance of a Muslim marrying into the subject’s family. 
In another surprising result, attachment to Maharashtra correlates negatively – not 
positively – with discrimination against Muslim neighbors (p-value=0.03).  
Table A.8 tests the weaker claim that people with a stronger salient ingroup 
identity favor their coethnics more. In reality, there is no statistical association between 
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identity salience and ingroup favoritism, as measured by the amount of money given to a 
Hindu in the dictator game. 
The results of the Dictator Game contradict Hamilton’s Rule, according to which 
people aid their genetic relatives more than strangers (Hamilton 1996). Given the low 
level of intermarriage between Maharashtrians and Muslims, there should be more 
genetic variation between these two groups than between the Maharashtrian subjects and 
their supposedly Maharashtrian partners. However, Marathi facial features and names did 
not elicit more altruism than photographs and names of Muslims. Despite contradicting a 
popular socio-biological view, this finding is consistent with an empirical observation 
from a very different part of the world. Analyzing survey data from the United States, 
Phan et al. (2009) found that Americans rely on friends, neighbors, and co-workers more 
than on siblings or other relatives, with the exception of parents and children. 
 
3.2.6 Reciprocity and Contact 
 
Chapter 1 suggested that reciprocity is a causal channel through which intergroup 
contact reduces prejudice. Although we will examine the connection between contact, 
reciprocity, and prejudice more fully in the next chapter, observational evidence in the 
experimental data indicates that the detected treatment effect can be attributed to 
reciprocity during the experiment and not to previous intergroup contact. Coefficients of 
the treatment variables did not change when the covariate adjustment included an 
indicator of acquaintances in the Muslim enclave of Bhendi Bazar (Tables 4 and 5). The 
treatment effect remained strong even after controlling directly for quantity and quality of 
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previous contact with Muslims (Table A.9 in the appendix).16 
Table A.9 also shows that people who had been taken advantage of by Muslims 
were no more or less responsive to the updating of their stereotypes during the 
experiment. Nor was there any sign of a stronger (or weaker) treatment effect among 
those who had been in less frequent contact with Muslims. Statistical insignificance of 
the interaction terms included in the models indicates that previous intergroup contact did 
not moderate the treatment effect. 
Finally, let us look at the optimal conditions of positive contact proposed by the 
contact hypothesis literature. Three of the optimal conditions of positive contact 
(common goal, cooperative interdependence, support of the authorities) were held 
constant at a positive value across all four treatments. Both the subject and his on-screen 
partner shared the common goal of earning money, depended on each other in this 
pursuit, and the experimenter sanctioned their positive interaction. Due to a lack of 
variation, these three conditions cannot explain the detected differences between the 
treatment groups. 
The fourth condition, equal status, could not be met during the interaction because 
the social status of Muslims in Mumbai is considered generally lower than the social 
status of Maharashtrians. On average, the sampled slum-dwellers also expressed this 
belief. In the post-treatment survey, participants were asked to place various ethnic 
groups living in Mumbai each on one of ten rungs of a hypothetical ladder corresponding 
16 Quantity of intergroup contact is measured by the answer to the question “How often do you have 
informal talks with Muslims?” running from -2 (“never”) to 2 (“very often”). Quality of contact is 
measured by the question “How often have you been taken advantage of by a Muslim?” using the same 
scale. These measures come from Islam and Hewstone (1993). Their advantage is that they have been used 
in the population of Indian Hindus and Muslims before, though only in a very small student convenience 
sample (Tausch et al. 2009). 
                                                 
90 
to socioeconomic status.17 The subjects perceived other Marathi people on average as 
having a significantly (p-value<0.001) higher social status (5.9 out of 10) than Muslims 
(4.4 out of 10). 
Since some individuals might have perceived Muslims as more or less equal in 
social status to the Marathi people, I also regressed discriminatory intentions on the 
perceived difference in social status between these two groups. The coefficient of relative 
social status in the regression predicting social distance was close to zero and statistically 
insignificant (see Table A.10 in the Appendix). As all interactions between social status 
and treatments were insignificant as well, the social status differential did not moderate 
the causal effect of reciprocity. The Mumbai experiment shows that it is possible to 
reduce prejudice by a very specific type of positive intergroup contact even in the case of 




 Experiencing indirect reciprocity in a laboratory game increased trust and reduced 
discriminatory intentions in two completely unrelated domains – ethnic segregation of 
housing in slums and intermarriage. This finding indicates that expectations of reciprocity 
are not only generalizable from the individual to the group, but also across situations. The 
treatment produced a robust causal effect in the predicted direction on cooperation, trust, 
17 The MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social Status that I used was originally developed to measure 
subjective social status in health surveys (Goodman et al. 2001). To my knowledge, it has not been 
employed in political science yet despite its growing popularity in other fields. Post-treatment measurement 
of covariates should be generally avoided because such variables may be in reality endogenous to the 
experimental intervention itself. However, the treatment most likely did not affect the perceived social 
status of Maharashtrians and Muslims because there are no significant differences in the average social 
status of these two ethnic groups across the four treatment groups. 
                                                 
91 
and discrimination across different specifications of the model. The treatment effect 
seems to be homogenous across various subgroups. At the same time, salience of social 
identities, altruism, and previous intergroup contact explain surprisingly little variation of 
the dependent variables. 
The optimistic conclusion of this chapter naturally leads to the question why we 
see so much ingroup bias and so little outgroup bias in real life. One possible explanation 
is that it is easier to find and punish someone who exploited one’s trust if the person 
belongs to one’s own group (Habyarimana et al. 2007). In addition to this straightforward 
mechanism, information about the person’s untrustworthiness can spread through her 
social network and reach potential partners that have not encountered her yet. Since 
social networks are usually denser within than across ethnic groups, it should be easier to 
obtain information about the past of a coethnic (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Laboratory 
experiments in different countries detected more cooperation between coethnics only 
when they were seen by others to cooperate, and no preference for ingroup members in 
an anonymous setting, in which no punishment of defectors was possible (Habyarimana 
et al. 2009; Yamagishi and Mifune 2008). If social sanctioning generally facilitates 
cooperation with ingroup members, it will increase expectations of reciprocity within the 
ingroup in the long run. In terms of my model, this tendency will lead to a situation 
equivalent to the Cooperative Hindus treatment group. 
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Chapter 4. Selective Discrimination of Outgroups 
 
 Laboratory experiments described in the previous chapter identified a clear causal 
relationship between reciprocity and discrimination against the Muslim minority. This 
chapter uses survey data collected in the control group to assess whether we can observe 
the same association between real-life reciprocity and discrimination in relations to a 
larger number of ethnic minorities. The two chapters complement each other. The 
experiment allows to draw causal inference unbiased by endogeneity. The survey shows 
that the identified relationship between the key variables is not an artifact of the 
laboratory setting or some particular Hindu-Muslim dynamics. The survey analysis 
presented in this chapter also provides an explanation for why the same person often 
discriminates against some, but not other outgroups. 
 
4.1 Puzzling Selective Discrimination and Its Explanations 
 
Chapter 1 discussed briefly the puzzling selective discrimination of outgroups. 
Why would the same person discriminate against a Russian immigrant, but not against an 
Irish immigrant? Why would a Marathi rioter kill a Muslims neighbor and spare a 
Gujarati? The theory proposed in this dissertation makes a prediction about the likely 
patterns of discrimination across multiple outgroups. If people tend to discriminate 
against groups not believed to be cooperative – as the experiment in Chapter 3 
demonstrated – we should be able to observe more discrimination targeting mistrusted 
ethnic groups in real life. Furthermore, if people update their stereotypes as theorized in 
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Chapter 1, we should be able to observe a negative correlation between a person’s 
discrimination against a particular group in the present and cooperative behavior by 
members of the same group experienced by the same person in the past. 
Obviously, this correlation may be spurious if not controlled for previous 
intergroup contact. Contact itself plausibly increases the number of opportunities for 
positive (and negative) experience. However, contact’s effect on discrimination may be 
mediated by other factors apart from reciprocity. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) listed 
increased liking, reduced anxiety, perceived outgroup variability, and several other 
candidates for intervening variables between intergroup contact and prejudice. Therefore, 
the direct effect of intergroup contact, or, rather, its effect unmediated by positive 
reciprocity is an alternative explanation that one has to take into account. 
To assess relative importance of reciprocity, this variable should be also compared 
to other existing explanations. According to a view associated with realistic group 
conflict theory, competition for scarce resources drives intergroup conflict (Sherif et al. 
1961). Obviously, not all groups compete for scarce resources. Posner (2004) predicted 
that relations should be worse between groups that are large enough to form a minimum 
winning coalition required to seize control of the contested resource. Consequently, a 
dominant group, such as Marathi-speakers, should feel threatened more as the relative 
size of an ethnic minority increases (Blalock 1967). 
Although relative group size is a plausible objective predictor of realistic conflict 
between groups, perception of collective threat is ultimately subjective. In principle, 
people can be concerned with perceived group threat in three major domains. First, an 
ethnic minority can be regarded as either a direct economic competitor or a scapegoat for 
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worsening economic conditions (Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Hardin 1995). Second, it 
can represent a threat to the person’s safety (Sniderman et al. 2004) due to the group’s 
association with crime, terrorism, or open warfare. Third, the minority can pose a threat 
to cultural identity (Sniderman et al. 2004). These types of threat are to some degree 
overlapping with the classification proposed by Stephan and Stephan (2000). In their 
integrated threat theory of intergroup attitudes, Stephan and Stephan differentiated 
between “realistic threats” to the group’s political and economic power and “symbolic 
threats,” which are essentially perceived differences in norms and values. 
Another factor to take into account is relative status. Empirical research in 
psychology reviewed by Hewstone et al. (2002) and Brown (2000) shows that high-status 
groups express more group bias than low-status groups. Their bias is especially strong if 
they perceive the status gap to be closing. Mirroring these laboratory results, Petersen 
(2002) found that status reversals triggered ethnic violence in twentieth century Eastern 
Europe. For example, Ukrainians attacked the resented Polish settlers in 1939, after the 
Soviet occupation reversed abruptly the high status of the Polish ethnic identity. In his 
book about Russian minorities in the “near abroad,” Laitin (1998) argued that the high 
social status of westernized Baltic nations may persuade the Russian minority in Latvia to 
assimilate, while Russians living in Kazakhstan are reluctant to adopt the language of the 
low-status local majority. In Laitin’s account, social status of ethnic groups in the post-
Soviet space is derived from their perceived level of modernity. There is also some 
evidence suggesting that the concept of social status obscures several different 
dimensions, each of them producing different behavior. For example, Cuddy et al. (2007) 
found that both admired and pitied groups elicited helping behavior, while envied and 
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hated groups elicited active harm. 
Finally, the last group-level explanation to test my theory against is the common 
ingroup identity model, formulated by Gaertner et al. (1989) and Gaertner et al. (1993). It 
claims that people discriminate less against the outgroups that share some superordinate 
identity with them. A superordinate identity is an identity held by the members of 
otherwise distinct subgroups, along with their particular subgroup (subordinate) 
identities. For example, Germans and French share a common European identity without 
surrendering their national identities. 
 
4.2 Research design 
 
 I regressed discriminatory attitudes on various measures of reciprocity and 
intergroup contact while controlling for prominent alternative explanations from the 
literature. The dataset is based on a survey of 210 randomly sampled adult male Marathi-
speaking slum-dwellers who served as a control group in the experiments described in the 
previous chapter. They were all interviewed by two male Hindu research assistants in the 
Marathi language. They did not receive any experimental treatment that could affect the 
results. 
The questionnaire asked the Marathi respondents a number of questions about 
four different ethnic minorities living in Mumbai: Muslims, Gujaratis, Biharis, and 
Parsis. The groups were chosen to maximize variation in the independent variables.18 As 
the same person could discriminate in different ways against these four ethnic groups, the 
18 Table A.11 in the Appendix summarizes the descriptive statistics of the used variables. 
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unit of observation is the respondent-outgroup dyad. All independent and dependent 
variables are measured separately for each dyad. Each respondent is thus responsible for 
four observations in the dataset. Since we cannot consider these observations statistically 
independent, robust standard errors are clustered at the level of individual respondent. 
Just as in the previous chapter, social distance serves as a proxy for discriminatory 
attitudes. Again, I used two different questions from the social distance scale developed 
by Bogardus (1925). The first question asks: “If it was up to you, would you accept a 
[member of a group] as a neighbor?” The second question asks: “If it was up to you, 
would you accept a [member of a group] to close kinship by marriage?” I took the 
average of the two to produce a composite indicator of discrimination, running from 0 
(would accept both a neighbor and a family member) to 1 (would not accept either). 
The measure of intergroup contact is based on Islam and Hewstone (1993) and 
has been used to study Hindu-Muslim relations in India by Tausch et al. (2009). The 
question asked: “How often do you have informal talks with [group]?” The question was 
asked separately about Muslims, Gujaratis, Biharis, and Parsis. Respondents could pick 
an answer from a scale ranging from -2 (never) to 2 (very often). 
To capture the effect of positive reciprocity, the survey asked respondents whether 
they had experienced cooperation with members of the listed outgroups: “In the past 
twelve months, which people, if any, have helped you directly by giving you money or 
some of their time?” A separate dichotomous variable for each group was coded 1 if the 
respondent had received any help from a member of that particular group and 0 
otherwise. Similarly to this work, Coleman (1988) defined reciprocity by giving and 
receiving help. The specific indicator employed in this study is inspired by a question in 
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the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) that Phan et al. (2009) used to 
study reciprocity in the United States. 
Self-reported received help is not a perfect indicator of the outgroup’s real 
cooperative behavior because the respondent’s perception can be biased by the quality of 
intergroup relationship. On the other hand, attitudes are motivated by the person’s 
perception of cooperativeness, not an objectively measured real record of cooperation. 
Due to the potential endogeneity problem, the analysis presented in this chapter is not as 
strong as the direct experimental test of the theory in Chapter 3. Saying that, both 
chapters found the same hypothesized correlation between reciprocity and ethnic 
discrimination. In another caveat, received generosity is but one example of cooperative 
interaction. As people could learn about other groups’ cooperativeness from many other 
sources, the used indicator is probably very noisy. 
Increased contact does not create only opportunities for cooperation, but also for 
defection. That is why the analysis also includes negative reciprocity. Negative 
reciprocity is measured by the question “How often have you been taken advantage of by 
[group]?” Tausch et al. (2009) adopted this question from Stephan et al. (2002). For each 
outgroup, a Likert-type scale runs from -2 (never) to 2 (very often). This 
conceptualization differs from that used by Phan et al. (2009, 902), who used the terms 
“positive” and “negative” reciprocity to describe “whether an individual is under 
benefiting or over benefiting from their helping network, relative to the expected norm of 
balanced exchange.” The rationale is that people can form negative stereotypes about 
other groups if they experience defection from their members. Again, to be taken 
advantage by someone is only one of many possible indicators. 
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Relative size of the outgroup is measured by the outgroup’s proportion of the total 
population of Mumbai according to the Census of India.19 Muslims and Gujaratis 
represent 19% of the population each, while Biharis (1.5%) and Parsis (0.5%) are much 
smaller minorities. Inclusion of these four ethnic groups in the questionnaire thus 
maximizes the variation in group size. 
Chapter 2 characterized Mumbai as a city plagued by violence caused by Muslim 
terrorism, Hindu rioting, and organized crime. It also described fierce intergroup 
competition for jobs. Therefore, I included two different subjective measures of threat 
perception. The corresponding survey items asked whether the respondent agreed or 
disagreed with several statements. The statements measuring the perceived threat to the 
economic well-being were “[Group] take jobs away from people like me.” The statements 
related to the threat to safety were “[Group] increase crime rates.” Answers appeared on a 
Likert-type scale running from -2 (disagree strongly) to 2 (agree strongly). The used 
questions come from the ISSP National Identity Survey. 
Relative status is simply the difference between the perceived social status of the 
outgroup and the perceived social status of Maharashtrians. The survey item asked 
respondents to place each group on one of ten rungs of a hypothetical ladder 
corresponding to socioeconomic status. The resulting MacArthur Scale of Subjective 
Social Status is explained in more detail in Goodman et al. (2001). 
Most Gujaratis and Biharis living in Mumbai are Hindus. Muslims and Parsis are 
separate minority religious groups. As Gujaratis and Biharis share a common Hindu 
19 If the sampled respondents members came from more than one group, I would have to use the size of 
their group as the denominator. However, they were all Maharashtrians and the size of the Marathi group is 
constant across all observations. 
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identity with Maharashtrians, the dichotomous indicator of the superordinate identity is 
coded 1 for them and 0 for Muslims and Parsis. As membership in the common Hindu 
ingroup and group size are fixed for each ethnic group, I chose four outgroups, for which 
these two variables are cross-cutting. Gujaratis are a large Hindu minority, Muslims a 
large non-Hindu minority, Biharis a small Hindu minority, and Parsis a small non-Hindu 
minority. Another relevant superordinate identity, the Indian national identity, is held 
constant for all the included ethnic groups. 
In addition to the group-level variables described above, the regression model also 
includes a number of individual-level correlates of discrimination. Social identity theory 
predicts more ingroup bias and, according to some interpretations, also more outgroup 
derogation among people with a salient ingroup identity (Brown 2000). The salience of 
the Marathi identity is measured by how attached to Maharashtra the respondent felt. 
Using Eurobarometer data, Sinnott (2006) found that this question had more predictive 
power than other indicators of social identity. 
The control variables also include age because older people appeared to be more 
prejudiced in some studies conducted in North America and Europe (Maykovich 1975; 
Quillian 1995). Age is also a positive predictor of social distance in the globally collected 
World Values Survey data (Guiso et al. 2003). In Mumbai, older cohorts may have been 
affected more directly by a personal experience with the deadly ethnic riots in the 1990s. 
Education may correlate with lower prejudice, as it does in many other countries 
(Quillian 1995; Guiso et al. 2003; Wagner and Zick 2006). I operationalized education as 
the number of years of schooling. To facilitate interpretation of the regression 
coefficients, age and the number of years of schooling are centered at their mean values. 
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Finally, I include dummy variables indicating the respondent’s neighborhood and 
religion. 
Due to its length, the questionnaire does not measure other individual attributes 
that correlate with discriminatory attitudes in surveys – perhaps the most notable example 
is social dominance orientation (Sidanius 1993). Although these variables could help 
explain the respondent’s general propensity to discriminate, the research question 
examined in this work does not ask which person discriminates against outgroups, but 
rather which outgroups the person’s discrimination targets. Saying that, one model 
specification (3) includes individual-level fixed effects to control for unmeasured 
individual-level confounders. The model (2) does the same for group-level confounders. 
Finally, the most conservative specification (4) controls for both individual and group-




Table 7 shows that the regression results are remarkably stable across various 
model specifications, including the most stringent model with fixed effects for both 
group-level and individual-level factors.20 In all four models, receiving help from 
outgroup members in the past year lowers social distance to the said outgroup by six to 
ten percentage points. This effect is statistically significant even after controlling for 
intergroup contact and other known alternative explanations. As both positive reciprocity  
20 As a robustness check, I replicated this analysis using a proportional odds ordinal logistic regression 
using the Huber-White method to correct for heteroscedasticity and clustering. This replication addresses 
potential concerns about the three values of the dependent variable. However, the ordinal logistic regression 
did not change any substantive conclusions drawn from the generalized linear model presented here. 
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Table 7: Generalized Linear Model Predicting Discrimination 












































































































Intercept  0.791***  0.698***  0.977***  0.442*** 
Fixed Effects No Group Individual Both 
N  778  838  778  838 
Adjusted R2  0.09  0.09  0.47  0.52 
Cluster-robust standard errors (for the models [1] and [2]) and robust standard errors (for 
the models [3] and [4]) in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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and contact are statistically significant, positive reciprocity adds more explanatory power 
to that of intergroup contact. At the same time, it would not be meaningful to compare the 
size of the coefficients of reciprocity and contact directly. As intergroup contact is 
plausibly a causal antecedent of helping behavior, some of its beneficial effect may be 
channeled through the causal channel of positive reciprocity. This part would not be 
captured by the reported coefficient of intergroup contact. 
Since the survey data are purely observational, the presented analysis cannot 
identify a causal relationships. It is entirely possible that respondents received help from 
outgroup members because they did not discriminate against them at the first place. 
Alternatively, some unmeasured confounder may have influenced both social distance 
and received generosity. However, the models (2)-(4) control for unmeasured individual-
level and group-level confounders without changing the main substantive results. 
Furthermore, the experiments described in Chapter 3 showed unambiguously that 
experiencing cooperation with outgroup members caused lower discriminatory attitudes 
towards the same outgroup as a whole. If the same mechanism operates outside the 
laboratory, it would create the same pattern as the one observed in the survey data. 
Interestingly, being taken advantage by an outgroup member in the past is not 
associated with higher discrimination of the said outgroup. This finding is consistent with 
the experimental results presented in the previous chapter, according to which 
discriminatory attitudes in the treatment groups paired with Muslim defectors were not 
much different from those in the control group, while attitudes in the groups paired with 
Muslim cooperators were significantly better. One plausible explanation is that negative 
reciprocity is too risky for someone who lives in a slum. This argument builds on Molm 
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(1997), who found that disadvantaged groups rarely use coercion to improve their 
position because they find this strategy too risky. People in slums are highly dependent 
on their social networks and have little insurance against a total breakdown of 
cooperation. Risk aversion may make them reluctant to punish occasional transgressions. 
Another plausible explanation is that slum-dwellers are simply used to being 
taken advantage by others. In the slums, bargaining is an important part of everyday life. 
People of all castes negotiate prices of vegetables and rice on the market. A large number 
of transactions, including bribes to government officials, are facilitated by brokers for an 
often-resented commission. A vast majority of slum-dwellers do not receive a regular 
salary. Instead, they find temporary jobs in the informal sector with little security of 
contract enforcement. Wages can be negotiated and renegotiated on a daily basis. In an 
environment characterized by constant bargaining, it is easy to feel being taken advantage 
by the other side. Therefore, a positive correlation between this variable and intergroup 
contact (r=0.31) should not come as a big surprise. At the same time, negative contact is 
not specific to intergroup relations. When asked about being taken advantage by another 
Maharashtrian, 30 percent of the sample answered that it happens very often. 
Only replication in other countries can find out whether the asymmetry between 
positive and negative reciprocity appears elsewhere in the world or it is an artifact of life 
in Indian slums. In contrast to the observed non-effect of daily slights, negative 
reciprocity may become important in extreme cases of defection and therefore should not 
be completely dismissed as a valid cause of discriminatory behavior. The following 
words of a victim of ethnic riots in Mumbai illustrates how defection of Muslim 
neighbors in the times of need contributed to the victim’s subsequent hatred of Muslims 
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(Punwani 2005, 251): 
“We 14 Hindu families there had a pact with our Muslim neighbors: if our people 
came to attack, we'd raise an alarm; if their guys came, they would. But they 
didn't keep the agreement: that's why I hate them. Had they simply driven us out, I 
wouldn't hate them so much; but they spat at the very plate from which we ate.” 
Table 7 adds a few more surprises. Unmeasured individual attributes explain 
almost a half of the variation in discriminatory attitudes. The sampled Marathi-speakers 
did not differentiate between minorities as much as I expected. Many of them simply 
preferred the ingroup over all outgroups. Only a small fraction of variance is explained 
by characteristics of outgroups themselves. Among them, relative group size is the 
strongest factor. All other things being equal, the number of Maharashtrians willing to 
discriminate against two largest minorities (Muslims and Gujaratis) is higher by 4 to 5 
percentage points than the number of Maharashtrians discriminating against the smaller 
minorities of Biharis and Parsis. This finding gives empirical support to Posner’s 
prediction that divisions between ethnic groups big enough to seize political power are 
more salient. According to the survey data from Mumbai, size of the ethnic minority 
matters in India as much as it does in Sub-Saharan Africa (Posner 2004, 2005) and 
Western Europe (Quillian 1995). 
The replication of Posner’s findings outside Sub-Saharan Africa is important 
enough to warrant a little detour. Blalock (1967) and Quillian (1995) argued that a bigger 
relative size makes a minority more threatening in the eyes of the dominant group. The 
survey data from Indian slums support this view. Table A.12 in the Appendix reports the 
results of two ordinal logistic regression models: one predicting the perceived economic 
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threat; another predicting the perceived safety threat. Relative group size is the strongest 
factor in both models. To illustrate the size of the effect, one can estimate the predicted 
probabilities of different levels of the perceived threat. Increasing the group size from 
that of Biharis (1.5%) to that of Muslims or Gujaratis (19%) while holding all other 
variables at their median levels increases the probability of the respondent agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with the statement that the said outgroup takes jobs away from people 
like him from 20 to 42 percent. Another highly significant predictor of both threats is 
negative reciprocity. Respondents reportedly felt threatened by the groups that (they 
believed) have taken advantage of them. Other groups eliciting perceptions of threat were 
non-Hindu minorities, minorities enjoying a high social status, and, surprisingly, 
minorities that the respondent was in frequent contact with. Although competition over 
jobs and crime are in principle two very different concerns, their statistical predictors 
look very similar. 
Relative group size correlates with both the respondent’s hostile intentions and his 
perception of collective threat. However, there is no evidence that the perceived threat 
mediates the effect of group size on discrimination. Self-assessed threat is not a 
statistically significant predictor of discriminatory attitudes in any of the regression 
models in Table 7. This is true for both economic and safety threats. Neither of them 
became significant even after the objective measure of the relative group size and the 
other subjective measure of the perceived threat were dropped from the regression 
equation (regression results not reported here). This surprising results contradicts an 
earlier study conducted among students in the Indian state of Orissa by Tausch et al. 
(2009). In their analysis, realistic threat was associated with social distance, though much 
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less among Hindus than among Muslims. Unfortunately, their composite indicator does 
not differentiate between economic and political threats. 
At first glance, insignificance of the perceived threat to access to jobs is surprising 
in a city, in which two major political parties routinely accuse minorities of stealing jobs 
from the Marathi-speaking “sons of the soil.” Ethnic conflict over jobs has a long and 
troubled history in Mumbai. Even before Shiv Sena launched its campaign of 
intimidation to secure jobs for Maharashtrians, some ethnic riots originated as ordinary 
industrial strikes and escalated into ethnic violence after employers tried to recruit 
blacklegs from a caste or religion different from that of the striking employees (Noronha 
2005). However, Marathi slum-dwellers in contemporary Mumbai see through the 
political parties’ rhetoric and know that their principal competitors on the job market are 
not Muslims or Gujaratis, but rather other Marathi-speakers. According to my survey 
data, 62 percent of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement: “Maharashtrians 
take jobs away from people like me.” Only 10 percent strongly agreed with the similar 
statement about Muslims and 8 percent about Gujaratis. Ethnic conflict in the slums of 
Mumbai is not driven by competition for scarce jobs because this competition actually 
often pits members of the same ethnic group against each other. 
Insignificance of the perceived threat to safety is even more counter-intuitive. In a 
city that is generally considered India's capital of organized crime, sensationalist media 
pay a lot of attention to the crimes committed by Muslims and almost automatically – and 
without any proof – link them to Islamist terrorist networks (Shaban 2010). Despite this 
dominant narrative, more respondents blamed Maharashtrians (76%) rather than Muslims 
(60%) for the increased crime rate. In a way, Indians surveyed for this research seem to 
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be surprisingly similar to the Dutch subjects surveyed by Sniderman et al. (2004), who 
found that threats to safety were actually the least important predictor of hostility towards 
immigrants in the Netherlands. 
Table 7 provides mixed evidence in support of the common ingroup identity 
model. Respondents seemed to discriminate less against the groups sharing the common 
Hindu identity with them, but the corresponding coefficients were not statistically 
significant at the customary 95% level. A replication using a subsample restricted to self-
reported Hindus did not make the superordinate Hindu identity any more significant. On 
the other hand, Table 7 shows that in comparison to Buddhists, Hindus tend to 
discriminate more across the board. 
A salient Marathi identity correlates with discrimination against non-Marathi 
minorities, except that the correlation is in the opposite direction to that predicted by 
social identity theory. After controlling for other factors, salience of the ingroup identity 
is negatively associated with discriminatory attitudes in general. The effect is stronger for 
discrimination against Gujaratis and Parsis. As these two groups are considered part of 
Mumbai’s traditional bourgeoisie (Hansen 2001), while Biharis are recent immigrants 
and Muslims represent the Other in the Marathi historiography, this result may indicate 
presence of a narrower superordinate identity, based on belonging to the city of Mumbai 
or to the state of Maharashtra, that influences people with a strong attachment to 
Maharashtra. 
Respondents did not discriminate between groups based on the perceived group 
status. Discrimination against the minorities with the lowest social status was no different 
from discrimination against other groups. Unfortunately, as social stratification in India is 
108 
quite rigid, the data gathered in the slums of Mumbai cannot test the hypothesized effect 
of status reversals. 
The regression coefficient for age is close to zero. This result contradicts some of 
the previous studies that found older people more prejudiced (Guiso et al. 2003). 
Although almost three quarters of the sample are old enough to remember the bloody 
ethnic riots of the 1990s, this negative experience does not appear to influence 
discriminatory attitudes in any systematic way 18 years later. 
Education is another control variable without the effect predicted by the literature. 
According to Wagner and Zick (2006), a negative correlation between education and 
prejudice is a robust empirical observation in Western Europe. However, my analysis 
questions whether we can expect the same beneficial effect in India. The null effect of 
education can be probably attributed to the differences between the average schools in 
Europe and in India. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) described the abysmal state of Indian 
schools, in which teachers miss on average more than one out of five days of work and 
when they come to school, “they are often found drinking tea, reading the newspaper, or 
talking to a colleague.” As a result, 35 percent of Indian children in the seven-to-fourteen 
age group surveyed for the Annual State of Education Report (ASER) could not read a 
simple paragraph (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Although the average respondent in my 
Mumbai survey completed 11 years of schooling, differences between schools in India 
and Europe make a direct application of Western theories about education reducing 






The analysis of survey data presented in this chapter showed that the causal 
relationships identified by the laboratory experiments in the previous chapter map onto 
real-life patterns of ethnic discrimination. Positive reciprocity is associated with lower 
discrimination against four different ethnic minorities living in Mumbai. The correlation 
remains significant after controlling for intergroup contact and other alternative 
explanations. At the same time, the survey data offers no evidence of a similar effect by 
negative reciprocity. 
Reciprocity adds more explanatory power to models of selective discrimination 
based on relative group size. The argument advanced by this dissertation can help explain 
discrimination of ethnic groups that are too small, weak, or politically disenfranchised to 
be considered serious contenders by the dominant group. Examples of such groups 
include not only Muslims and Christians in many parts of India, but also Roma and 
foreign immigrants in Europe. 
Positive reciprocity is an important factor despite a lot of competition over scarce 
resources in economically and socially disadvantaged slum neighborhoods of Mumbai. It 
is a stronger factor than threat perception, identity salience, or education. If this finding 
can be replicated elsewhere, encouraging cooperation across group boundaries may 




Chapter 5. Ethnic Diversity and Public Goods Provision 
 
The previous chapters tested observable implications of the theory on the data 
collected in Indian slums. Using cross-national survey data, this chapter extends the 
analysis beyond India. Examining whether generalized reciprocity moderates the effect of 
ethnic diversity on people’s willingness to contribute to public goods around the world, it 
also applies the proposed theory on one of the greatest puzzles in the economic 
development literature. 
 
5.1 Public Goods Provision in Ethnically Heterogeneous Countries 
 
A plethora of studies from all around the world indicates that ethnic diversity 
sometimes – but not always – leads to suboptimal public goods provision and hinders 
economic development. Since Easterly and Levine (1997) blamed ethnic diversity for low 
economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and La Porta et al. (1999) for bad governance, 
economists have detected a negative correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and public 
goods provision both cross-nationally (Alesina et al. 2001) and within individual 
countries as different as the United States (Alesina et al. 1999), India (Banerjee et al. 
2005), and Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). At the micro-level, Okten and Osili (2004) 
found that households in ethnically mixed communities are less likely to contribute to 
voluntary organizations that generate public goods in Indonesia. Applying a multilevel 
model on cross-national survey data, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) showed that 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization is also associated with a lower tax morale. 
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Despite the seeming robustness of the negative association between ethnic 
diversity and public goods provision claimed by some of the earliest studies (La Porta et 
al. 1999), many cases deviate from this pattern. Ethnic heterogeneity leads to different 
outcomes even in some very similar cases, such as comparable districts in Kenya and 
Tanzania (Miguel 2004). The results also depend on the type of social heterogeneity, with 
racial diversity possibly having more negative effects than cultural diversity (Alesina and 
La Ferrara 2005). As Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, 794) concluded in their 
comprehensive survey of the relevant literature: 
 “Rich democratic societies work well with diversity, in the case of the United 
States very well in terms of growth and productivity. Even within the developing 
world, similar levels of ethnic diversity are associated with very different degrees 
of conflict and interethnic cooperation.” 
 Existing theories do not explain very well under what conditions ethnic diversity 
prevents multiethnic societies from generating enough public goods for their members. 
The causal mechanism proposed by early studies – ethnically fragmented societies not 
able to agree on which public goods to produce due to divergent preferences – did not 
include any intervening variables or boundary conditions (Easterly and Levine 1997; 
Alesina et al. 1999; Kinder and Winter 2001). Habyarimana et al. (2009) tested this and 
several other causal mechanisms explaining why ethnically homogenous communities 
succeed more often in providing their members with public goods. However, their book 
addressed the question how ethnic diversity undermines public goods provision and not 
under what conditions it does not. This chapter offers an answer to the latter. 
 Few studies have suggested what might moderate the negative effect of ethnic 
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heterogeneity. Comparing Kenya and Tanzania, Miguel (2004) explained why ethnic 
diversity has no impact on local public goods provision in Tanzania by the inclusive 
national identity. He argued that Tanzanian political leaders managed to bridge ethnic 
divisions in their country chiefly by promoting Swahili as the common language. 
Similarly, Glennerster et al. (2010) highlighted the role of a common lingua franca in 
Liberia, where, as they found, ethnic heterogeneity did not influence local public goods 
provision. 
 Collier (2000) argued that ethnic fractionalization has negative effects on 
economic growth and productivity only in nondemocratic regimes, while democracies 
manage to cope better with ethnic diversity. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) provided more 
empirical support for this argument. At the same time, they also pointed out that ethnic 
heterogeneity and lower growth are associated more strongly in poorer countries as well 
as in less affluent counties of the United States. As economic development is highly 
correlated with democracy, it is not easy to disentangle the moderating effect of wealth 
from that of political regime. 
 This dissertation highlights a different factor likely to moderate the effect of 
ethnic diversity on public goods provision. Chapter 1 argued that people are able to 
cooperate across ethnic lines if they trust their partners to reciprocate cooperative 
behavior. Mirroring the results of the laboratory public goods experiment described in 
Chapter 3, expectations of reciprocity should lead to greater public goods provision also 
in real life. And they do. For example, Frey and Torgler (2007) observed a strong 
correlation between perceived tax evasion and tax morale of European survey 
respondents. This chapter does not look at the effect of conditional cooperation, but rather 
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at the interaction between conditional cooperation and ethnic diversity. Do beliefs about 
others’ cooperativeness motivate people to invest in public goods despite ethnic 
heterogeneity? Unlike alternative mechanisms discussed in previous studies, the 
argument proposed by this paper sees the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and 
public goods provision as conditional on generalized reciprocity. 
Table 1 in Chapter 1 established generalized reciprocity as one of possible stable 
states of the society. In the societies with a strong social norm of generalized reciprocity, 
rational actors have an incentive to cooperate regardless of the group membership of their 
partners because they expect ingroup and outgroup members to cooperate with the same 
(high) probability. Therefore, ethnic divisions should not prevent such a society from 
generating enough public goods for its members. 
At the micro-level, I expect trustful people to be equally willing to contribute to 
public goods regardless of how ethnically fragmented their society is. If they do not trust 
strangers to be cooperative, however, I expect them to contribute less as ethnic 
heterogeneity increases. In other words, we should observe a significant interaction 
between ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust. The paper tests this hypothesis on 
worldwide survey data from 87 countries and dependencies. 
 Chapter 3 used a survey question about trust of a particular ethnic group to 
measure expectations of reciprocity regarding the said group. As I explain in the next 
section, this chapter uses a survey question about generalized trust to measure 
expectations of generalized reciprocity. Unlike trust particular to a specific group, 
“generalized trust reflects a bond that people share across a society and across economic 
and ethnic groups, religions, and races” (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005, 45). It can be 
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defined as horizontal trust among people and it encompasses strangers and unknown 
groups as well. Freitag and Bühlmann (2009, 1540) considered generalized trust to be an 
indicator of the “environment of general reciprocity” that “makes cooperation possible, 
and minimizes the risks involved in the act of trust.” 
 Generalized trust has an important advantage that several big national and cross-
national surveys attempt to measure it in a systematic way. However, the standard proxy 
for generalized trust only roughly approximates expectations of generalized reciprocity, 
as Chapter 1 defined them. The dyadic example summarized in Table 1 reserved the term 
generalized reciprocity for the case, in which a person trusts both ingroup and outgroup 
members to reciprocate cooperative behavior. Applying the same logic to multiple 
groups, expectations of reciprocity are generalized if all relevant groups can be expected 
to cooperate. On the other hand, surveys usually ask the respondent whether “most 
people” can be trusted. The conventional wording does not help distinguish a situation, in 
which a member of the ethnic majority trusts other ingroup members – and thus “most 
people” – and yet refuses to contribute to public goods provision because she does not 
want to throw resources on a mistrusted minority. Broadly speaking, the standard survey 
measure covers cases, in which the respondent trusts members of the groups that 
comprise a majority of the population without necessarily extending her trust to the 
society as a whole. To illustrate this discrepancy with empirical data, 45 percent of the 
respondents in the Mumbai survey, who declared that they trusted most people, also said 
they did not trust Muslims. 
Another problem with the generalized trust question is that it does not 
differentiate between different levels, at which contributions to public goods happen. A 
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citizen paying local property taxes may be more concerned specifically with trust in other 
residents of her school district rather than with trust in humanity as a whole or in most 
people she knows. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive cross-national source of 
information about group-specific and contextualized trust. As I could not find a better 
proxy, I had to use the imperfect survey measure of generalized trust. 
 
5.2 Research design 
 
The main goal of this chapter is to model individual willingness to contribute to 
public goods provision as a function of ethnic diversity and generalized trust. The unit of 
analysis is the individual respondent and the data come from the World Values Survey. 
The World Value Survey (WVS) is a large-scale cross-national survey organized in six 
waves: 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, 2005-2008, and 2008-2010. As 
the results of the last wave have not been made public yet, this study pools the data from 
all surveys between 1981 and 2008. Table A.13 in the appendix shows which countries 
are included in what years. Table A.14 describes the distribution of the variables. 
The main analysis uses the weighted generalized linear model, with the weights 
provided by the national WVS teams to make the samples more representative of the 
population of each country. The multilevel model at the end of the chapter is weighted in 
the same way. As I was interested in variation across countries, I did not use weights 
proportional to the total population of the country in the pooled data. Weighting by 
population of the country would practically discard variation in ethnic fractionalization 
among small countries and the overall results would be driven by few biggest countries, 
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such as China and the United States. 
Public Goods. The dependent variable of interest is the respondent’s willingness 
to invest in public goods. The WVS does not ask directly whether the respondent is a free 
rider or if she contributes to public goods provision. A direct question would probably 
elicit a large number of socially desirable – though untrue – responses. Due to the 
prevailing social norms, respondents would be unlikely to disclose free riding behavior. 
Instead of a more direct question producing biased answers, the WVS asks about people’s 
acceptance of free-riding behavior in general. The assumption is that people approving of 
free riding are also more likely to act in this way. Conversely, people rejecting free riding 
are plausibly more likely to contribute to public goods produced by their society. 
Two relevant WVS questions ask about contributions to public goods in the form 
of paying taxes and paying a fare on public transportation. The first item says: “Please 
tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between, using this card. Cheating on taxes if you 
have a chance.” The second item asks the same question about “avoiding a fare on public 
transport.” Both indicators are positively correlated (r=0.51) in the WVS data. Therefore, 
this chapter’s dependent variable is the arithmetic average of the two elements described 
above with the scale inverse of that of the original WVS variables: 10 denotes the highest 
and 1 the lowest willingness to contribute to public goods. 
Uslaner (1999) used these two WVS questions as part of his indicator of “moral 
behavior.” Knack and Keefer (1997) included them in their “index of civic cooperation.” 
Taking a leap from observed attitudes to what motivates them, Letki (2006, 306) argued 
that tax compliance and paying one’s due on public transportation are proxies for “civic 
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morality” that “leads citizens to maximize public rather than private gains, therefore 
deterring them from engaging in corruption and free-riding.” These three cited studies 
merged the two questions about paying one’s taxes and a fare on public transportation 
with several other WVS questions to form composite indices of “moral behavior,” “civic 
cooperation,” or “civic morality.” My study focuses only on the public goods aspect. 
Trust. Similarly to other large-scale surveys, the WVS measures generalized trust 
by the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Answers are coded 1 (“Most 
people can be trusted”) or 0 (“Can´t be too careful”). 
Although Glaeser et al. (2000) found that the question was associated with greater 
trustworthiness – not trustfulness – among the subjects playing a laboratory trust game, 
Cox et al. (2009) observed a positive correlation between trust measured by the survey 
question and trustful behavior in lab. Knack and Keefer (1997) found that average 
generalized trust measured by the survey question was associated with return rates in 
wallet-drop experiments in the same territory. As I pointed out above, it is not completely 
clear how respondents understand the term “most people” despite these correlations with 
behavior. 
Ethnic Fractionalization. Ethnic diversity is measured at the country level. 
Although there are several competing measures of ethnic heterogeneity, most of them are 
based on the Herfindahl concentration formula: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗  = 1−  �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗2𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
  
where ELFj is ethnic fractionalization of country j, sij is the share of group i in country j, 
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and N is the number of groups.21 This formula essentially measures the probability that 
two randomly selected individuals from the population will be from different groups. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) used the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(ELF), based on the data from Atlas Narodov Mira, a Soviet ethnographic atlas published 
in 1964. The Soviet source was originally popularized by Taylor et al. (1972). Since then, 
ELF has become a standard measure of ethnic heterogeneity in quantitative cross-national 
studies. Fearon (2003) built an alternative – and more up-to-date – ethnic 
fractionalization score from a variety of different secondary sources. Finally, Alesina et 
al. (2003, 159) created an ethnic fractionalization index combining “racial and linguistic 
characteristics” in order to identify the most meaningful ethnic categories in each 
country. The primary source was Encyclopedia Britannica, complemented with the CIA 
World Factbook, national census data, and other sources. Due to an overlap of their 
sources, Alesina et al. (2003) and Fearon (2003) produced very similar indices. Alesina’s 
index is probably the most widely-used measure of ethnic fractionalization in the fields of 
economics and political economy. Because of its comprehensive coverage of countries 
and wide use in the literature, I decided to adopt Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization index 
as a proxy for ethnic diversity. 
Just as virtually all ethnic fractionalization indices, the variable is computed at the 
21 Notable exceptions include indices measuring ethnic polarization instead of ethnic fractionalization. For 
example, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) developed an index of ethnic polarization and Cederman and 
Girardin (2007) proposed an alternative N* index of ethnonationalist exclusiveness. Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) argued that polarization is a better predictor of ethnic conflict than fractionalization because 
its non-monotonicity approaches the well-known inverted-U relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and 
the probability of ethnic conflict. However, this dissertation chapter focuses on a different question – 
whether an individual is willing to cooperate with a large group of strangers in public goods provision. 
Fractionalization is arguably part of a rational calculus whether to cooperate. If I trust ingroup members 
more than outgroup members and I am deciding whether to pay taxes, the share of ingroup in the total 
population matters. If everyone faces the same decision, the probability of cooperating should decrease 
with the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population will be from different 
groups, that is ethnic fractionalization. 
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country level and does not vary in time. Although Laitin and Posner (2001) criticized 
ethnic fractionalization indices as disregarding the fact that ethnic identities can change 
over time, the lack of temporal variation should not be a big problem for the short time 
window 1981-2008 explored in this study. 
The regression equations presented in this chapter also control for a number of 
variables possibly confounding the effect of trust on the willingness to contribute to 
public goods provision. They are listed below. 
Acceptance of Bribe. Trustful people may refrain from free raiding not because 
they expect strangers to reciprocate cooperation, but because of some innate personal 
attribute, such as altruism or natural law abidance. In fact, Guiso et al. (2003) used 
components of my dependent variable (justification of cheating on taxes and avoiding a 
fare on public transportation) as proxies for people’s attitudes to legal norms. To control 
for this confounding effect, I included another variable on the right side of the regression 
equation: acceptance of bribe.22 Controlling for this variable should disentangle the 
public goods element of the questions used to construct the dependent variable from law 
compliance measured by the corruption question. 
Confidence in Government. Apart from horizontal generalized trust in fellow 
citizens, there also exists vertical trust between citizens and the state. Scholz and Lubell 
(1998) argued that vertical (political) trust creates focal points for cooperative solutions 
and horizontal (social) trust reduces the costs of enforcement of collective solutions. They 
also found that political trust, in the form of confidence in government institutions, is 
22 The exact wording of the WVS question is: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether 
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out 
statements. Code one answer for each statement). Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” 
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empirically associated with higher tax compliance. This finding was successfully 
replicated by Letki (2006), Marien and Hooghe (2010), and other studies. The correlation 
between political and social trust is typically weak because confidence in government 
institutions varies to a great degree with partisanship: people who support the ideology of 
the ruling party are also more likely to express confidence in the government (Rothstein 
and Stolle 2008). However, the regression models presented in this chapter control for 
confidence in political institutions, as this variable may confound the effect of trust on tax 
compliance. 
Similarly to Marien and Hooghe (2010), I constructed a composite variable of 
confidence in political institution from a battery of questions included in the WVS data. 
The survey question asks: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, 
could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?” The 
items included in the composite variable are the armed forces, the police, parliament, the 
civil service, the government, and justice system. Missing values were imputed based on 
answers to non-missing questions from this battery. The resulting composite variable is 
an arithmetic average of all the answers rescaled so the higher numbers indicate more 
confidence in government institutions. 
Church Attendance. Listhaug and Miller (1985) and Guiso et al. (2003) found 
religious people to be less likely to approve of cheating on taxes. Based on a 
comprehensive review of more recent studies, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) 
consider this result to be one of the most robust findings in the tax compliance literature. 
At the same time, religion also influences generalized trust (Guiso et al. 2006), creating a 
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possible confounding problem. When Torgler (2006) concluded that religiosity raises tax 
morale, he analyzed a variety of WVS questions. Unfortunately, most of them were asked 
only in some of the surveys included in my analysis. One of Torgler’s indicators of 
religiosity, church attendance, has an advantage of appearing frequently in the WVS. As 
it produces the least number of missing values, I chose it for this study. The question 
asked: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend 
religious services these days?” The scale runs from 0 (“never, practically never”) to 7 
(“more than once a week”). 
I also added a host of individual-level demographic variables that influence the 
dependent variable and may correlate with trust: Sex, Age, Marital Status, Education, and 
Income.23 A great number of studies have found that tax compliance tends to be higher 
among older people, women, and married people (Uslaner 1999; Guiso et al. 2003; 
Torgler 2006). Age, gender, and marital status seem to be the most consistent 
demographic predictors of tax morale in the literature (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 
2010). Listhaug and Miller (1985) and Guiso et al. (2003) also found people with higher 
income to be more likely to cheat on taxes. The effect of education is much less 
consistent (Uslaner 1999; Torgler 2006; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010). 
Tax Revenue. As Rose (1984, 122) put it succinctly: “Within any given country, 
the level of tax resistance is likely to be greater when taxes are high rather than low.” 
Simultaneously, tax rates seem to correlate with generalized trust due to relatively heavy 
taxation in the exceptionally trustful Nordic countries. The control variables thus include 
23 Sex is coded 1 for male and 0 for female respondents. Age is coded in the number of years. Marital status 
differentiates between married (1) and unmarried (0) people. The highest educational level attained has 
eight categories, as provided by the WVS. The scale of income uses ten categories specific for each 
country. Therefore, this variable measures within-country, but not between-country variation. 
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the overall tax revenue as a share of the country’s GDP (in percent). The variable is 
measured at the country-level. Given the high measurement error and the fact that the 
World Bank does not report this variable for all the years, in which the WVS was run, I 
computed country averages for each survey wave. So, for example, the missing tax 
revenue of Georgia in 1996 was imputed with Georgia’s average tax revenue during the 
whole survey wave (1994-1999). Unfortunately, no tax revenue data could be found for 
the first wave of the WVS (1981-1984). 
Democracy. Political institutions may be another country-level confounder. La 
Porta et al. (1999) found that ethnic diversity is associated simultaneously with bad 
governance, low public goods provision, low tax compliance, and less political freedom. 
Rothstein and Stolle (2008, 453) showed that “countries with high levels of generalized 
trust also have the most effective and impartial institutions and the longest experiences 
with democracy.” Tabellini (2010) sought an explanation in history: regions of Europe 
with less legal constraints on the executive in the past tend to be characterized by lower 
generalized trust in the present. As my variables of interest (ethnic diversity, generalized 
trust, public goods) are all correlated with political institutions, I included the Polity IV 
score of the country at the time of the survey as a control variable. The scale runs from    
-10 (autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). 
Some of the effect of ethnic diversity and trust is probably channeled through the 
control variables. For example, distrustful people usually have less confidence in political 
institutions as well. At the same time, they are less willing to pay their taxes. If this is the 
case, the reported coefficient of generalized trust may underestimate its effect because 
some of it will appear as part of the coefficient of confidence in government. That is why 
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Quantitative analysis of the cross-national survey data identified the hypothesized 
interaction between ethnic diversity and generalized trust. Figure 6 summarizes concisely 
the main finding. It shows the predicted values of the willingness to contribute to public 
goods as a function of ethnic fractionalization and generalized trust, while holding all 
other variables constant at their median values. The solid line represents trustful people; 
the dotted line those who do not trust strangers. Shaded areas around each line show 95% 
confidence intervals. The rug plot along the x-axis describes the distribution of countries 
based on their ethnic fractionalization index. 
The down-sloping dotted line indicates that people with no expectations of 
generalized reciprocity are less willing to contribute to public goods as ethnic 
heterogeneity of the country increases. This result mirrors earlier findings by Alesina et 
al. (2001), Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010), and other studies. However, the novel 
finding is that ethnic diversity interacts with generalized trust, as predicted by the theory 
outlined in this dissertation. The negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on public 
goods provision almost disappears among trustful people. The predicted values 
(represented by the solid line) approach the ideal flat line corresponding to the null effect 
of ethnic fractionalization. The difference between the two lines is more significant for 
highly diverse countries, in which the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on public goods 
would be otherwise the most detrimental. 
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Figure 6: Predicted Willingness to Contribute to Public Goods 
 
 
Figure 6 is based on the full regression model with all the control variables 
(model 3 in Table 8). But let us take a step back and start with the simplest model (1) in 
the same table. As found in many previous studies, people in ethnically diverse countries 
are less likely to contribute to public goods. However, the model (1) shows that the 
relationship between these two variables is moderated by generalized trust. People with 
expectations of generalized reciprocity are more willing to contribute to public goods 
than their distrustful compatriots as ethnic fractionalization increases. This basic finding 
remains robust after adding more control variables in models (2)-(4). 
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Table 8: Weighted GLM Predicting Willingness to Contribute to Public Goods 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















































































Intercept  7.738***  7.446***  7.856***  7.840*** 
N  206809  155142  109345  109345 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The model (2) includes individual-level covariates. Since not every question was 
asked in every survey, the number of respondents drops by 50,000. Despite all these 
changes, the interaction term between ethnic fractionalization and generalized trust is still 
statistically significant and in the predicted direction. In other words, the main finding of 
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the study is robust in light of individual-level confounders. Similarly, the main effect of 
ethnic diversity remains negative and statistically significant. 
The interaction term remains statistically significant and positive even after 
controlling for country-level confounders of tax revenue and democracy in the model (3). 
In this model, N drops again by about a third because the country-level variables are 
missing for some of the territories included in the WVS. The model (3) increases 
confidence that the reported effect of ethnic diversity and its interaction with generalized 
trust are disentangled from the effect of political institutions that they may correlate with. 
The model (4) shows what happens if we exclude the interaction term, as previous 
studies of public goods provision did. The coefficient of ethnic fractionalization is 
negative and highly significant, but the coefficient of generalized trust is essentially equal 
to zero. Although trust is a positive predictor of contributions to public goods in the 
model (1), more comprehensive models with covariates show that almost all of its 
explanatory power can be attributed to various confounders, such as confidence in 
political institutions or law abidance. However, even while insignificant on its own after 
controlling for possible confounders, generalized trust still moderates ethnic 
heterogeneity in the model (3). A safe interpretation of these results is that although 
generalized trust does not necessarily increase individual contributions to public goods, it 
substantially reduces the negative effect of ethnic diversity. 
The regression analysis presented in Table 8 mostly confirms findings of previous 
studies regarding individual-level factors. Older, married, and religious people are more 
likely to invest in public goods. Women tend to contribute more than men. Richer and 
better educated people are more reluctant to contribute, which may be explained by their 
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greater tax burden under progressive taxation or by their knowledge of how to evade 
taxes. Quite predictably, public goods provision correlates positively with confidence in 
political institutions and negatively with the overall level of taxation. What is a bit more 
puzzling, citizens of democratic countries seem to be less willing to contribute on 
average. 
Standard errors in all four models were clustered at the level of individual surveys 
because error terms of respondents surveyed in the same country and in the same year 
may be correlated. Coefficients from the weighted GLM are easy to interpret and 
clustering of standard errors removes the concern that the reported errors are 
underestimated. However, a more appropriate way to analyze data with individual-level 
and group-level predictors is through multilevel modeling. A major advantage is that 
variables from different levels can be analyzed simultaneously. 
Therefore, I replicated the analysis using a weighted random-intercept multilevel 
model of the willingness to contribute to public goods as a function of all the individual- 
and country-level variables included in the weighted GLM model (3). The used 
multilevel model allows intercepts to vary across 841 regions within the 87 sampled 
countries. Different intercepts capture different unmeasured conditions in these regions. 
For example, Putnam et al. (1993) famously showed that North Italy inherited a more 
cooperative culture than South Italy. The multilevel model can estimate a different 
(probably higher, in this case) intercept for North Italy. Due to different historical 
circumstances, regional differences in public goods provision are substantial (Tabellini 
2010; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2010). Unlike the GLM model in Table 8, the random-
intercept model takes them into account. 
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Table A.15 in the appendix summarizes the results. On the one hand, the 
interaction between ethnic fractionalization and generalized trust is in the predicted 
positive direction, while the main effect of ethnic fractionalization is in the predicted 
negative direction. On the other hand, in this model specification, the interaction term is 
no longer statistically significant at the conventional threshold of 5% (p-value=0.076). 
The multilevel model thus offers only weak evidence for the inferences drawn from the 




The negative effect of ethnic diversity on public goods provision has become an 
accepted wisdom in the economic literature. However, not all ethnically mixed societies 
fare badly. Consequently, the question which communities can escape the supposed trap 
of ethnic fragmentation has become of crucial importance. As Rothstein and Stolle (2008, 
441) stated: “That citizens in some countries, regions, cities, or villages are able to trust 
each other and thereby solve many of their collective action problems while others are 
not turns out to be one of the most interesting puzzles in the social sciences.” 
Applying a new theory on an old problem, the chapter offers a solution to this 
puzzle. The cross-national analysis of survey data showed that whereas the country’s 
ethnic heterogeneity is associated with citizens’ lower willingness to invest in public 
goods provision, expectations of generalized reciprocity significantly reduce this negative 
effect. The dissertation adds a new item to the short list of variables that moderate the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision. Whereas other known 
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moderators – common language (Miguel 2004), democratic regime (Collier 2000), and 
economic development (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) – are macro-scale and difficult to 
manipulate, generalized trust can be increased more easily at the individual level. This 
unique feature has profound implications for future experimental research as well as 
policy-making. 
The chapter also provides an important empirical test of the theory explained in 
Chapter 1. Departing from the dissertation’s focus on ethnic discrimination in India, it 
includes a different dependent variable (contributions to public goods) and uses data from 
87 countries all around the world. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
 
The dissertation provides empirical evidence supporting the observable 
implications outlined in Chapter 1. The lab-in-the-field experiments in the slums of 
Mumbai showed that positive indirect reciprocity experienced during interactions with 
individual Muslims in the laboratory increased trust in and reduced discrimination against 
the Muslim outgroup as a whole. The experimental intervention was effective even in a 
subgroup of supporters of local nationalist Hindu parties, infamous for organizing ethnic 
riots against Muslims. The survey demonstrated a similar positive correlation between 
positive reciprocity in real life and discriminatory attitudes towards four different ethnic 
minorities living in Mumbai. The statistical relationship remained significant after 
controlling for intergroup contact and various alternative explanations, including relative 
group size, perception of threat, relative social status, salience of ingroup identity, and 
superordinate identity. Finally, the cross-national section of the dissertation extended the 
analysis beyond India. Using surveys from 87 countries, it showed that generalized trust 
moderates the negative effect of ethnic diversity on people’s willingness to contribute to 
public goods. 
As most of the crucial evidence comes from field research in Indian slums, I hope 
that future extensions of this research to other populations will assess to what extent the 
lessons learned in the slums of Mumbai are generalizable to other contexts. It would be 
especially interesting to examine the effect of reciprocity among men and women in more 
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peaceful and economically more developed countries. The dissertation also left 
unanswered the intriguing question of long-term causal effects of reciprocity. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
The dissertation advances reciprocity as a determinant of relations between 
groups. This new understanding of intergroup relations has implications especially for 
students of ethnicity and economic development. The presented work sheds light on one 
micro-level mechanism (linking expectations of cooperative behavior and discrimination) 
in a causal chain leading to macro-level phenomena, such as ethnic violence and public 
goods provision. More research is needed to follow other causal links from this level of 
analysis to the macro-scale phenomena that interest most political scientists. 
 
6.2.1 Contributions to the Literature on Ethnicity 
 
The dissertation develops and tests a new explanation of ethnic discrimination. 
Using both experimental and survey data, it demonstrates that positive reciprocity can 
improve relations between groups. At the same time, there is no clear evidence in the data 
that negative reciprocity has necessarily the opposite effect. Increasing expectations of 
cooperative behavior from outsiders as an intervention is a new addition to the prejudice 
reduction literature, until now preoccupied mostly with intergroup contact, multicultural 
education, perspective-taking, and other approaches (Paluck and Green 2009). 
Despite much discrimination in everyday life, subjects displayed little 
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ethnocentrism in the laboratory. When anonymity removed any fear of social sanctions, 
people did not prefer coethnics in the dictator game or the public goods game. Curiously, 
there is almost no evidence of ethnocentric altruism in the experimental data gathered in 
Mumbai. Altruism also remained unaffected by positive and negative experience with 
another ethnic group. Although both elements of other-regarding preferences (reciprocity 
and altruism) have received a lot of attention in the literature, this study suggests that we 
should focus more on reciprocity. The dissertation also contributes to the growing body 
of evidence that ingroup bias is largely driven by social sanctions and not so much by 
natural preference for coethnics (Yamagishi and Mifune 2008; Habyarimana et al. 2009). 
In contrast to the usual understanding of social identity theory, a salient ingroup 
identity was not associated with more outgroup discrimination in the analyzed sample. In 
fact, after controlling for other factors, a salient Marathi identity seemed to be associated 
with lower discrimination in some model specifications. Neither did identity salience 
increase donations to other Hindus in the dictator game. 
 
6.2.2 Contributions to the Literature on Economic Development 
 
The dissertation provides evidence from three different sources that expectations 
of reciprocity facilitate collective action in ethnically diverse societies. The laboratory 
experiment run in the slums showed that cooperation across ethnic lines was possible 
even among the poor living in the conflict-ridden city of Mumbai. After I manipulated 
expectations of reciprocity, ethnically heterogeneous groups produced as much public 
goods as the homogeneous ones in the public goods game. The survey conducted in the 
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same environment demonstrated that helping behavior in the slums crosses ethnic lines in 
real life as well. Positive reciprocity \ leads to greater trust, which in turn enables more 
future cooperation. As previous works have discovered substantial positive effects of trust 
on economic and social outcomes, it was important to demonstrate experimentally that 
interpersonal trust can be increased by experiencing others’ cooperative behavior. The 
analysis of the World Values Survey data for this dissertation also showed that 
generalized trust moderates the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and the 
willingness to invest in public goods. All these findings suggest that ethnic diversity is 
not a poverty trap, but its negative effects on economic development can be reduced by 
micro-level interventions. 
 
6.3 Methodological Contributions 
 
The dissertation also makes several methodological contributions to experimental 
research in social sciences. Probably the most important contribution is that the 
laboratory experiment in Mumbai used a behavioral game as treatment and measured the 
dependent variable by a post-treatment survey. This approach opens up a new venue for 
experimentalists interested in how subjects’ experience during laboratory games changes 
their attitudes and behavior after the experiment is over. The strong findings also raise 
worries that any uncontrolled behavior by other players in repeated games may have a 
strong effect on the subject. Green and Tusicisny (2012) explain in more detail what 
changes to research design and analysis of repeated games are needed to produce 
unbiased estimates of the ATE if this is the case. 
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The dissertation helps remedy the lack of experimental studies of prejudice 
reduction in post-conflict zones and in non-western settings that Paluck and Green (2009) 
identified in their exhaustive survey of literature. Following a recent trend among lab-in-
the-field experimentalists, the dissertation also uses a sample representative of a 
politically relevant population instead of a convenience sample consisting of 
undergraduate students. 
Questionable external validity is traditionally one of the main criticisms of 
experimental research in political science. The dissertation increased the external validity 
of its findings not only by using a random sample for the laboratory experiments, but also 
by adopting a multi-level research design. The survey showed that the experimental 
results are in line with observation of attitudes towards a higher number of groups outside 
the lab. The cross-national analysis of surveys from 87 countries then tested one of the 
implications of the theory beyond India. 
Laboratory experiments are also often criticized for not proving that the treatment 
and outcome variables correspond to a meaningful real-world phenomenon. Departing 
from the usual practice in laboratory research, I asked subjects not only how they 
understood the survey questions, but also what motivated their choices. Qualitative 
evidence provides more support for the tested theory. It also increases confidence in 
internal validity of the used indicators. Finally, interviews with subjects can identify 
problems with the research design, as the example of the detected house money effect 
demonstrated. Since experiments and interviews have complementary strengths, I believe 
that experimental research would benefit from implementing mixed methods more often. 
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6.4 Policy Implications 
 
The experiment in the slums of Mumbai demonstrated that it is possible to change 
deep-rooted stereotypes and reduce discrimination between ethnic groups despite pre-
existing tensions and a long history of ethnic conflict. The relatively simple experimental 
intervention had a considerable effect given the fact that I was working with real ethnic 
groups and strong prejudices. 
Encouraging positive reciprocity between groups is a useful alternative to costly 
and unreliable interventions attempting to manipulate pre-existing identities: 
recategorization and decategorization. The decategorization approach emphasizes 
individual identity over social identity. For example, an advertisement may stress the 
occupational and not the racial identity of a political leader. Recategorization aims to 
recategorize two group identities as part of a common superordinate category. For 
example, the European Union exerts much effort to convince the French and Germans 
that they are not only two separate nations, but also members of a larger European 
community. However, even social psychologists themselves admit that their usual 
prescriptions of recategorization and decategorization of social identities are hardly 
applicable outside scientific laboratories (Brewer 1997). 
Positive intergroup contact seems to work better (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006), but 
the “optimal conditions of positive contact” are impractically restrictive. This study 
suggests that we should focus on one particular aspect of intergroup contact, which is the 
positive reciprocity in indirect exchange. As the experiment in India showed, positive 
reciprocity improves relations even between groups that hold unequal social status, which 
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is the case in many hierarchical and post-conflict societies. 
The demonstrated possibility of micro-level interventions increasing trust in 
strangers has interesting implications for the field of economic development. Previous 
studies have suggested that ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to bad economic 
outcomes in democratic (Collier 2000) and developed (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) 
countries. Nation-building emphasizing a common language can also prevent the 
negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity (Miguel 2004). However, it should be easier, 
faster, and much less costly to manipulate expectations of cooperative behavior than to 
build a nation with an inclusive common identity, well-functioning democratic 
institutions, and a high GDP per capita. 
People update beliefs about other groups after they get to know their members. 
For intergroup contact to work, this study suggests that we do not need to satisfy all the 
“optimal conditions” specified by the contact hypothesis literature (Allport 1954; 
Pettigrew 1971; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Instead, we can use thousands of different 
ways to encourage intergroup cooperation and indirect reciprocity when intergroup 
contact occurs. Every successful cooperative interaction between individual group 
members will update their stereotypes a little bit and thus contribute to the overall 
improvement of intergroup relations in the long run. 
Members of different groups can meet and cooperate, for example, if they belong 
to the same horizontal social network, such as those built by civil society organizations 
with inclusive membership (Putnam et al. 1993; Varshney 2002). Sometimes, exposure to 
cooperative members of another group can be also mandated from above. For example, 
Beaman et al. (2009) showed that randomly assigned gender quotas across Indian village 
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councils eliminate the negative bias in how male villagers perceive female leaders' 
effectiveness. Racial integration in military forces and schools is another example. 
In addition to engaging in social exchange, for example by helping a member of a 
different ethnic group (Chapter 4), people can signal their cooperative type also by 
symbolic exchange. Malinowski (1926) observed more than 80 years ago that almost 
every ceremonial or religious act in primitive societies was regarded as a duty that one 
individual or social group owed to another individual or social group – not to a deity. By 
fulfilling our other social obligations, we signal that we are trustworthy enough for 
economic exchange as well. One of the recurrent themes in the interviews that I 
conducted in India was that the interviewed Hindus appreciated a lot if Muslims invited 
them to their homes or participated in a Hindu religious festival. 
To what extent stereotypes about cooperativeness can be updated through 
dissemination of information instead of direct experience is an empirical question. There 
is some evidence that learning about acts of cooperation from written sources can reduce 
people’s underestimation of the extent of pro-social behavior. This is why many private 
fundraisers inform potential donors about other people’s contributions (Meier 2006). 
Future field experiments disseminating information about outgroups’ cooperativeness 
through the media or educational campaigns will hopefully measure the effect of mass 
communication on discrimination using the causal link of positive reciprocity. 
A long strand of literature focuses on the effect of monitoring and punishment on 
cooperation. The number of defections usually drops whenever a third party has an ability 
to identify and punish defectors. Consequently, a higher cooperation rate in the present 
caused by credible enforcement should also increase expectations of future cooperation. 
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Chapter 4 suggested that stronger monitoring capacities within groups may explain why 
so many societies have ended up with ingroup bias. However, institutions with an 
authority over more than one group can expand the umbrella of credible enforcement to 
cover intergroup interactions as well. Herreros and Criado (2008, 55) argued that “the 
state can affect the citizen's expectation about other people's trustworthiness by acting as 
a third-party enforcer of agreements.” Which specific state institutions matter? I expect 
institutions supporting the rule of law to be particularly important. As Rothstein and 
Stolle (2008, 445-6) explained: 
“Institutions of law and order have one particularly important task, to detect and 
punish people who break contracts and who therefore should not be trusted. Thus, 
if citizens think that these order institutions do what they are supposed to do in a 
fair, reasonably efficient, and unbiased manner, then they also have reason to 
believe that the chance people will get away with treacherous behavior is 
relatively small. They thus conclude that most people can be trusted.” 
Establishing expectations of generalized reciprocity, political institutions can 
contribute to better relations between groups in multiethnic countries. On the other hand, 
state failure or ethnic bias overtly displayed by the bureaucracy can erode interethnic 
trust. As the example of Tanzania analyzed in Miguel (2004) demonstrates, carefully 
designed state policies can help bridge ethnic differences. However, a strong state power 
can also undermine intergroup trust by purposeful destruction of horizontal networks – as 
Boix and Posner (1998) described in the case of South Italy. 
In order to create generalized expectations of reciprocity, political institutions 
should be regarded as both effective and fair (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). People are 
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more likely to expect cooperation from outgroup members if they can trust the justice 
system to punish defectors. If the police is underfunded and corrupted, or if courts do not 
act in a timely fashion, the state ceases to be an effective arbiter of intergroup disputes. 
State institutions should be also believed to apply law indiscriminately on all citizens, 
regardless of their group membership. Effective but unfair institutions of law may 
persuade members of the politically dominant group that they live in a cooperative world, 
but they will not increase trust among oppressed groups. 
In principle, reciprocity can be generalized to all groups even without state – by 
socialization. If a vast majority of people internalizes the social norms of reciprocity 
(obligation to help someone who has helped us) or general altruism (obligation to help 
others in general), their outgroup partners can expect cooperative behavior even without 
much enforcement. According to Dovidio (1984), social norms of reciprocity and general 
altruism can be sustained by affective feelings of fear, shame, or pride in addition to more 
material rewards (social status) and punishments (social sanctions). 
Let me end by warning against dangers of political and economic inequality that 
can destroy positive reciprocity in the society. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) found that 
people living in a racially mixed neighborhood with a high income disparity are much 
less trustful. A study focused on reciprocal behavior by Phan et al. (2009, 899) made a 
similar conclusion: “Neighborhood deprivation is found to exacerbate the exclusion of 
poorer individuals from informal helping; it also makes it harder for residents to 
reciprocate when they do participate in helping activities.” There are two major reasons 
to expect less cooperation in unequal societies. First, poor people have less resources to 
spend on others. As a result, their partners have less incentive to cooperate with them. 
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Second, inequality allows the powerful to use exploitation as a strategy alternative to 
reciprocity. Gouldner (1960) argued that reciprocity is less essential for people who have 
many alternative resources of the services that they receive from the other side. 
Moreover, members of a subordinate group may not seek punishment of occasional 
defections by members of the dominant group because they cannot afford jeopardizing 
the relationship they depend on. In other words, reciprocity can break down in highly 
unequal societies because the weak have nothing to contribute or they can be easily 
exploited. With social inequality rising in most countries of the world, positive 
reciprocity may become more difficult to achieve both in the slums of Mumbai and in 
developed countries. 
141 
Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Distrust of Muslims 0.43 0.50 0 1 393 
Social Distance (Neighbors) 0.59 0.49 0 1 402 
Social Distance (Marriage) 0.73 0.45 0 1 402 
Bhendi Bazar 0.37 0.48 0 1 401 
Hindu 0.86 0.35 0 1 402 
Age 0.00 9.80 -12.48 27.52 400 
Education 0.00 3.71 -10.64 4.36 396 
Income 0.00 31.43 -19.05 278.95 395 
Extremist Voter 0.34 0.47 0 1 402 
Salience of Marathi Identity 3.62 1.25 1 5 400 
Salience of Hindu Identity 0.87 0.34 0 1 401 
Quantity of Contact 0.17 1.04 -2 2 391 
Quality of Contact -0.15 1.18 -2 2 390 
Status Differential 1.48 2.58 -6 9 383 




Table A.2: Logistic Regression Predicting Distrust of Muslims 
 Generalized Reciprocity and 
Cooperative Hindus groups 
Cooperative Muslims and 
No Reciprocity groups 














Magathane  -0.066 
(0.823) 
  0.910 
(0.617) 
Shivaji Nagar  -0.609 
(0.899) 
  0.821 
(0.850) 
Bhendi Bazar  -1.035. 
(0.609) 
  0.171 
(0.559) 
Hindu  -0.127 
(0.743) 
  0.155 
(0.561) 




Education  -0.150* 
(0.063) 
  0.149. 
(0.088) 
Income   0.008 
(0.007) 
  0.005 
(0.007) 
Extremist Voter   0.736 
(0.661) 
  0.620 
(0.535) 
Intercept -0.174  0.387  0.442 -0.599 
N  90  84  93  85 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table A.3: Logistic Regression Predicting Social Distance 
 Would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor 
Would not accept intermarriage 
with a Muslim 











































Shivaji Nagar   0.572. 
(0.299) 
  0.250 
(0.335) 




Hindu   0.152 
(0.334) 
  0.683* 
(0.338) 












Extremist Voter   0.212 
(0.245) 
  0.189 
(0.276) 
Intercept  0.893***  0.256  1.447***  1.110** 
N  402  386  402  386 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.4: Test of Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
 Would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor 
Would not accept intermarriage 
with a Muslim 














































Extremist Voter   0.612. 
(0.331) 




  0.274 
(0.949) 
 
Hindu*T2  1.335 
(0.996) 
  1.897. 
(0.999) 
 
Hindu*T3  0.595 
(0.987) 





  0.981 
(0.971) 
 
















Intercept  0.486  0.682***  1.477**  1.171*** 
N  402  402  402  402 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.5: Logistic Regression of Social Distance on Altruism 
 Neighbors Intermarriage 
Generalized Reciprocity                -1.470 ** 
               (0.487) 
               -1.355 ** 
               (0.502) 
Cooperative Hindus                -0.321 
               (0.468) 
                0.351 
               (0.519) 
Cooperative Muslims                -0.802 . 
               (0.445) 
               -0.639 
               (0.493) 
Altruism                 0.092 
               (0.151) 
               -0.116 
               (0.176) 
Magathane                 0.829 . 
               (0.497) 
                0.580 
               (0.547) 
Shivaji Nagar                 0.850 
               (0.567) 
                0.313 
               (0.560) 
Bhendi Bazar                -0.456 
               (0.342) 
               -0.764 * 
               (0.364) 
Hindu                -0.086 
               (0.448) 
                0.687 
               (0.460) 
Age                 0.022 
               (0.021) 
                0.004 
               (0.022) 
Education                 0.091 * 
               (0.045) 
               -0.032 
               (0.038) 
Income                 0.004 
               (0.005) 
                0.002 
               (0.005) 
Extremist Voter                -0.277 
               (0.377) 
               -0.148 
               (0.396) 
Intercept                 0.123                 0.730 
N                 177                 177 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. The No Reciprocity group is a 
baseline. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
146 
Table A.6: Linear Regression Predicting Altruism Change Score 
Model (1) (2) 
Generalized Reciprocity                -0.104 
               (0.185) 
               -0.097 
               (0.201) 
Cooperative Hindus                -0.172 
               (0.240) 
               -0.128 
               (0.253) 
Cooperative Muslims                 0.185 
               (0.203) 
                0.125 
               (0.208) 
Magathane                  0.153 
               (0.190) 
Shivaji Nagar                  0.370 
               (0.282) 
Bhendi Bazar                  0.178 
               (0.193) 
Hindu                 -0.005 
               (0.234) 
Age                 -0.012 
               (0.013) 
Education                  0.028 
               (0.023) 
Income                 -0.001 
               (0.002) 
Extremist Voter                  0.177 
               (0.164) 
Intercept               -0.083                -0.401 . 
N                 192                 177 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. The No Reciprocity group is a 
baseline. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.7: Logistic Regression of Social Distance on Social Identity Salience 
 Would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor 
Would not accept intermarriage 
with a Muslim 
















































  0.707. 
(0.395) 
  0.303 
(0.406) 
































































Intercept  0.995* -0.198  1.283*  1.442** 
N  384  384  333  333 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.8: Logistic Regression Predicting Ingroup Favoritism in the Dictator Game 
Model (1) (2) 
Salience of Marathi Identity                -0.023 
               (0.102) 
 
Salience of Hindu Identity                  
 
                0.108 
               (0.237) 
Magathane                 0.963 *** 
               (0.250) 
                0.882 ** 
               (0.278) 
Shivaji Nagar                 0.720 ** 
               (0.241) 
                0.475 . 
               (0.250) 
Bhendi Bazar                 0.413 . 
               (0.238) 
                0.509 . 
               (0.259) 
Hindu                -0.327 . 
               (0.175) 
                
 
Age                -0.012 
               (0.010) 
               -0.014 
               (0.011) 
Education                -0.012 
               (0.020) 
               -0.017 
               (0.021) 
Income                -0.002 
               (0.001) 
               -0.003 . 
               (0.002) 
Extremist Voter                 0.019 
               (0.216) 
               -0.058 
               (0.249) 
Intercept                 1.375 *                 0.965 ** 
N                 175                 144 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. The No Reciprocity group is a 
baseline. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.9: Quantity and Quality of Previous Intergroup Contact 
 Would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor 
Would not accept intermarriage 




















































  0.084 
(0.150) 
Quantity*T1  0.033 
(0.337) 
  0.225 
(0.320) 
 



















Quality*T2   0.289 
(0.305) 
 -1.137 * 
(0.480) 
Quality*T3   0.284 
(0.282) 
  0.044 
(0.283) 




Intercept  0.890 ***  0.907 ***  1.422 ***  1.440 *** 
N  391  390  391  390 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.10: Logistic Regression of Social Distance on Relative Social Status 
 Would not accept a Muslim 
neighbor 
Would not accept 
intermarriage 
T1 (Generalized Reciprocity)                -1.885 *** 
               (0.102) 
               -1.572 *** 
               (0.390) 
T2 (Cooperative Hindus)                -0.918 * 
               (0.412) 
               -0.210 
               (0.423) 
T3 (Cooperative Muslims)                -1.679 *** 
               (0.420) 
               -1.453 *** 
               (0.415) 
T4 (No Reciprocity)                -1.081 ** 
               (0.391) 
               -0.466 
               (0.417) 
Status Differential                 0.126 . 
               (0.075) 
                0.032 
               (0.083) 
Status*T1                 0.035 
               (0.136) 
                0.187 
               (0.140) 
Status*T2                 0.126 
               (0.169) 
                0.039 
               (0.147) 
Status*T3                 0.103 
               (0.129) 
                0.243 . 
               (0.142) 
Status*T4                 0.090 
               (0.134) 
                0.034 
               (0.128) 
Intercept                 0.898 ***                 1.333 *** 
N                 383                 383 
Design-based robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.11: Descriptive Statistics for the Control Group 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Discrimination 0.70 0.36 0 1 840 
Positive Reciprocity 0.37 0.48 0 1 840 
Intergroup Contact 0.16 1.05 -2 2 840 
Negative Reciprocity -0.15 1.13 -2 2 840 
Economic Threat -0.12 1.10 -2 2 838 
Safety Threat -0.24 1.10 -2 2 840 
Relative Group Size 0.10 0.09 0.005 0.19 840 
Relative Group Status -1.95 2.49 -9 8 780 
Shared Hindu Identity 0.50 0.50 0 1 840 
Identity Salience 3.09 1.11 1 5 840 
Education 0.31 2.40 -6.64 4.36 840 
Age 1.73 9.89 -12.48 27.52 840 
Hindu 0.90 0.30 0 1 840 
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Table A.12: Ordinal Logistic Regression Predicting Perceived Threat 
 Economic Threat Safety Threat 
Relative Group Size                 8.297 *** 
               (0.887) 
                9.072 *** 
               (0.917) 
Intergroup Contact                 0.325 * 
               (0.138) 
                0.282 * 
               (0.134) 
Positive Reciprocity                -0.009 
               (0.208) 
                0.086 
               (0.210) 
Negative Reciprocity                 0.450 ** 
               (0.140) 
                0.837 *** 
               (0.147) 
Shared Hindu Identity                -0.207 
               (0.143) 
               -0.848 *** 
               (0.147) 
Relative Group Status                 0.223 *** 
               (0.059) 
                0.144 * 
               (0.059) 
Intercept Y ≥ -1                 3.243 **                 4.371 *** 
Intercept Y ≥ 0                 0.267                 1.484 
Intercept Y ≥ 1                -1.739                -0.506 
Intercept Y ≥ 2                -4.547 ***                -3.614 ** 
N                 778                 780 
Individual-level fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A.13: Number of Respondents per Survey 
Territory 1981-1984 1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007 
Albania  0 0 999 1000 0 
Algeria  0 0 0 1282 0 
Andorra  0 0 0 0 1003 
Argentina  1005 1002 1079 1280 1002 
Armenia  0 0 2000 0 0 
Australia  1228 0 2048 0 1421 
Azerbaijan  0 0 2002 0 0 
Bangladesh  0 0 1525 1500 0 
Belarus  0 1015 2092 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0 0 1200 1200 0 
Brazil  0 1782 1149 0 1500 
Bulgaria  0 0 1072 0 1001 
Burkina Faso  0 0 0 0 1534 
Canada  0 0 0 1931 2164 
Chile  0 1500 1000 1200 1000 
China  0 1000 1500 1000 2015 
Colombia  0 0 6025 0 3025 
Croatia  0 0 1196 0 0 
Cyprus  0 0 0 0 1050 
Czech Republic  0 924 1147 0 0 
Dominican Republic  0 0 417 0 0 
Egypt  0 0 0 3000 3051 
El Salvador  0 0 1254 0 0 
Estonia  0 0 1021 0 0 
Ethiopia  0 0 0 0 1500 
Finland  1003 0 987 0 1014 
France  0 0 0 0 1001 
Georgia  0 0 2008 0 1500 
Germany  0 0 2026 0 2064 
Ghana  0 0 0 0 1534 
Great Britain  0 0 1093 0 1041 
Guatemala  0 0 0 0 1000 
Hong Kong  0 0 0 0 1252 
Hungary  1464 0 650 0 0 
India  0 2500 2040 2002 2001 
Indonesia  0 0 0 1004 2015 
Iran  0 0 0 2532 2667 
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Iraq  0 0 0 2325 2701 
Israel  0 0 0 1199 0 
Italy  0 0 0 0 1012 
Japan  1204 1011 1054 1362 1096 
Jordan  0 0 0 1223 1200 
Kyrgyzstan  0 0 0 1043 0 
Latvia  0 0 1200 0 0 
Lithuania  0 0 1009 0 0 
Macedonia  0 0 995 1055 0 
Malaysia  0 0 0 0 1201 
Mali  0 0 0 0 1534 
Mexico  1837 1531 2364 1535 1560 
Moldova  0 0 984 1008 1046 
Morocco  0 0 0 2264 1200 
Netherlands  0 0 0 0 1050 
New zealand  0 0 1201 0 954 
Nigeria  0 1001 1996 2022 0 
Norway  0 0 1127 0 1025 
Pakistan  0 0 733 2000 0 
Peru  0 0 1211 1501 1500 
Philippines  0 0 1200 1200 0 
Poland  0 938 1153 0 1000 
Puerto Rico  0 0 1164 720 0 
Romania  0 0 1239 0 1776 
Russian Federation  0 1961 2040 0 2033 
Rwanda  0 0 0 0 1507 
Saudi Arabia  0 0 0 1502 0 
Serbia  0 0 0 0 1220 
Serbia and Montenegro  0 0 1520 2260 0 
Singapore  0 0 0 1512 0 
Slovakia  0 466 1095 0 0 
Slovenia  0 0 1007 0 1037 
South Africa  1596 2736 2935 3000 2988 
South Korea  970 1251 1249 1200 1200 
Spain  0 1510 1211 1209 1200 
Sweden  0 0 1009 1015 1003 
Switzerland  0 1400 1212 0 1241 
Taiwan  0 0 780 0 1227 
Tanzania  0 0 0 1171 0 
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Thailand  0 0 0 0 1534 
Trinidad and Tobago  0 0 0 0 1002 
Turkey  0 1030 1907 3401 1346 
Uganda  0 0 0 1002 0 
Ukraine  0 0 2811 0 1000 
United States  0 0 1542 1200 1249 
Uruguay  0 0 1000 0 1000 
Venezuela  0 0 1200 1200 0 
Vietnam  0 0 0 1000 1495 
Zambia  0 0 0 0 1500 
Zimbabwe  0 0 0 1002 0 
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Table A.14: Descriptive Statistics of the World Values Survey Data 
Variable Mean SD Min Max N 
Public Goods 7.59 2.04 0 9 218588 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.40 0.23 0 0.93 254493 
Trust 0.27 0.44 0 1 246798 
Acceptance of Bribe 1.77 1.79 1 10 243824 
Male 0.48 0.50 0 1 252941 
Age 40.31 15.91 14 99 247978 
Education 4.41 2.33 1 8 230283 
Income 4.51 2.39 1 10 226003 
Married 0.58 0.49 0 1 253001 
Church Attendance 3.62 2.58 0 7 238981 
Confidence in Government 2.51 0.68 0.35 5.03 248053 
Tax Revenue 15.47 6.46 0.23 49.1 176388 




Table A.15: Multilevel Model of Willingness to Contribute to Public Goods 
Ethnic Frac.                -0.342 ** 
               (0.119) 
Trust                -0.069 ** 
               (0.024) 
E. F. * Trust                 0.090 . 
               (0.051) 
Acceptance of Bribe                -0.509 *** 
               (0.003) 
Male                -0.087 *** 
               (0.010) 
Age                 0.010 *** 
               (0.000) 
Education                 0.015 *** 
               (0.003) 
Income                -0.006 * 
               (0.003) 
Married                 0.104 *** 
               (0.011) 
Church Attendance                 0.032 *** 
               (0.002) 
Confidence in Government                 0.143 *** 
               (0.009) 
Tax Revenue                 0.008 
               (0.004) 
Democracy                -0.002 
               (0.004) 
Intercept                 7.573 *** 
N (individuals)                 103848 
N (regions)                 841 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
. p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix B: Questionnaire Used in India 
 
q1: “Can you read and write in Marathi?” 
Answers: 1. Yes. / 0. No. 
 
q2: “Your access to water is from:” 
Answers: 1. Individual tap. / 2. Shared tap. / 3. Stand post. / 4. No access to water where 
you live. 
 
q3: “You usually use:” 
Answers: 1. An individual toilet. / 2. A common toilet in your building. / 3. A pay to use 
toilet. / 4. A free public toilet. / 5. No toilet. 
 
q4: “Was your garbage collected at least once in the last 7 days?” 
Answers: 1. Yes. / 0. No. / 999. Don't know. 
 
“In the past six months, have community members from your neighborhood organized 
community efforts to...” 
q5: ...distribute water? 
q6: ...build, maintain or clean public toilets? 
q7: ...organize garbage collection for this area? 
Answers: 1. Yes. / 0. No. / 999. Don't know. 
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q8: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need 
to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Answers: 1. Most people can be trusted. / 0. Need to be very careful. 
 
“I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from 
various groups. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not 






Answers: -2. No trust at all. / -1. Not very much trust. / 1. Some trust. / 2. A lot of trust. 
 
“In the past twelve months, which people, if any, have helped you directly by giving you 
money or some of their time?” 








“In the past twelve months, for which people, if any, have you helped directly by giving 
some of your money or time?” 







“How often do you have informal talks with...?” 







“How often have you been taken advantage of by... ?” 
Answers: -2. Never / -1. Seldom. / 0. Occasionally. / 1. Often. / 2. Very often. 
q29: a Maharashtrian. 
q30: a Muslim. 
q31: a Gujarati. 
q32: a Bihari. 
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q33: a Parsi. 
 
“How often have you been treated as inferior by...?” 
Answers: -2. Never / -1. Seldom. / 0. Occasionally. / 1. Often. / 2. Very often. 
q34: a Maharashtrian. 
q35: a Muslim. 
q36: a Gujarati. 
q37: a Bihari. 
q38: a Parsi. 
 
q39: If it was up to you, would you accept a Maharashtrian to close kinship by marriage? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q40: If it was up to you, would you accept a Muslim to close kinship by marriage? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q41: If it was up to you, would you accept a Gujarati to close kinship by marriage? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q42: If it was up to you, would you accept a Bihari to close kinship by marriage? 




q43: If it was up to you, would you accept a Parsi to close kinship by marriage? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q44: If it was up to you, would you accept a Maharashtrian as a neighbor? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q45: If it was up to you, would you accept a Muslim as a neighbor? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q46: If it was up to you, would you accept a Gujarati as a neighbor? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q47: If it was up to you, would you accept a Bihari as a neighbor? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q48: If it was up to you, would you accept a Parsi as a neighbor? 
Answers: Answers: 0. Yes. / 1. No. 
 
q49: “How often do you lend personal possessions (for example bicycle, mobile phone, 
clothes, etc.) to your relatives, friends, and other people?” 




q50: “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair?” 
Answers: 0. Would take advantage. / 1. Would try to be fair. 
 
q51. “How much confidence do you have in the police?” 
Answers: -2. No confidence at all. / -1. Not very much confidence. / 0. Some confidence. 
/ 1. Quite a lot of confidence. / 2. A great deal of confidence. 
 
q52: “How successful do you think the government in India is nowadays in controlling 
crime?” 
Answers: -2. Very unsuccessful. / -1. Quite unsuccessful. / 0. Neither unsuccessful, nor 
successful. / 1. Quite successful. / 2. Very successful. 
 
q53: “In your opinion, how often do elected public officials and civil servants deal fairly 
with people like you?” 
Answers: 2. Almost always. / 1. Often. / 0. Occasionally. / -1. Seldom. / -2. Almost never. 
 
q54: “Please tell me whether you think avoiding a fare on public transport can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between.” 
Answers: 1. Always justified. / 2. Often justified. / 3. Occasionally justified. / 4. Seldom 




q55: “Think of this ladder as representing where people stand in India. At the top of the 
ladder are the people who are the best off, those who have the most money, most 
education, and the most respected jobs. At the bottom are the people who are the worst 
off, those who have the least money, least education, and worst jobs or no job. The higher 
up you are on this ladder, the closer you are to the people at the very top. The lower you 
are, the closer to the people at the very bottom you are. Where would you place the 
Maharashtrians on this ladder, relative to other people in India?” 
Answers: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 
 
q56: „Where would you place Muslims?“ 
Answers: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 
 
q57: „Where would you place Gujaratis?“ 
Answers: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 
 
q58: „Where would you place Biharis?“ 
Answers: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 / 9 / 10 
 
q59: „Where would you place Parsis?“ 





Question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” 
Answers: -2. Disagree strongly. / -1. Disagree. / 0. Neither agree, nor disagree. / 1. Agree. 
/ 2. Agree strongly. 
q60. Maharashtrians take jobs away from people like me. 
q61. Muslims take jobs away from people like me. 
q62. Gujaratis take jobs away from people like me. 
q63. Biharis take jobs away from people like me. 
q64. Parsis take jobs away from people like me. 
 
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” 
Answers: -2. Disagree strongly. / -1. Disagree. / 0. Neither agree, nor disagree. / 1. Agree. 
/ 2. Agree strongly. 
q65. Maharashtrians increase crime rates. 
q66. Muslims increase crime rates. 
q67. Gujaratis increase crime rates. 
q68. Biharis increase crime rates. 
q69. Parsis increase crime rates. 
 
q70: “We are all parts of different groups. People may feel different degrees of 
attachment to their groups. Please tell me how attached you feel to India.” 
Answers: 5. Very attached. / 4. Fairly attached. / 3. Somewhere in between. / 2. Not very 
attached. / 1. Not at all attached.  
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q71: “Please tell me how attached you feel to Maharashtra.” 
Answers: 5. Very attached. / 4. Fairly attached. / 3. Somewhere in between. / 2. Not very 
attached. / 1. Not at all attached.  
 
q72: “How often do you pray?” 
Answers: 1. Daily. / 2. Weekly. / 3. Only on festivals. / 4. Never. 
 
q73: “In what year were you born?” 
Answers: [number] 
 
q74: “In which state and district were you born?” 
Answers: [text] 
 
q76: “In what year did you come to this neighborhood?” 
Answers: [number] 
 





5. Other or no religion. 
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q78: “What is your Jati / caste / tribe name?” 
Answers: [text] 
 
q79: “What language do you normally speak at home?” 
Answers: Marathi. / Hindi. / Gujarati. / Other. 
 
q80: “How many years of schooling have you had?” 
Answers: [number] 
 
q81: “What was the total income of your household last month, putting together the 
income of all members of the household? Write in the number of Rupees.” 
Answers: [number] 
 
q82: “Now I will ask you about the last Lok Sabha elections held in 2009? I mean the MP 
elections for electing the Central Government in Delhi. Which political party did you 
vote for?” 
1. Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). 
2. Bahujan Vikas Aghadi (BVA). 
3. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
4. Indian National Congress (INC). 
5. Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS). 
6. Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). 
7. Samajwadi Party (SP). 
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8. Shivsena (SHS). 
9. Swabhimani Paksha (SWP). 
10. Other political party or independent candidate. 
11. Did not vote. 
12. Does not remember. 
 
q83: “Do you have any acquaintances in Dadar?” 
Answers: 1. Yes. / 0. No. 
 
q84: “Do you have any acquaintances in Bhendi Bazar?” 
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